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VALUATIONS IN FINANCIAL REPORTING VALUATION ADVISORY 4: VALUATION OF CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION



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VFR Valuation Advisory #4

Valuation of Contingent Consideration

This communication is for the purpose of issuing voluntary guidance on recognized valuation methods and techniques.

Date Issued: February 14, 2019

Application: Business Valuation

Summary: When negotiating the purchase price of a business, contingent consideration is often used to bridge the price gap between what the seller would like to receive and what the buyer would like to pay. More generally, a portion of the purchase consideration may be contingent on the outcome of future events. For example, additional consideration may be paid if the acquired business meets certain targets (such as future revenue, margin, or profit targets), passes regulatory reviews, has successful litigation outcomes, meets covenants, or completes product development.

The valuation of contingent consideration is inherently challenging due to dependence on the occurrence of future events and the often complex structure of the payoff functions. It has also been an area for which limited guidance exists, therefore making it a suitable topic for an undertaking such as this one.

Valuation specialists strive to provide reasonably consistent and supportable fair value conclusions. To this end, it is believed that guidance regarding best practices on certain specific valuation topics would be helpful. The Appraisal Foundation selects topics based on those in which the greatest diversity of practice has been observed. To date, The Appraisal Foundation has issued three prior Valuations in Financial Reporting (VFR) Advisories as follows: VFR Advisory #1, *The Identification of Contributory Assets and Calculation of Economic Rents* (May 31, 2010); VFR Advisory #2, *The Valuation of Customer Related Assets* (June 15, 2016), and VFR Advisory #3, *The Measurement and Application of Market Participant Acquisition Premiums* (September 6, 2017).

The Appraisal Foundation wishes to express its utmost gratitude to the Working Group on *Valuation of Contingent Consideration* for volunteering their time and expertise in contributing to this Advisory. Specifically, sincere thanks to the following individuals:

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The views set forth in this Advisory are the collective views of the members of this Working Group and do not necessarily reflect the views of any of the firms that the Working Group members are associated with.

This Advisory was approved for publication by the Board of Trustees of The Appraisal Foundation on February 14, 2019. The reader is informed that the Board of Trustees defers to the members of the Working Group for expertise concerning the technical content of the document.

Valuation of Contingent Consideration

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Section 1: Introduction

1 This document (Valuation in Financial Reporting Advisory #4, hereinafter referred to as the Valuation
2 Advisory), entitled *Valuation of Contingent Consideration*, is the result of deliberations by the
3 Working Group on Contingent Consideration (the fourth Working Group in the “Best Practices for
4 Valuations in Financial Reporting: Intangible Asset Working Group” series) and was developed with
5 input received from interested parties.

6 As part of the initial recognition and measurement requirements under Financial Accounting Standards
7 Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 805 – Business Combinations (ASC
8 805) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Standard 3 *Business Combinations*
9 (Revised) (IFRS 3R), contingent consideration included in a business combination must be measured
10 at fair value as of the acquisition date. The purpose of this Valuation Advisory is to outline best
11 practices in the valuation of contingent consideration for financial reporting purposes pursuant to ASC
12 805 and IFRS 3R. While there may be differences in the accounting related to contingent consideration
13 under ASC 805 and IFRS 3R, the valuation principles for estimating the fair value of contingent
14 consideration described in this Valuation Advisory are the same. The guidance in this document may
15 also be applicable to estimating the fair value of contingent consideration for other purposes, including
16 FASB ASC Topic 946 Financial Services—Investment Companies (ASC 946), as will be discussed
17 in Section 2.

18 This Valuation Advisory is not intended to provide guidance on the accounting for contingent
19 consideration. References to accounting concepts or rules used to provide context within this
20 Valuation Advisory are specific to United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S.
21 GAAP), unless noted otherwise.

22 ASC 805 and IFRS 3R define contingent consideration as usually being an obligation of the acquirer
23 to transfer additional assets or equity interests to the former owners of the acquiree as part of the
24 exchange for control of the acquiree if specified future events occur or conditions are met (an
25 “earnout”). However, contingent consideration also may give the acquirer the right to claw back
26 previously transferred consideration if specified conditions are met (a “clawback”).

27 1.1 Scope

28 The following discussion on the valuation of contingent consideration for financial reporting purposes
29 requires an understanding of relevant accounting and valuation concepts. In-depth discussion of these
30 concepts is beyond the scope of this Valuation Advisory and the reader is assumed to have a general
31 understanding of these concepts. Specifically, the reader is assumed to have knowledge of relevant
32 accounting and valuation concepts as they relate to the valuation of assets and liabilities for financial
33 reporting purposes.

34 The Working Group recognizes professional judgment is critical in effectively planning, performing,
35 and concluding a valuation. Professional judgment requires a process of fact-gathering, research, and
36 analysis to reach well-reasoned conclusions based on relevant facts and circumstances available at the
37 measurement date. Due to the nature of judgments, questioning and skepticism are appropriate. Even
38 then, knowledgeable, reasonable, objective individuals can reach different conclusions for a given set
39 of facts and circumstances.

40 The following important clarifications regarding this document are also made:

- 41 a) These best practices have been developed with reference to U.S. GAAP and IFRS effective as
42 of the date this document was published. While the Working Group believes the best practices

43 described herein may have application outside of U.S. GAAP and IFRS, valuation specialists
44 should not apply these best practices to valuations prepared under different standards/statutory
45 requirements without a thorough understanding of the differences between those standards and
46 U.S. GAAP and IFRS existing as of the date of this publication.

47 b) The discussions and examples in this Valuation Advisory make specific assumptions for
48 illustrative purposes only. While general principles have been provided for guidance to assist
49 in the valuation of contingent consideration, assumptions used in the valuation of any asset or
50 liability should be based on situation-specific facts and circumstances.

51 c) The models used in the sample calculations are for illustrative purposes only and are not
52 intended to represent the only form of model, calculation, or final report exhibit that is
53 generally considered acceptable among valuation specialists.

54 d) The methods discussed in this Valuation Advisory are not intended to represent an exhaustive
55 list; additional methods exist and may be developed in the future.

56 This document provides guidance related to valuation techniques that are used to value contingent
57 consideration and includes detailed discussion of the following topics:

58 a) Fair value of contingent consideration and relevant concepts

59 b) Identification of typical structures of contingent consideration and key valuation issues

60 c) Valuation methodologies used to estimate the fair value of contingent consideration that are
61 viewed to be representative of best practice, including

62 (1) Strengths and weaknesses of each methodology

63 (2) Applicability of methods

64 (3) Practical solutions or alternatives where appropriate

65 d) Methods for assessing the reasonableness of contingent consideration fair value estimates

66 e) Additional considerations related to any updates of the fair value of contingent consideration
67 at subsequent measurement dates.

68 This Valuation Advisory include examples of several techniques relevant to the valuation of
69 contingent consideration. Each example provides a set of facts and circumstances to demonstrate the
70 associated valuation techniques discussed.

71 **1.2 Intended Users**

72 The intended users of this document are financial statement issuers, valuation specialists, auditors, and
73 other interested parties.

74 **1.3 Motivations for Structuring Contingent Consideration**

75 As part of a business combination, companies may structure a portion of the purchase consideration
76 contingent on the future performance of the acquired business or post-acquisition events. Contingent
77 consideration can arise out of transaction negotiations for many reasons, including:

- 78 • Bridging the valuation gap – The buyer and seller may have differences of opinion regarding
79 the outlook and associated risks for the acquired business or regarding the likelihood of certain
80 post-acquisition events. The buyer may be unwilling to pay for value perceived by the seller's
81 typically more optimistic outlook. This gap can be bridged by agreeing on an upfront price
82 consistent with the buyer's perception of the outlook and risk, while providing for a contingent
83 payment in the future if the seller's more optimistic outlook is achieved.

- 84 • Alternative financing – The buyer and seller could use contingent consideration to defer a
85 portion of the purchase consideration to a later date when the buyer will have greater financial
86 ability to pay as the business performs.
- 87 • Incentive for management – If the sellers have the opportunity to remain involved with or help
88 contribute to the future success of the business, contingent consideration can be used to help
89 incentivize and motivate the sellers to help the business meet certain targets.
- 90 • Sharing of risk and reward – Contingent consideration, whether an earnout or clawback, can
91 provide a mechanism for the buyer and seller to shift and allocate risk by enabling the seller to
92 share in the risk and reward related to future performance.

93 According to studies in recent years, the percentage of deals for private company targets that include
94 contingent consideration is in the range of 19% to 38%, but can reach as high as 75% in industries
95 such as biotech and pharmaceuticals.¹

96 **1.4 Motivation for Providing a Guide for the Valuation of Contingent Consideration**

97 Valuation of contingent consideration can be challenging. Contingent consideration assets or liabilities
98 are rarely traded and contingent consideration structures are often unique, making finding comparable
99 traded assets or liabilities impractical. Contingent consideration is often related to the cash flows of
100 the business, but the typical option-like, leveraged structures make it difficult to assess the appropriate
101 discount rate to properly account for the risk of the contingent payments.

102 As a result, valuation of contingent consideration has been a subject of significant diversity in practice.
103 Some valuation specialists use a simple probability-weighted methodology, but are not able to offer
104 good support for what discount rate to use. Others use option-based models, which may be considered
105 complex, lacking in transparency or difficult to understand.

106 The Working Group has explored various types of prevailing valuation methodologies and analyzed
107 the strengths and weaknesses of each. In the process, we have gained an appreciation for the
108 complexity of the issues surrounding contingent consideration valuation and a deeper understanding
109 of how fundamental valuation principles should affect the choice and implementation of valuation
110 methodology for contingent consideration.

111 **1.5 Recommendations for Contingent Consideration Valuation Methods**

112 For valuing contingent consideration, the market approach is rarely used due to the lack of an active
113 trading market that provides reliable indications of value. The cost approach is also typically not
114 appropriate, since typically there is no obvious way to estimate a replacement cost and the cost
115 approach does not consider future expectations. The Working Group has observed two income
116 approach methods for valuing contingent consideration commonly used by valuation specialists:

- 117 • In the Scenario-Based Method (SBM, see Section 5.3), the valuation specialist identifies
118 multiple outcomes, probability weights these outcomes to arrive at an expected payoff cash
119 flow, and discounts the expected payoff cash flow at an appropriate rate. The SBM discount
120 rate addresses the time value of money (risk-free rate) over the relevant time horizon, Required
121 Metric Risk Premium,² the contingent consideration payoff structure, and any counterparty
122 credit risk.

¹ See the American Bar Association's 2017 Private Target Deal Points Study, SRS Acquiom's 2018 M&A Deal Terms Study, and Houlihan Lokey's 2014 Purchase Price Allocation Study.

² A "metric" is a quantifiable measurement unit or an event defined in the contingent consideration agreement, the value or occurrence of which will affect the amount of the contingent consideration to be paid (see Section 3.1). The Required Metric Risk Premium is a

123 • In the Option Pricing Method (OPM, see Section 5.4), the valuation specialist applies an
124 appropriate discount rate to the relevant forecast in order to establish a risk-neutral forecast
125 distribution for the metric underlying the contingent consideration, estimates the expected
126 payoff cash flow in this risk-neutral framework, and then discounts the risk-neutral expected
127 payoff cash flow at the risk-free rate over the relevant time horizon, adjusted for any
128 counterparty credit risk.

129 Other methods also may exist or be developed in the future.

130 No single method for valuing contingent consideration appears to be superior in all respects and
131 circumstances. Each method has merits and challenges, the methods differ in level of complexity, and
132 there are trade-offs in selecting one method over the other.

133 However, the Working Group has concluded that there are contingent consideration types for which
134 each of these income approach methods is typically most appropriate. As described in more detail in
135 the remainder of this Valuation Advisory, the Working Group recommends the following to select a
136 method for valuing contingent consideration:

- 137 a) If the risk of the underlying metric is diversifiable (see Section 4.3), e.g., achievement of a
138 product development milestone, choose SBM
- 139 b) If the payoff structure is linear (e.g., a fixed percentage of revenues or earnings before interest,
140 tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) with no thresholds, caps, or tiers, see Section
141 3.2.1), choose SBM
- 142 c) If the risk of the underlying metric is non-diversifiable *and* the payoff structure has thresholds,
143 caps, tiers, or other nonlinearities, choose OPM
- 144 d) If the payoff structure is path dependent (e.g., a carry-forward feature, a catch-up provision or
145 a multi-year cap) or is based on multiple interdependent metrics (see Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3),
146 choose SBM or OPM as recommended above, using a technique that can handle these
147 complexities (such as Monte Carlo simulation).

148 The Working Group does not recommend the use of SBM for nonlinear payoff structures involving a
149 metric with non-diversifiable risk. In this situation, the SBM discount rate would have to be adjusted
150 to account for the impact of the nonlinear payoff structure. However, the magnitude of the discount
151 rate adjustment cannot be easily intuited and the Working Group is not aware of any reasonable “rules
152 of thumb” for developing such adjustments. It is for this reason that OPM is recommended over SBM
153 in this situation.

154 Whether applied to the expected payoff cash flow (as in SBM) or to create a risk-neutral expected
155 payoff cash flow (as in OPM), the discount rate should incorporate a risk premium *associated with*
156 *and appropriate to the underlying metric* for the contingent consideration. The Required *Metric* Risk
157 Premium will often differ from the risk premium used to value the associated business, due to
158 differences in risk between the underlying metric (such as revenue or EBITDA) and the long-term free
159 cash flows of the business. For example, the long-term free cash flows of the business are generally
160 riskier than revenues, due to a difference in leverage. Thus, even for a linear payoff structure, the
161 contingent consideration discount rate will often differ from the weighted average cost of capital
162 (WACC) and from the transaction internal rate of return (IRR).

measure of the excess return above the risk-free rate, or risk premium, that investors would demand to bear the non-diversifiable risk associated with an investment in the metric over the duration of the earnout, as discussed in Section 5.2.2.

163 The valuation of contingent consideration considers the value from the perspective of a market
164 participant in a hypothetical sale or transfer of a contingent consideration asset (or liability) on a
165 *standalone* basis post-transaction, i.e., separate from the related business and with the related business
166 under the new ownership of the actual buyer. For this reason, no matter which valuation methodology
167 is selected, all synergies relevant to the calculation of the payoff, *including buyer-specific synergies*,
168 are generally included in the financial projections for the contingent consideration valuation.³

169 The remainder of this Valuation Advisory provides background information, key concepts, reasons
170 for the recommendations above, additional and more detailed implementation recommendations, and
171 examples and illustrations.

³ Buyer-specific synergies are included unless excluded from or irrelevant to the definition of the metric underlying the contingent consideration.

Section 2: Accounting Background

172 2.1 Consideration Transferred in Business Combinations

173 From the acquirer's perspective in a business combination, ASC 805 and IFRS 3R require the
174 recognition and measurement of the fair value (with limited exceptions) of identifiable assets acquired
175 (including financial assets, fixed assets, intangible assets, and contingent assets), liabilities assumed
176 (including financial liabilities and contingent liabilities), any consideration transferred, and any
177 noncontrolling interest and/or previously held equity interest in the acquiree. The consideration
178 transferred includes contingent consideration, which is required to be measured at fair value on the
179 acquisition date. As mentioned previously, while the *valuation principles* for estimating the fair value
180 of contingent consideration should be the same, there are differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS
181 regarding under what circumstances contingent consideration must be measured at fair value. For
182 example, the guidance in ASC 805 and IFRS 3R require an acquirer to classify contingent
183 consideration as an asset, a liability, or equity based on U.S. GAAP or IFRS, respectively. Differences
184 in the related U.S. GAAP or IFRS might cause differences in the initial classification and, therefore,
185 might cause differences in the subsequent accounting. Discussion of these accounting differences is
186 beyond the scope of this document.

187 Furthermore, while the details of the acquirer's accounting classification of contingent consideration
188 is beyond the scope of this document, for financial reporting purposes under U.S. GAAP a contingent
189 consideration arrangement that requires payment from the buyer to the seller in cash or assets will
190 generally result in classification as a liability, while settlement required in the acquirer's shares may
191 be classified as either a liability or as equity depending on the structure of the arrangement. Similarly,
192 a contingent consideration arrangement that requires payment from the seller to the buyer in cash or
193 assets will generally result in an asset classification.

194 From the seller's perspective, estimating the fair value of contingent consideration may also be
195 necessary for financial reporting purposes. For instance, pursuant to ASC 946, an investment company
196 may be required to estimate the fair value of assets it holds related to contractual rights arising from
197 contingent consideration arrangements. Similarly, if a non-investment company sells an investment
198 and contingent consideration is part of the structure, the company may also need to determine the fair
199 value of the contingent consideration. Note that the seller's accounting for contingent consideration
200 and determining whether it will be measured at fair value at initial recognition and at subsequent
201 reporting dates is beyond the scope of this Valuation Advisory.

202 It should be noted that contingent payments in a business combination sometimes have characteristics
203 (such as being contingent on an employee's continued employment) that might imply that the
204 payments are compensatory for post-combination services. Depending on facts and circumstances,
205 such payments may be accounted for as post-combination employment compensation expense and not
206 as part of the consideration transferred in the business combination. The specific accounting rules for
207 determining whether a contingent payment is considered compensation expense or contingent
208 consideration to be included in the consideration transferred are beyond the scope of this Valuation
209 Advisory.

210 It is common for a portion of the purchase price in a business combination to be held in escrow to
211 cover items such as working capital adjustments or possible payments related to the seller's
212 satisfaction of representations and warranties. The specific accounting rules for determining whether
213 an escrow payment is contingent consideration are beyond the scope of this guide. However, given
214 that the definition of contingent consideration is an obligation to make a payment "if specified future

215 events occur or conditions are met,” then if the release of the escrow payment is contingent on whether
216 specified *future* events occur or conditions are met, the escrow payment may be considered contingent
217 consideration. On the other hand, if the release of the escrow payment is contingent on verifying
218 conditions *that existed at the acquisition date*, generally, the escrow payment would not be considered
219 contingent consideration. Although typically escrow payments for general representations and
220 warranties and working capital adjustments fall into the latter category and are not considered to be
221 contingent consideration, the specific terms of the agreement should be reviewed before making such
222 a determination.

223 2.2 Fair Value Concepts

224 ASC 820 and IFRS 13 define fair value as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to
225 transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.

226 These standards also provide a framework for developing fair value measurements. A fair value
227 measurement assumes that the asset or liability is exchanged in an orderly transaction between market
228 participants to sell the asset or transfer the liability at the measurement date under current market
229 conditions. According to ASC 820 and IFRS 13:

- 230 • An orderly transaction is a transaction that assumes exposure to the market for a period prior
231 to the measurement dates to allow for marketing activities that are usual and customary for
232 transactions involving such assets or liabilities; it is not a forced transaction (for example, a
233 forced liquidation or distressed sale).
- 234 • The transaction to sell the asset or transfer the liability is a hypothetical transaction at the
235 measurement date, considered from the perspective of a market participant that holds the asset
236 or owes the liability.

237 Therefore, the objective of a fair value measurement is to estimate the price at which an orderly
238 transaction would take place between market participants under the market conditions that exist at the
239 measurement date.

240 While contingent consideration typically represents an obligation of the acquirer, it is appropriate to
241 think about valuing the contingent consideration based on the value of the corresponding asset. This
242 is supported by the following guidance:

- 243 • ASC 820-10-35-16B states, “When a quoted price for the transfer of an identical or a similar
244 liability or instrument classified in a reporting entity’s shareholders’ equity is not available and
245 the identical item is held by another party as an asset, a reporting entity shall measure the fair
246 value of the liability or equity instrument from the perspective of a market participant that
247 holds the identical item as an asset at the measurement date.”⁴
- 248 • ASC 820-10-35-16BB states, “In such cases, a reporting entity shall measure the fair value of
249 the liability or equity instrument as follows:
 - 250 a) Using the quoted price in an active market for the identical item held by another party
251 as an asset, if that price is available
 - 252 b) If that price is not available, using other observable inputs, such as the quoted price in
253 a market that is not active for the identical item held by another party as an asset
 - 254 c) If the observable prices in (a) and (b) are not available, using another valuation
255 technique, such as:

⁴ Similar guidance is provided in IFRS 13:37.

- 256 (1) An income approach (for example, a present value technique that takes into account
257 the future cash flows that a market participant would expect to receive from holding
258 the liability or equity instrument as an asset; see paragraph 820-10-55-3F)
- 259 (2) A market approach (for example, using quoted market prices for similar liabilities
260 or instruments classified as shareholders' equity held by other parties as assets; see
261 paragraph 820-10-55-3A).”⁵

262 Below is a list of additional considerations pursuant to this fair value framework:

- 263 • Fair value hierarchy and level of inputs – ASC 820 and IFRS 13 provide a hierarchy of inputs
264 to be used in fair value measurements. Available observable inputs should be prioritized over
265 unobservable inputs. Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs, which can include assumptions
266 related to prospective financial information, probabilities of events occurring, and estimated
267 volatility. Given the lack of quoted prices for identical or similar types of arrangements, the
268 fair value measurement of contingent consideration will likely involve a significant number of
269 Level 3 inputs.
- 270 • Unit of account – The unit of account is the level at which the asset or liability is aggregated
271 or disaggregated for recognition purposes. Contingent consideration arrangements with
272 multiple elements may be determined to be a single unit of account or multiple units of account
273 depending on facts and circumstances, and such determination may require significant
274 professional judgment. Guidance on the application of this accounting concept to contingent
275 consideration arrangements is beyond the scope of this Valuation Advisory.
- 276 • Principal and most advantageous market – Typically, there will be no observable or principal
277 market for the contingent consideration arrangement; thus, the reporting entity will need to
278 identify a most likely market based on assumptions that would be made by market participants
279 (i.e. the most advantageous market).
- 280 • Market participants – According to ASC 820 and IFRS 13, market participants are:
 - 281 a) Independent of each other (that is, they are not related parties)
 - 282 b) Knowledgeable, having a reasonable understanding about the asset or liability and the
283 transaction using all available information, including information that might be obtained
284 through due diligence efforts that are usual and customary
 - 285 c) Able to enter into a transaction for the asset or liability
 - 286 d) Willing to enter into a transaction for the asset or liability (that is, they are motivated but
287 not forced or otherwise compelled to do so).

288 The reporting entity will need to determine the characteristics of the market participants and
289 identify the assumptions that those market participants would consider when valuing the
290 contingent consideration. See Section 4.1 for further discussion of market participant
291 assumptions.

⁵ Similar guidance is provided in IFRS 13:38.

Section 3: Characterizing Contingent Consideration

292 Buyers and sellers commonly use contingent consideration when they cannot reach agreement on the
293 consideration to be paid for the acquired business, to mitigate the risk of the business not meeting
294 future performance expectations, to incent the sellers to help the business meet post-close targets
295 established by the buyer, and/or to allow the sellers to share in the upside potential. While contingent
296 consideration arrangements are often used to achieve similar purposes and exhibit certain common
297 characteristics, contingent consideration structures observed in practice come in many different forms
298 that are designed to address the unique risks associated with each specific transaction. An earnout⁶
299 may be broadly characterized by the choice of the underlying metric or event which triggers the
300 payment, the structure or payoff of the earnout, and the means by which the earnout is ultimately
301 settled.

302 3.1 Underlying Metric(s)

303 In this Valuation Advisory, the terms “underlying metric” and “metric”⁷ refer to a measurement unit
304 defined in the contingent consideration agreement, the value of which will (in some cases in
305 conjunction with the value of other metrics, occurrence or non-occurrence of specified events, or other
306 terms of the agreement) determine the amount of the contingent consideration to be paid. Typically,
307 an earnout metric will be a quantifiable measure the parties can use to track, monitor and assess the
308 success or failure of the acquired business, post-acquisition.

309 The metric(s) chosen by buyers and sellers when structuring an earnout is a key consideration when
310 valuing that earnout. Not only does an earnout derive its value from the underlying metric, but the
311 metric may provide the valuation specialist with useful insights as to the rationale for incorporating
312 the earnout in the transaction. For example, the metric may be indicative of the risks that the buyer
313 and seller designed the earnout to mitigate, or of the areas of the business that the seller has the most
314 ability to positively influence post-transaction. Ideally, the chosen metric(s) would represent the future
315 performance of the acquired business in a manner that is easily defined and objectively measurable.

316 Typical metrics include:

- 317 • Financial metrics: revenue (in some cases in conjunction with minimum gross margin
318 conditions), EBITDA, net income, and business metrics such as number of units sold, rental
319 occupancy rates, etc.⁸
- 320 • Nonfinancial milestone events: regulatory approvals, resolution of legal disputes, execution of
321 certain commercial contracts or retention of customers, closing of a future transaction,
322 achievement of technical milestones (such as completion of a product launch, a stage of
323 product development, certain software integration tasks, or a construction project), etc.

324 Occasionally, there are terms or metrics in a contingent consideration arrangement related to employee
325 retention. As noted in Section 2, for financial reporting purposes under ASC 805, payments that are
326 contingent on retention of employees are often classified as post-combination compensation expense

⁶ Clawbacks often have similar structures to earnouts but are generally paid by the seller to the buyer in cases of poor performance or occurrence of downside events. To simplify the exposition in this Valuation Advisory, most of the examples and discussion will be couched in terms of earnouts. Section 6 addresses discount rate and counterparty credit risk issues specific to clawbacks.

⁷ The terms “underlying metric” and “metric” will be used interchangeably in this Valuation Advisory.

⁸ Business metrics such as these, while not typically categorized as “financial metrics,” are often closely related to financial metrics. The discussions in the remainder of this Valuation Advisory about financial metrics are also generally applicable to business metrics.

327 rather than as contingent consideration. The specific accounting rules related to this determination are
328 beyond the scope of this Valuation Advisory.

329 The choice of the underlying metric will affect the riskiness of the contingent consideration payoff
330 cash flow and therefore the relevant discount rate. For example, as explained in Section 4.3, the risk
331 associated with certain nonfinancial milestone events (such as an earnout contingent on regulatory
332 approval of a pharmaceutical drug) might typically not be influenced by movements in the markets
333 and therefore such risks are diversifiable, leading to the use of a discount rate similar to the cost of
334 debt of the obligor over the appropriate time horizon.⁹ In contrast, the risk associated with a financial
335 metric will generally not be fully diversifiable, leading to the use of a discount rate that includes a risk
336 premium for that financial metric's exposure to systematic risk.¹⁰

337 **3.2 Contingent Consideration Payoff Structures**

338 At one extreme, contingent consideration may be structured in a simple way as a fixed percentage of
339 an underlying metric such as earnings or revenue (i.e., a linear payoff structure). At the other extreme,
340 contingent consideration payoff structures may be complex, nonlinear functions of the underlying
341 metric, including minimum thresholds below which no payment is made, a maximum payment cap,
342 tiers with differing rates of payment per unit of improved performance, and/or carry-forward
343 provisions that link payment in one time period to performance in other time periods.

344 As discussed in Section 4.4, the contingent consideration structure can have a substantial impact on
345 the risk, degree of leverage, and discount rate to use in the valuation. Furthermore, similar to the
346 distinction between diversifiable and non-diversifiable risk (discussed in Section 4.3), the distinction
347 between linear and nonlinear payoff structures is a key consideration when selecting the contingent
348 consideration valuation methodology. In particular, the expected payoff of an earnout with a linear
349 structure (i.e., with no caps, thresholds, tiers, etc.) may be estimated based on the single payoff
350 associated with the expected (probability-weighted) outcome for the metric. In contrast, any payoff
351 structure that varies in any way from a purely linear structure—a nonlinear structure incorporating any
352 operative¹¹ thresholds, caps, multiple tiers, carry-forwards, etc.—will require explicit consideration of
353 the probability distribution of possible outcomes for the metric and the associated payoffs.

354 **3.2.1 Common Contingent Consideration Payoff Structures**

355 The following examples present certain common contingent consideration payoff structures observed
356 in practice. A fixed payment (constant payoff) structure is also included—even though a non-
357 contingent payoff structure generally is not considered to be *contingent* consideration—to illustrate a
358 structural extreme.¹² Where the example contingent consideration payoff structure resembles the
359 payoff structure for an option, such as a put option or a call option, that resemblance is noted (in
360 parentheses). The impact of structure on risk alluded to in the examples is explained in Section 4.4.
361 Illustrative examples of fair value computations for each of these payoff structures (and additional
362 variations) are provided in Section 9.








⁹ See an example of the valuation of a technical milestone in Section 9.3.

¹⁰ The Required Metric Risk Premium is discussed in Section 5.2.2.

¹¹ A cap might not be operative if, for example, the likelihood of the metric being above the cap is de minimis. Such a situation is more likely to occur when the valuation of the contingent consideration is updated a year or two post-transaction (after some of the uncertainty is resolved unfavorably) than for the initial valuation.

¹² At initial recognition, a fixed payment would be considered deferred consideration. However, once the uncertainties are resolved, a contingent consideration liability can resemble a fixed payment obligation, due at its contractual maturity.

EXAMPLE STRUCTURES

Structure	Payoff	Description and Risk Characteristics ¹³
Constant (debt-like)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A fixed (deferred) payment. • The earnout cash flow is only subject to counterparty credit risk.
Milestone payment (digital / binary option) See Examples 9.3-9.4		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A fixed payment contingent upon achieving a future milestone or performance threshold. • Nonlinear payoff, where the risk of the earnout cash flow depends on the risk of the underlying metric, the impact of the nonlinear structure (which is non-zero if the metric's risk is non-diversifiable) and counterparty credit risk.
Linear See Examples 9.1-9.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment is equal to a fixed percentage of the outcome for the underlying metric. • Linear payoff, where the risk of the earnout cash flow is the same as the risk of the underlying metric, plus counterparty credit risk.
Percentage of total above a threshold (asset-or-nothing call option) See Example 9.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment is equal to a percentage of the underlying metric, but only if a performance threshold is reached. • Nonlinear payoff, where the risk of the earnout cash flow depends on the risk of the underlying metric, the impact of the nonlinear structure, and counterparty credit risk.
Excess above a threshold with a cap (capped call option) See Example 9.7		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment is equal to a percentage of the excess of the underlying metric above a performance threshold, with a payment cap. • Nonlinear payoff, where the risk of the earnout cash flow depends on the risk of the underlying metric, the impact of the nonlinear structure, and counterparty credit risk.
Excess above a threshold (call option) See Example 9.5		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment is equal to a percentage of the excess of the underlying metric above a performance threshold. • Nonlinear payoff, where the risk of the earnout cash flow depends on the risk of the underlying metric, the impact of the nonlinear structure, and counterparty credit risk.
Clawback (put option) See Example 9.11		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment is equal to a percentage of the shortfall of the underlying metric below a performance threshold. • Nonlinear payoff, where the risk of the clawback cash flow depends on the risk of the underlying metric, the impact of the nonlinear structure, and counterparty credit risk.

¹³ The discount rate for any of these structures should consider the time value of money, as well as the risks described in this table.

363 3.2.2 Path Dependency

364 Contingent consideration arrangements may cover a short time period (e.g., three months) or a long
365 period (e.g., many years). In addition, the arrangement may specify a single measurement period or
366 multiple measurement periods. For some arrangements that include multiple measurement periods, the
367 payoff in each period may be independent of (and therefore can be valued separately from) the results
368 in other periods. Some arrangements, however, include carry-forward or catch-up features, overall
369 (multi-year) caps, or other terms that cause some of the payments to depend on the performance over
370 multiple periods. This latter type of contingent consideration is typically referred to as having path-
371 dependent features.

372 When a payment in one period is dependent on the outcomes in other periods, one typically cannot
373 model the payments independently. More complex techniques, the most common of which is a Monte
374 Carlo simulation, are generally required. See Section 5.4.4 for a description of a Monte Carlo
375 simulation.

376 *Example:* The acquirer is required to pay 70% of EBITDA above 1 million in year 1, and 70%
377 of EBITDA above 2 million in year 2, with an overall payment cap of 2 million. Due to the
378 overall payment cap, the earnout payment in year 2 depends on the earnout payment in year 1,
379 and is therefore path dependent.

380 Also, see the example in Section 9.10.

381 3.2.3 Multiple Underlying Metrics or Multiple Forms of Settlement

382 The contingent consideration payoff may depend on more than one underlying metric. In such cases,
383 each underlying metric would typically be modeled based on its forecast and risk characteristics,
384 taking into account the correlation between the metrics. In most cases the valuation of an earnout based
385 on multiple, correlated (or otherwise interdependent) underlying metrics will require a Monte Carlo
386 simulation.¹⁴

387 *Example:* The acquirer is required to pay 100 if first year post-close revenue exceeds 1,000
388 and first year post-close EBITDA exceeds 200. Expected first year post-close revenue and
389 EBITDA are 1,000 and 200, respectively.

390 In the example above, the situations in which revenue exceeds 1,000 are more likely to occur (but not
391 certain to occur) when EBITDA is above 200. That is, these two financial metrics (like most financial
392 metrics) are not independent; they are positively correlated. Because of this positive correlation, the
393 value of the earnout is higher than if the two metrics were independent. (To grasp this concept
394 intuitively, it might help to consider that whenever revenue exceeds 1,000, EBITDA is more likely to
395 exceed 200 if the two metrics are positively correlated than if they are independent.) A Monte Carlo
396 simulation is one technique that can incorporate the impact of the correlation between revenue and
397 EBITDA on the value of the earnout. In contrast, if (instead of EBITDA) the criterion related to a
398 nonfinancial milestone whose achievement had no impact on or relationship with first year revenue
399 (for example, on-time completion of the first year of a multi-year new product development effort that
400 will produce no revenues until the new product is launched), then in this example a Monte Carlo
401 simulation would not be required.

¹⁴ In rare situations, it may be possible to simplify the analysis by modeling one risky metric in terms of another, under certain strong assumptions about the relationship between the risky metrics (such as where the relationship between the metrics can be reasonably modeled as perfectly correlated).

402 Similarly, the contingent consideration payoff may require settlement in more than one form. In such
403 cases, each form of settlement needs to be modeled based on its risk characteristics, taking into account
404 the correlation between the metric(s) and the form of settlement.

405 See Sections 5.3.6 and 5.4.4 for a description of Monte Carlo simulation in the context of SBM and
406 OPM, respectively.

407 *3.2.4 Buyer or Seller Choices*

408 In rare cases, the earnout is structured with the ability of the buyer or seller to make a decision during
409 or at the conclusion of the earnout period, which will impact the form, amount, or settlement type for
410 the earnout payment. In these cases, and consistent with fair value concepts, the valuation specialist
411 needs to consider the optimal decision that would either maximize (in the case of a seller decision) or
412 minimize (in the case of a buyer decision) the value of the earnout payment.

413 *Example:* An earnout equal to 10% of future EBITDA over five years, where each year the
414 seller can choose between continuing to receive the contingent payments or receiving a pre-
415 specified cash settlement amount.

416 The above example illustrates that the introduction of a choice can turn a simple, linear contingent
417 consideration payment that can be valued based on the expected EBITDA into a complex, path-
418 dependent, nonlinear arrangement for which the valuation requires a full understanding of the
419 distribution of future outcomes and the use of methods such as a binomial (lattice) model (discussed
420 in Section 5.4.5) or a Monte Carlo simulation in conjunction with an algorithm that incorporates
421 optimal decision making.¹⁵

422 *3.2.5 Currency*

423 The currency in which an earnout is structured and/or settled can significantly impact its fair value. In
424 most cases, all the features of the earnout arrangement (including settlement, performance thresholds,
425 payment caps, etc.) are denominated in a single, common currency. Such a single, common currency
426 is usually the currency in which the valuation analysis is performed, to avoid the need to model future
427 foreign exchange rates.

428 *Example:* An earnout payment of 1,000 Brazilian Real if EBITDA earned in the first year
429 exceeds 2,000 Brazilian Real.

430 Since all the earnout features are contractually denominated in Brazilian Real, the valuation analysis,
431 including all assumptions, is usually more easily performed in Brazilian Real. Once the fair value of
432 the earnout is estimated in a specific currency, then the fair value can be converted to other currencies
433 as needed, for example by using the appropriate spot foreign exchange rate at the measurement date.

434 For earnout arrangements with terms that span multiple currencies (where the multiple currency
435 exposure is substantial), the valuation can be significantly more complicated, as discussed further in
436 Section 5.2.7.

437 **3.3 Settlement Types for Contingent Consideration**

438 While most earnouts are settled in cash, there are cases where settlement involves the transfer of other
439 assets, equity, and/or liabilities. For example, an earnout may be settled in the acquirer's shares, which

¹⁵ In some situations, the algorithm can be a relatively simple decision rule assessed by management. For more complex situations such as the path-dependent early exercise option in the example above, there are many algorithms and techniques that have been developed. See for example, Longstaff and Schwartz (2001), "Valuing American options by simulation: A simple least-squares approach."

440 may be specified as a fixed number of shares or as a fixed monetary value of shares. The currency in
441 which the earnout is settled will also have an impact on the valuation (see Section 3.2.5).

442 The way an earnout is settled may or may not have an impact on its fair value.

443 *Example (settlement in fixed monetary value of shares):* An earnout payment equal to \$500
444 worth of the acquirer's common shares if EBITDA earned in the first year exceeds \$5,000.

445 In the above example, the earnout payment is specified in monetary terms, but settled through the
446 transfer of other assets (the acquirer's common stock in this example). Such an earnout is economically
447 equivalent to an earnout settled in cash.

448 *Example (settlement in fixed number of shares):* An earnout payment equal to 500 common
449 shares of the acquirer if EBITDA earned in the first year exceeds \$5,000.

450 However, specifying an earnout as a fixed number of the acquirer's shares (as in the example above)
451 will impact the fair value of the earnout, and the valuation of such an earnout generally requires
452 consideration of the fair value of the shares being transferred, the impact on the counterparty credit
453 risk (if any, see discussion and examples in Section 5.2.6) and the correlation between the value of the
454 shares and the underlying metric. Also, a contingent consideration obligation that requires settlement
455 in the acquirer's shares may be classified as either a liability or as equity for financial reporting
456 purposes, depending on facts and circumstances.

Section 4: Key Valuation Concepts Related to Earnouts

457 There are several concepts that are key to understanding why certain methodologies are, or are not,
458 appropriate for valuing various types of contingent consideration:

- 459 • **Market participants and their assumptions:** since fair value requires one to assume a
460 transaction involving the contingent consideration on a standalone basis, it is important to
461 carefully consider the perspectives of the relevant market participants on issues such as the
462 inclusion of synergies.
- 463 • **Probabilistic forecasts:** contingent consideration valuation often requires an understanding of
464 the probability distribution of potential outcomes for the underlying metric, not just the
465 expected (probability-weighted, mean) outcome.
- 466 • **Diversifiability of risk:** contingent consideration payoffs may depend on metrics that are
467 largely uncorrelated with the market, which can simplify the valuation analysis. However, if
468 the risk associated with the metric is non-diversifiable, valuation complexities can arise and
469 affect the choice of valuation methodology.
- 470 • **Payoff structure:** whether the payoff is a nonlinear function of the underlying metric has
471 implications for the risk of, and therefore the discount rate used for, the contingent
472 consideration cash flow.
- 473 • **Leverage:** contingent consideration payoff structures often entail a leveraged exposure to the
474 underlying metric(s), which affects the riskiness of the contingent consideration cash flow.
- 475 • **Risk-neutral valuation:** this concept of adjusting for risk is a fundamental underpinning of
476 the option pricing method.

477 These key valuation concepts will be referenced throughout this Valuation Advisory.

478 4.1 Market Participant Assumptions

479 As explained in Section 2.2, the objective of a fair value measurement is to estimate the price at which
480 an orderly transaction would take place between market participants under the market conditions that
481 exist at the measurement date. In the context of contingent consideration, therefore, developing a fair
482 value estimate requires identification of the assumptions of market participants for the contingent
483 consideration as a freestanding instrument.

484 It is rare for the parties to contingent consideration arrangements to subsequently transact in or sell
485 their interest in the arrangement as a freestanding instrument; there is not an established market for
486 trading of most contingent consideration arrangements.¹⁶ Rather, the parties typically retain their
487 respective interests until the contingencies have been resolved and any payments made. As a result,
488 one does not typically observe how market participants value and price contingent consideration
489 arrangements as separate freestanding instruments. Therefore, careful consideration of the assumed
490 orderly transaction and the perspectives of the relevant market participants may require significant
491 judgment.

492 The market participants for the contingent consideration may be different from the market participants
493 for other items requiring fair value determinations in a business combination. For example, the market
494 participant for an acquired intangible asset might be a company that operates in the same industry with
495 similar products. For a contingent consideration arrangement, the market participant purchasing the

¹⁶ A rare exception (contingent value rights) is discussed in Section 5.1.

496 rights to receive the future contingent payments or assuming the contingent payment obligations could
497 be a private equity firm, hedge fund or some other investor wanting to gain exposure to the acquired
498 business by purchasing the rights to receive future payments, or willing to assume the risk of
499 potentially paying the future contingent payments in exchange for a lump sum cash payment on the
500 measurement date.

501 The perspective of market participants transacting in the contingent consideration arrangement may
502 also differ from that of market participants transacting in other items requiring fair value measurement
503 in a business combination. For example, a market participant for an intangible asset would not consider
504 post-combination synergies that are specific to the acquirer when estimating the projected cash flows
505 related to that intangible asset. Similarly, the financial projections developed for valuing an acquired
506 business typically only include market participant synergies, not buyer-specific synergies. On the other
507 hand, a market participant transacting in an earnout arrangement on a standalone basis would consider
508 *all* relevant post-combination synergies, including those specific to the acquirer. This is because any
509 payments ultimately due will reflect the contractual terms of the earnout arrangement and buyer-linked
510 characteristics are implicit elements of that contract. A market participant for the standalone earnout
511 would therefore consider the impact of buyer-linked characteristics when estimating the projected
512 earnout cash flow and pricing the earnout arrangement.

513 To summarize, all synergies relevant to the calculation of the payoff, i.e. all synergies not excluded
514 contractually from the definition of the metric underlying the contingent consideration, *including all*
515 *relevant buyer-specific synergies*, should be included in the financial projections for the contingent
516 consideration valuation.

517 Similarly, market participants valuing a contingent consideration arrangement would consider risks
518 specific to the post-acquisition business in developing assumptions for other inputs. For example, if
519 an earnout has been put in place to share the risk of a large uncertainty around the degree of success
520 for a new product launch, then a market participant would estimate a volatility specific to these
521 circumstances—which might be considerably higher than the volatility observed for public company
522 comparables.

523 **4.2 Probabilistic Forecasts and Expected Values**

524 The valuation of earnouts often requires the use of probabilistic models. That is, one typically needs
525 to contemplate future scenarios and their associated probabilities (i.e., a probability distribution) to
526 correctly estimate the expected future earnout payment. For clarity, in this Valuation Advisory, all
527 uses of the term “expected” as an adjective, including expected case, expected payment, expected cash
528 flow, expected value, etc. refer to the mean—the mean case (the mean, probability-weighted result
529 across the possible outcomes, not the most likely case), the mean payment, the mean cash flow, and
530 the mean value, respectively. In addition, all uses of the term “probability” refer to the real-world
531 probability of an outcome, unless the context is explicitly described as involving a “risk-neutral”
532 probability in a risk-neutral framework (see Section 4.6).

533 A key concept in valuing earnouts is to recognize that, except for linear payoff structures,¹⁷
 534 the expected cash flow for the contingent consideration
 535 is usually **NOT** equal to
 536 the payoff associated with the expected value of the metric.

537 *Example:* An earnout with a payoff equal to the excess of future EBITDA above 100, where
 538 forecast EBITDA is 100, and the probability of various outcomes is as shown in the first three
 539 columns of Table 1 below.

TABLE 1

Scenario	Probability	EBITDA	Earnout Payoff (Max (EBITDA-100,0))
1	2.5%	180	80
2	15%	130	30
3	20%	120	20
4	25%	100	0
5	20%	80	0
6	15%	70	0
7	2.5%	20	0
Expected Value:		100	10.5

540 In the above example, the future earnout payoff associated with the expected EBITDA forecast of 100
 541 is zero, but zero is not the expected future cash flow of the earnout. To calculate the expected future
 542 cash flow of the earnout, one needs to consider the probability of being above or below the forecast
 543 (i.e., one needs to consider the probability distribution of future EBITDA). Consideration of the full
 544 probability distribution for the EBITDA metric leads to a variety of scenarios for the earnout payoff
 545 such as those shown in the last column of Table 1.

546 Based on the probability distribution in Table 1, the correct expected earnout cash flow in this example
 547 is equal to 10.5,¹⁸ not zero.

548 As the example in Table 1 illustrates, an understanding of the full distribution of outcomes is often
 549 required for the valuation of an earnout. As for any valuation, it can be important to confirm that the
 550 financial projections provided by management represent the expected (probability-weighted, mean)
 551 case. However, when valuing an earnout, it can additionally be important to investigate whether the
 552 valuation specialist's assumption regarding the probability distribution around that mean (e.g., a
 553 distribution with a volatility in growth rate for the metric based on an analysis of comparable
 554 companies in the industry) is appropriate. Such an investigation might identify an event, for example
 555 the timing of a new product launch or the effectiveness of a potential new partnership, that
 556 substantially affects the distribution (or even the mean) of outcomes over the timeframe for the
 557 earnout. While these kinds of diversifiable, near-term events might not affect the long-term value of
 558 the business, they can have a sizeable impact on the value of the earnout. Similarly, an investigation

¹⁷ For example, when the earnout is a flat percentage of the underlying metric (i.e., a linear payoff structure with no thresholds, caps, tiers, carryforwards, minimum levels of profitability, or other terms or conditions), the expected earnout cash flow is equal to the payoff at the expected metric outcome. See the examples of a linear structure in Sections 9.1 and 9.2.

¹⁸ Specifically, the computation to arrive at the expected payoff is $(80 \times 2.5\%) + (30 \times 15\%) + (20 \times 20\%) + (0 \times 62.5\%) = 10.5$.

559 might identify that there is a wider range of uncertainty around the mean financial projections for a
560 young, high-growth business than there is for the public company comparables in the industry. Any
561 such issues identified should be captured in the valuation specialist's modeling of the distribution of
562 outcomes for the underlying metric.

563 See Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4 for a more in-depth discussion of methods for estimating the mean for
564 the underlying metric and the probability distribution around that mean.

565 Another important factor to consider is consistency between the assumed probability distribution for
566 the underlying metric in the earnout analysis and the forecasts for that metric implied by the expected
567 case cash flows used to value the business.¹⁹ See Section 7.1 for a discussion of this issue and an
568 example.

569 4.3 Diversifiable and Non-Diversifiable Risk

570 A widely accepted valuation principle assumes that rational investors and market participants reduce
571 risk through diversification. As a result, it is assumed that market participants will only require a return
572 premium for those risks that cannot be diversified away. Therefore, for valuation purposes, risks are
573 often categorized into two broad groups.

- 574 • **Non-diversifiable risk:** risks that cannot be fully removed through diversification (such as
575 systematic risks, i.e., risks that are correlated with the market)
- 576 • **Diversifiable risk:** risks that can be diversified away.²⁰ For example, an event whose outcome
577 is not influenced by movements in the markets is a diversifiable risk; such risks are often
578 illustrated by comparison to a coin flip.

579 The categorization of the risk associated with the underlying metric as diversifiable or non-
580 diversifiable is a key consideration when estimating the value of contingent consideration. In
581 particular, whether the risk associated with the underlying metric is diversifiable will affect the
582 estimation and the magnitude of the required rate of return (or discount rate) associated with the
583 contingent consideration.

584 To illustrate this concept, suppose that the risk associated with the underlying metric for an earnout is
585 largely diversifiable. In the context of contingent consideration, events with predominantly
586 diversifiable risks include, for example, a payment contingent upon receiving regulatory approval,
587 upon favorable resolution of a legal dispute, upon timely completion of a construction project, or upon
588 achievement of technical milestones such as successfully completing a software integration task or
589 development of a new product.²¹

¹⁹ Note however, that the mean forecast for the metric associated with the expected case cash flows used to value the business might differ from the mean forecast for the metric used to value the earnout, due to the impact of buyer-specific synergies. See Section 4.1.

²⁰ For clarity, note that a diversifiable risk need not be one where you can make another investment with a favorable result if the uncertainty is resolved in the negative direction. Diversifiability does not imply that you can cancel out the uncertainty and remove the possibility of a negative outcome for a single uncertain event. Rather, a diversifiable risk is a peril that is peculiar to an individual company. An investor's portfolio can include numerous (unrelated, i.e. diverse) investments that entail such risks. The more such (unrelated) investments there are in the portfolio, the more likely it is that the expected outcome will be achieved across the portfolio, due to the law of large numbers. The same level of assurance of achieving the expected case cannot be achieved with a portfolio of non-diversifiable risks, since they are all, to some degree, interdependent, due to their correlation with movements in the market. See, e.g., *Principles of Corporate Finance* by Brealey, Myers, Allen (2013), p. 174.

²¹ While there may be a small degree of systematic risk associated with the achievement of technical or regulatory milestones, in most cases, the non-diversifiable risk is *de minimis* as compared to the diversifiable risk. Assuming the risk associated with such events to be diversifiable is therefore generally considered reasonable.

590 *Example:* The acquiree has a pharmaceutical drug under development that has passed clinical
591 trials. An earnout is structured that pays one million if that drug receives regulatory approval.

592 The discount rate associated with the expected (probability-weighted, mean) cash flow contingent on
593 a metric with only diversifiable risks is the risk-free rate, plus any adjustment for counterparty credit
594 risk.²² In the above example, the risk-free rate plus any adjustment for counterparty credit risk would
595 be the discount rate to apply to (one million × the probability the drug receives regulatory approval).
596 No additional premium for *systematic* risk needs to be incorporated in that discount rate.

597 This is not to say that even a fully diversifiable metric is not subject to uncertainty. Indeed, the
598 likelihood of occurrence of an event on which an earnout is based could be high or low, but it is
599 typically *uncertain*. That likelihood of occurrence should be incorporated in the calculation of the
600 expected payoff (in the above example by multiplying the payoff of one million by the probability of
601 receiving regulatory approval).

602 Conversely, if the risk associated with the underlying metric for an earnout is non-diversifiable, market
603 participants require a risk premium²³ above the risk-free rate as compensation to take on such non-
604 diversifiable risk. In the context of contingent consideration, metrics with non-diversifiable risk
605 include financial metrics such as revenue, EBITDA, number of units sold, rental occupancy rates, etc.
606 If the earnout metric exhibits systematic risk, then the discount rate applied to the expected payoff will
607 be affected by the structure of the earnout, as described in more detail in Section 4.4.

608 *4.3.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model Framework for Quantifying Non-Diversifiable Risk*

609 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a framework that is widely used to estimate the required
610 rate of return or discount rate associated with an investment. While the recommendations and best
611 practices discussed in this Valuation Advisory do not require use of CAPM, many principles
612 surrounding the estimation of a risk premium for non-diversifiable risk will be illustrated in a CAPM
613 framework. The same principles would apply to other models for estimating systematic risk, such as,
614 for example, models that provide various adjustments to CAPM (some of which are discussed later in
615 this section) or the Fama-French Five-Factor Model (Fama and French 2015).

616 Simply stated, CAPM describes investors' required rate of return for a security as being comprised of
617 two components: compensation for the time value of money and for taking on non-diversifiable risk.
618 As shown in the equation below, in a CAPM framework, the time value of money is represented by
619 the risk-free rate, which compensates investors for the risk-free return they could have earned over the
620 holding period of the investment. The systematic risk component is represented by the beta of the
621 investment, which quantifies the degree of non-diversifiable risk based on the volatility of the
622 investment relative to the market volatility and the correlation of its performance with the market,
623 multiplied by the Market Risk Premium.

²² See Sections 5.2.6 and 6.3 for discussions of the incorporation of the obligor's credit risk into the valuation of contingent consideration.

²³ The Required Metric Risk Premium is discussed in Section 5.2.2.

624
$$R_A = RFR + \beta_A(R_{Market} - RFR) = RFR + \beta_A MRP$$

625 Where:

- 626 R_A = Required rate of return for security A
627 RFR = Risk-free rate of return
628 β_A = Beta of security A
629 R_{Market} = Expected return on the market portfolio
630 MRP = $R_{Market} - RFR$ = Market Risk Premium

631 The CAPM definition of risk is consistent with the notion that rational investors will try to diversify
632 away risk, which leaves only risk that is non-diversifiable as impacting the required risk premium. For
633 a given investment, non-diversifiable risk depends on the volatility of returns for the investment
634 relative to the market, as well as the extent to which the investment's returns are correlated with the
635 market returns (as captured by beta), and can be quantified by multiplying beta by the Market Risk
636 Premium.

637 Valuation specialists often also factor in adjustments to the CAPM results, as illustrated by the
638 equation below, to capture additional risk beyond what is captured by the traditionally measured beta
639 associated with the textbook CAPM. Some of these additional risk premiums include adjustments
640 based on company size (size premiums²⁴), country-related risk (country-specific risk premiums), and
641 company-specific risk (alpha). For simplicity of exposition, in this Valuation Advisory we will refer
642 to the CAPM results with adjustments to capture additional risk premiums as the "Adjusted CAPM"
643 framework.

644
$$R_A = RFR + \beta_A(R_{Market} - RFR) + SP + CRP + \alpha = RFR + \beta_A MRP + SP + CRP + \alpha$$

645 Where:

- 646 R_A = Required rate of return for security A
647 RFR = Risk-free rate of return
648 β_A = Beta of security A
649 R_{Market} = Expected return on the market portfolio
650 MRP = $R_{Market} - RFR$ = Market Risk Premium
651 SP = Size premium
652 CRP = Country-specific risk premium
653 α = Company-specific risk premium, where α can be positive, zero or negative


654 The following example illustrates at a high level how the estimated CAPM risk premium might be
655 adjusted, and that such adjustments typically result in a risk premium that is more consistent with the
656 risk premium implied by the transaction internal rate of return (IRR).²⁵

²⁴ A size premium typically reflects the higher return required by market participants for investing in companies that are smaller in size. For a textbook discussion, see, e.g., *Cost of Capital* by Pratt and Grabowski (2014).

²⁵ As noted in the Appraisal Practices Board's *Valuation Advisory #2 – The Valuation of Customer-Related Assets*, Section 5.2.25, "The WACC and the IRR should be compared and reviewed for reasonableness. An IRR that is significantly different from the WACC may warrant a reassessment of both the [Prospective Financial Information (PFI)] and the WACC calculation to determine if market participant assumptions are being consistently applied or if adjustments need to be made in either the PFI or WACC. While the purchase consideration is most often the best indication of fair value, the valuation specialist needs to be alert for circumstances when this is not the case and there is evidence of, for example, buyer-specific synergies, overpayment, or a bargain purchase."

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Example: Suppose the IRR for an acquisition of a small private company is 20% per annum and a 10% required rate of return (2% risk-free rate plus 8% risk premium) is estimated in a CAPM framework (assuming no debt) using comparable, publicly traded companies. However, the valuation practitioner has identified that it is appropriate to add a size premium of 10% due to non-diversifiable risk associated with the company's size. As a result, the transaction IRR and the estimated WACC for the company are consistent, as shown in the figure below.



664 Note, however, that the WACC may not always reconcile to the IRR as it does in the above illustration.
665 If the IRR is significantly higher than the WACC, the valuation specialist will typically consider
666 whether the projected cash flows truly represent expected case, market participant cash flows, or if
667 there may be an optimistic bias that should be removed and/or unmodeled risks that should be
668 addressed. Alternatively, if the projected cash flows are representative of probability-weighted,
669 expected case cash flows using market participant assumptions, and the IRR is still significantly higher
670 than the WACC, the valuation specialist will typically consider the possibility that the transaction
671 price represents a bargain purchase.

672 Similarly, if the IRR is significantly lower than the WACC, the valuation specialist will typically
673 consider whether the projected cash flows have a conservative bias or exclude market participant
674 synergies that should be included. If the projected cash flows are representative of probability-
675 weighted, expected case cash flows using market participant assumptions, and the IRR is still
676 significantly lower than the WACC, the valuation specialist will typically consider the possibility of
677 an overpayment situation.

678 The concept of additional risk premiums also applies to the valuation of contingent consideration.
679 Suppose there is an earnout structured as part of this transaction that requires the acquirer to pay 5%
680 of future revenue to the seller in perpetuity.²⁶ The discount rate applied to the expected cash flow of
681 this earnout should take into account the portion of the additional size, country-specific and/or
682 company-specific risks identified by the valuation specialist that are applicable to the expected cash
683 flow associated with the earnout.²⁷

²⁶ Note that this is a linear payoff structure. Additional complexities can arise in the estimation of the appropriate discount rate for a nonlinear earnout payoff structure based on a metric with non-diversifiable risk, as described in Section 4.4. Whether the structure is linear or nonlinear, however, the additional risks related to the business identified by the valuation specialist should also be considered for the earnout valuation.

²⁷ If an alternative framework to the Adjusted CAPM were used, the same principle would apply: the discount rate applied to the expected earnout cash flow should include the earnout-appropriate portion of the risk premiums employed in that framework.

684 **4.4 The Risk Associated with the Contingent Consideration Payoff Structure**


685 The payoff structure can affect the risk associated with an earnout, if the risk of the earnout metric is
686 non-diversifiable.

687 For a metric with only diversifiable risk, the appropriate discount rate is the risk-free rate, plus any
688 adjustment for counterparty credit risk, applied to the expected earnout cash flow over the relevant
689 time horizon. When there is no systematic risk associated with the metric, the payoff structure cannot
690 affect the amount of systematic risk and therefore the payoff structure does not affect the magnitude
691 of the required rate of return.

692 For a metric (such as a financial metric) with non-diversifiable risk, the relative risk of the earnout as
693 compared to the risk of the underlying financial metric will depend on the earnout payoff structure.

694 A simple earnout that pays a fixed percentage of a financial metric such as revenue (a linear payoff
695 structure) has the same risk as that revenue (over the relevant timeframe). However, as illustrated in
696 Section 3.2, earnouts typically exhibit more complex payoff structures, such that the amount of
697 payment depends on whether the performance with respect to a financial metric satisfies certain
698 contingencies (e.g., reaches a threshold, a tier, or a cap). When this is the case, i.e., when the payoff
699 structure is nonlinear, the risk of the earnout cash flow can diverge significantly from the risk of the
700 underlying metric. For a metric with non-diversifiable risk and a nonlinear payoff structure, the risk
701 of the earnout will depend not only on the risk associated with the metric, but also on the probability
702 of achieving each threshold, tier, cap or other structural element.

703 Consider the two financial-metric-based earnouts illustrated in Figure 1 below. For the milestone
704 (binary) payoff structure 1(a) illustrated on the far left, upon achieving a specified level of earnings
705 (above a threshold), a fixed amount is paid. For the payoff structure in illustration 1(c), upon achieving
706 a specified level of earnings (above a threshold), the payoff is an amount proportional to the earnings.
707 This structure is similar to an asset-or-nothing payoff structure for an option. If the probability of
708 achieving the earnings threshold is 100% (as depicted by the pattern of dotted and solid lines in Figure
709 1, the payoff will occur with certainty at some point along the solid line), then the milestone payment
710 structure in 1(a) is equivalent to a deferred payment (referred to in illustration 1(b) below as “debt-
711 like”), and the risk of the asset-or-nothing payoff structure in 1(c) is equal to the risk of the underlying
712 earnings (i.e., equivalent to a linear payoff structure as shown in illustration 1(d)).




713 However, if the probability of achieving the earnings threshold is less than 100% (i.e., unlike as shown
714 in Figure 1, if there is some chance that the earnings outcome will be less than the threshold and the
715 earnout payoff will be zero), the risk of the milestone earnout cash flow will be greater than that of a


716 deferred payment and the risk of the asset-or-nothing earnout will be greater than the risk of the
 717 earnings metric. Similarly, the risk of the cash flow of an earnout structured as an asset-or-nothing
 718 option is always at least as great as the risk of the underlying financial metric. How much greater will
 719 depend on the probability of achieving the threshold.

720 This same logic can be applied to another common earnout payoff structure, which has both a threshold
 721 and a cap.

- 722 • If the probability of earnings being above the level at which the cap is in force is 100% as
 723 shown by the solid line in structure 2(a) on the left of Figure 2 below, then the earnout cash
 724 flow is equivalent to a deferred payment (debt-like, see illustration 2(b)).




- 725 • If the probability of earnings being above the threshold is 100% (and the probability of hitting
 726 the cap is less than 100%, as shown by the solid lines in structure 3(a) on the left of Figure 3
 727 below), then the risk of the earnout cash flow is between the risk of a deferred payment, see
 728 3(b), and the risk of the earnings, see 3(c), as illustrated on the right side of Figure 3 below.




- 729 • If the probability of earnings being between the threshold and the cap is 100% (neither the
 730 threshold nor the cap is “active,” as shown by the dotted lines in structure 4(a) on the left of
 731 Figure 4 below), then the structure is effectively linear and the risk of the earnout payoff is
 732 equal to the risk of the earnings metric, see 4(b), as illustrated on the right side of Figure 4
 733 below.

FIGURE 4



- 734 • Finally, if the probability of earnings being below the level at which the cap is in force is 100%
735 (and the probability of hitting the threshold is less than 100%, as illustrated by the solid lines
736 in structure 5(a) on the left side of Figure 5 below), then the risk of the earnout cash flow is
737 greater than the risk of the earnings (see 5(b) on the right side of Figure 5).

FIGURE 5




738 Thus, when the earnout metric has non-diversifiable risk, the risk of the contingent consideration
739 payoff is inherently tied to the likelihood of achieving a threshold, tier or cap.²⁸ The lower the
740 probability of achieving the threshold for example, the greater the leveraged position of the earnout
741 relative to the underlying financial metric and the higher the risk of the earnout payoff (see Section
742 4.5 on leverage).

743 Based on these types of considerations, it is possible to rank order the riskiness of a financial metric-
744 based earnout's cash flow as shown in Figure 6 below. In this figure, the least risky payoff structure
745 is on the far left, and the most risky payoff structure is on the far right. The gray arrows indicate that
746 the ordering of risk of certain structures depends on the specific circumstances (in particular, it depends
747 on the likelihood of achieving the threshold and/or the cap). For example, a milestone payoff structure
748 is always less risky than an asset-or-nothing payoff structure, assuming the same likelihood of
749 achieving the threshold in each case. But whether a milestone payoff structure is more or less risky
750 than a linear payoff structure depends on the likelihood of achieving the milestone.

²⁸ The likelihood of achieving a threshold for a contingent consideration metric is similar to the concept of “moneyness” in the context of an option. “Moneyness” refers to the relative position of the current price of an asset to the strike price of an option written on that underlying asset. The lower the probability of achieving the threshold, the less likely it is that any earnout amount will be paid, and the more likely it is that the earnout is “out of the money.”

FIGURE 6



751 For an earnout with a nonlinear payoff structure based on a metric with non-diversifiable risk, the time
752 remaining until the uncertainty is resolved can also affect the systematic risk of the earnout cash flow
753 through the impact of time on the variability of the outcome. For example, assume a milestone
754 structure with a revenue metric for the first year post-close and for which the probability of achieving
755 the revenue target is 50%. The risk associated with the earnout cash flow will be very different if the
756 time remaining to achieve the revenue target is one year or one week.

757 4.5 The Impact of Payoff Structure on Risk: the Analogy to Leverage

758 The analogy to leverage provides important insights into the risk associated with nonlinear contingent
759 consideration payoff structures based on financial metrics. Leverage is most commonly thought of as
760 an equity holder's leveraged exposure to the underlying business given the presence of debt. More
761 generally, leverage can be characterized as a payoff resulting from something that is risky less
762 something that is risk free (or relatively close to risk free²⁹).

763 Common examples of leverage include:

- 764 • Equity as a leveraged exposure to the underlying business:

$$765 \text{ Equity} = \text{Enterprise Value} - \text{Debt}$$

- 766 • A forward contract's leveraged exposure to the underlying stock:

$$767 \text{ Forward Contract} = \text{Stock Price} - \text{Forward Price}$$

- 768 • A call option's leveraged exposure to the underlying stock:

$$769 \text{ Stock Option} = \text{Max}(\text{Stock Price} - \text{Strike Price}, 0)$$

- 770 • Operational leverage as a result of fixed costs:

$$771 \text{ EBITDA} = (\text{Revenue Net of Variable Costs}) - \text{Fixed Costs}$$

- 772 • Financial leverage as a result of fixed interest expense:

$$773 \text{ Net Income} = \text{EBITDA} - \text{Interest Expense}$$

774 To illustrate the impact of leverage on the value of an earnout, consider an earnout that has a payoff
775 equal to 100% of the excess of future EBITDA earned over the next year above 100:

²⁹ Assumptions about whether debt risk is diversifiable (whether debt repayment is correlated with the market) characterizes some of the differences among methods for estimating the Required Metric Risk Premium associated with certain earnout metrics. See Section 10.3.1 in the Technical Notes portion of the Appendix.

776 • Payoff of earnout = $\text{Max}(\text{Future EBITDA in 1 year} - 100, 0)$
777 • Assume:
778 ○ Forecast (expected value) for EBITDA earned over 1 year = 120
779 ○ Discount rate applicable to forecast 1-year EBITDA = 10%
780 ○ Achievement of future EBITDA of at least 100 is nearly certain³⁰
781 ○ 1-year risk-free rate = 1%
782 ○ Enough money has been put into escrow that the counterparty credit risk is *de minimis*.

783 Under the stylized assumptions above, of the total expected 120 in EBITDA, the first 100 is certain
784 and therefore has no risk. All the risk is in the performance above that threshold of 100. More
785 generally, the lower, easier to achieve levels of a metric are far less risky than the overall metric risk.
786 Higher, more difficult to achieve levels of a metric are far riskier than the overall metric risk. Using
787 the above example, we can see the impact this concept of leverage has on the value of the earnout.

788 The relevant calculations for the example (assuming a mid-period convention³¹) are as follows:

789 • Value of all future EBITDA = $120/1.10^{0.5} = 114.4$
790 • Value of first (risk-free) 100 of EBITDA = $100/1.01^{0.5} = 99.5$
791 • Value of earnout is the difference = 14.9

792 Since the expected payoff of the earnout is $120 - 100 = 20$, the implied discount rate for the earnout
793 is $(20 \div 14.9) - 1 \approx 34\%$. That is, the earnout is much riskier than the underlying EBITDA metric. Just
794 like equity entails greater risk the greater the company's level of debt (due to leverage), so too does
795 the imposition of a threshold on a non-diversifiable metric like revenue or EBITDA increase the
796 riskiness of the earnout cash flow.

797 The impact of leverage on the riskiness of an instrument can be significant, and earnouts structured as
798 the excess of a financial metric above a threshold can be subject to significant leverage (as illustrated
799 above). For a similar reason, structuring an earnout with a cap (removing the highest risk outcomes
800 for the financial metric) makes that earnout less risky than it would be without the cap.

801 To further illustrate how a nonlinear payoff structure can affect the discount rate, Table 2 below depicts
802 the implied discount rates³² for certain traded S&P 500 call options, as a function of the term of the
803 option and its moneyness. In this example, moneyness refers to the relative position of the current
804 price of the S&P 500 to the strike price of an option written on the S&P 500. The implied volatility is
805 the S&P 500 volatility derived from the traded price of the call option with the corresponding term
806 and moneyness. Assuming a 7% (annual effective) cost of equity for the S&P 500 index, the discount
807 rates implied by the traded prices for these call options are high, due to the impact of leverage (no
808 payoff is achieved unless the threshold, i.e. the strike price, is reached). Such high discount rates are
809 not easy to estimate (without using an option pricing framework) and may not be intuitive for many
810 valuation specialists and their clients.

³⁰ This assumption is made so that the payoff can be assumed to be approximately linear, in order to illustrate the impact of leverage. The resulting implied discount rate is the same if we relax this assumption (i.e., assume that EBITDA can fall below 100), but assume that the payoff of the earnout is strictly linear i.e., equal to Future EBITDA in 1 year – 100 (with no payment floor). Since forecast EBITDA is risky and the threshold of 100 is contractual, the applicable discount rates are 10% and 1%, respectively.

³¹ See Section 5.2.5 for a discussion about the appropriate in-period discounting convention for the valuation of contingent consideration.

³² The Working Group is not suggesting that the valuation specialist needs to calculate an implied discount rate. Table 2 and the example provided above are intended only to illustrate the impact of leverage on the risk of a nonlinear payoff structure.

TABLE 2: Implied Discount Rates for S&P 500 Call Options³³

Term (yrs)	Moneyness	Implied Volatility	Call Option: Implied Discount Rate
2.22	106.77%	19.24%	31.03%
2.22	101.91%	18.42%	34.81%
2.22	98.91%	17.87%	37.76%
2.22	93.42%	16.79%	44.82%
2.22	84.08%	15.40%	61.81%
2.22	76.43%	14.25%	85.87%
2.22	74.74%	14.18%	91.13%
1.22	103.48%	17.66%	49.34%
1.22	101.91%	17.28%	52.56%
1.22	98.91%	16.52%	60.00%
1.22	96.09%	15.83%	68.80%
1.22	90.89%	14.58%	92.21%
1.22	86.23%	13.58%	125.00%
1.22	80.07%	12.99%	180.11%

811 In the context of an earnout, the relative position of the expected outcome for an earnout metric to the
812 threshold for a payoff is a similar concept to moneyness in an option context.

813 Contingent consideration arrangements tend to be more complex than the stylized leverage example
814 above, often including the combination of a threshold and a cap, multiple tiers, aggregate payment
815 caps over multiple payments, and/or catch-up and carry-forward features. The impact of the payoff
816 structure on risk depends on the proximity of the expected metric forecast relative to the various
817 thresholds, caps and other structural features, as well as on the volatility in growth for the metric and
818 the time remaining to settlement. For this reason, it is difficult to determine the impact of the payoff
819 structure on the discount rate for many real-world examples.

820 This is one of the key reasons why it is problematic to apply the SBM to the valuation of a nonlinear
821 payoff structure based on an earnout metric with non-diversifiable risk: it is hard to know what
822 discount rate to apply to adjust for the riskiness of the earnout cash flow. The next section introduces
823 a concept that helps the valuation specialist avoid this difficult assessment when using an option
824 pricing methodology.

825 **4.6 Risk-Neutral Valuation**

826 Many valuations involve discounting a stream of expected cash flow by an appropriately chosen
827 discount rate. A fundamental principle of valuation requires the chosen discount rate to accurately
828 capture the market participant view of the risk of the cash flow.

829 The simplest situation involves cash flows that are known and certain to be paid at different points in
830 time. In such a case, the discount rate need only capture the time value of money (and any counterparty
831 credit risk). The appropriate discount rate in this case is the risk-free rate plus any adjustment for
832 counterparty credit risk,³⁴ where both the risk-free rate and the credit spread are for a term
833 commensurate with the time from the valuation date to the expected date(s) of payment.

834 When the cash flows vary due to exposure to non-diversifiable sources of risk (e.g., revenue, EBITDA)
835 the discount rate should include a premium in addition to the risk-free rate plus counterparty credit

³³ Implied discount rates are based on data as of September 30, 2013. Source: OptionMetrics, a provider of historical option price data.

³⁴ Counterparty credit risk is discussed in Section 5.2.6.

836 risk. This premium should be commensurate with the degree of non-diversifiable risk of the cash flow.
837 For example, in a CAPM framework such as that described in Section 4.3.1, the higher the correlation
838 of the cash flow with the market, the higher the premium over the risk-free rate.³⁵

839 The CAPM framework provides one methodology for quantifying the risk premium associated with
840 the expected cash flow for an earnout with a *linear* structure. The product of the beta for the underlying
841 metric and the Market Risk Premium (plus, in an Adjusted CAPM framework, an appropriate portion
842 of any additional risk premiums) represents the Required Metric Risk Premium (RMRP) for the non-
843 diversifiable risk associated with the cash flow of that linearly-structured earnout. As discussed in
844 Section 5.2.3, the quantification of the RMRP incorporates the correlation between the earnout metric
845 and the market portfolio, volatility, and an appropriate portion of any additional risk premiums.

846 Importantly, however, the RMRP for a metric with non-diversifiable risk does *not* capture the impact
847 of any nonlinearities in the earnout payoff structure. As illustrated by the implied discount rates for
848 call options shown in Table 2 of Section 4.5, directly assessing the adjustment to the discount rate to
849 incorporate the impact on the risk premium of even a relatively simple nonlinear payoff structure can
850 be challenging.

851 Risk-neutral valuation provides a way to circumvent this issue.

852 As mentioned above, valuation is often accomplished by discounting a stream of expected cash flows
853 by (premium for non-diversifiable risk + risk-free rate), plus in the context of contingent consideration
854 valuation an adjustment for counterparty credit risk. An equivalent way to value cash flows is to first
855 remove the non-diversifiable risk from the expected cash flows, for example by reducing the projected
856 growth rate by the RMRP.³⁶ Then the resulting “risk-neutral” expected cash flows are discounted at
857 the risk-free rate + adjustment for counterparty credit risk. This process is mathematically equivalent
858 to the usual discounting—it just happens in two steps. However, separating the discounting into these
859 two steps allows one to consider the impact of a nonlinear payoff structure on cash flows *from which*
860 *the systematic risk has been removed*. If there is no systematic risk in the cash flows, the payoff
861 structure cannot affect the amount of systematic risk and therefore the payoff structure does not affect
862 the magnitude of the required rate of return. Thus, in this context of risk-neutral expected cash flows,
863 there is no need to estimate the effect of a nonlinear structure on the discount rate.³⁷

864 Similarly, in the context of contingent consideration, removing the non-diversifiable risk from the
865 metric forecast allows the valuation analysis to be performed in a risk-neutral framework. Once the
866 non-diversifiable risk has been removed from the forecast distribution for the metric, the payoff
867 structure (whether it is linear or nonlinear) no longer affects the required rate of return.

868 More specifically, contingent consideration valuation in a risk-neutral framework can be performed,
869 for example, using the following process:

³⁵ Methods for estimating the risk premium when the metric is exposed to non-diversifiable risk are explained in Section 5.2.3.

³⁶ There are two (equivalent) ways to risk-adjust expected cash flows to remove non-diversifiable risk: (1) subtract an amount commensurate with the (non-diversifiable) risk or (2) discount by a risk premium commensurate with the (non-diversifiable) risk. The latter is the more common method used by valuation specialists.

³⁷ For a discussion of the mathematics underlying this result, see the textbook by Hull entitled *Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives*, 8th ed., 2011, pp. 631-634.

- 870 • Discount the expected case forecast of the metric by the RMRP (to create a risk-neutral
871 forecast) and assume an appropriate volatility for the metric, to construct a risk-neutral
872 distribution of outcomes for the metric³⁸;
- 873 • From the risk-neutral distribution of metric outcomes, calculate the (risk-neutral) contingent
874 consideration payoff distribution according to the terms of the contingent consideration
875 arrangement
- 876 • Compute the expected (risk-neutral) payoff, from that (risk-neutral) payoff distribution
- 877 • Discount the expected (risk-neutral) payoff cash flow at the risk-free rate plus any adjustment
878 for counterparty credit risk.

879 To illustrate how risk-neutral valuation incorporates the impact of a nonlinear structure, consider an
880 earnout with a fixed payment of 100 if an EBITDA threshold of 2,000 is reached, i.e. a binary payoff
881 structure. Suppose for purposes of this example that management's expected case (mean) EBITDA
882 forecast is equal to that threshold, as depicted by Figure 7. Adjusting for the RMRP (shifting the
883 distribution of EBITDA to the left) moves the risk-neutral expected (mean) EBITDA below the
884 threshold, as depicted by Figure 8. If the earnout were a fixed percentage of EBITDA (i.e. linear) then
885 the impact of the shift in distribution on the earnout would be the same as discounting at the RMRP.
886 However, in this example, the shift of the distribution potentially dramatically reduces the likelihood
887 of payment, reflecting the increased impact of systematic risk due to the nonlinear structure.

³⁸ The lognormal distribution, which is commonly used in practice to represent the distribution of most financial metric outcomes, can be specified with two parameters (a mean and a standard deviation). See Section 5.4.3 for a discussion of how to address cases for which the metric distribution is known to be far from lognormally distributed.

FIGURE 7: EBITDA Distribution with Associated Earnout Payoff





FIGURE 8: Risk-Neutral EBITDA Distribution with Associated Earnout Payoff



888 Section 9.4 demonstrates risk-neutral valuation in the context of valuing this type of binary payoff
 889 structure. As can be seen by comparing the examples in Sections 9.1 and 9.4, the implied discount rate
 890 for this nonlinear structure is more than twice the discount rate appropriate for a similar earnout with
 891 a linear structure.

892 As we shall see in Section 5.4, this concept of removing the systematic risk so that the valuation can
 893 be performed in a risk-neutral framework is crucial for the application of option pricing methods to
 894 the valuation of contingent consideration when the underlying metric has non-diversifiable risk and
 895 the payoff structure is nonlinear. The magnitude of the impact of any nonlinear structure on the
 896 discount rate depends not only on the structure and the metric (as illustrated via the examples in
 897 Chapter 9) but also on the assumptions for volatility and the positioning of the mean of the metric
 898 forecast distribution relative to the payoff threshold. Risk-neutral valuation allows the valuation
 899 specialist to avoid the difficulties of estimating an adjustment to the discount rate to address a nonlinear
 900 contingent consideration payoff structure.

Section 5: Valuation Methodologies

901 In this section, we present methodologies and recommendations for the valuation of contingent
902 consideration. Although we touch briefly on the market approach and cost approach below, we will
903 primarily focus on the income approach, as (1) the other approaches do not consider future cash flows
904 and (2) contingent consideration is rarely traded and has no replacement cost.

905 5.1 Valuation Approaches: Income Approach, Market Approach, and Cost Approach

906 The three commonly used approaches to determine the value of an asset or liability are the income,
907 market, and cost approaches. The nature of the asset or liability being valued, as well as the availability
908 of information, determine which approach(es) will ultimately be used.

909 The income approach uses valuation methods to convert future cash flows to a single current (or
910 present) value. The measurement reflects current market expectations about those future cash flows
911 and their riskiness.

912 Given that the income approach incorporates future expectations, it is typically the approach used to
913 value contingent consideration. Two income approach methods the Working Group has observed
914 being used in practice for valuing contingent consideration are the Scenario Based Method (SBM, see
915 Section 5.3) and the Option Pricing Method (OPM, see Section 5.4). Other income approach methods
916 for the valuation of contingent consideration also may exist or be developed in the future.

917 A comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the SBM and OPM is presented in Section 5.5
918 and the recommendations of the Working Group for the circumstances under which each methodology
919 is typically appropriate are provided in Section 5.6.

920 Monte Carlo simulation (see Sections 5.3.6 and 5.4.4) and binomial lattice models (see Section 5.4.5)
921 are examples of techniques that can be used in conjunction with either SBM or OPM. Section 5.6
922 provides the recommendations of the Working Group for the circumstances under which techniques
923 such as Monte Carlo simulation are typically appropriate.

924 The market approach uses prices and other relevant information generated by market transactions
925 involving identical or comparable assets or liabilities. Valuation methods consistent with the market
926 approach typically rely on observed ranges of market value multiples of key financial metrics derived
927 from a set of comparables. The selection of the appropriate multiple within the range requires
928 judgment, considering qualitative and quantitative factors specific to the measurement.

929 Given the nature of contingent consideration and the lack of an active trading market, the market
930 approach is rarely used to value contingent consideration. In rare cases, there may be traded securities
931 that are relevant (e.g., contingent value rights [CVRs]). However, the market for CVRs often exhibits
932 low trading volumes, trades between related parties, and/or perceived information asymmetries
933 (where, for example, sellers may be perceived to have more information about the likely outcomes
934 than most buyers.)³⁹ The valuation specialist would need to consider these factors along with other
935 typical market approach reliability indicators to determine if the market approach is useful, even in
936 the rare case where market data on the value of contingent consideration is available.

937 The cost approach is based on the amount that currently would be required to replace the service
938 capacity of an asset (often referred to as current replacement cost). From the perspective of a market
939 participant seller, the price that would be received for the asset is based on the cost to a market

³⁹ In most fair value measurements, buyers and sellers are assumed to be informed of relevant facts; information asymmetries are assumed to be minimal. However, in the market for CVRs, perceived information asymmetries can be significant.

940 participant buyer to acquire or construct a substitute asset of comparable utility, adjusted for
941 obsolescence.

942 Given that there often is no obvious way to estimate a replacement cost for a contingent consideration
943 arrangement and that the cost approach does not consider future expectations, it typically would not
944 be appropriate to use the cost approach to value contingent consideration.

945 The remainder of Section 5 will focus on the income approach to valuing contingent consideration.

946 **5.2 Key Elements of an Income Approach to Contingent Consideration Valuation**

947 Key elements of valuation using an income approach include:

- 948 • The expected (mean) cash flow
- 949 • (For nonlinear payoff structures), the probability distribution around the mean cash flow
- 950 • The discount rate and Required Metric Risk Premium.

951 Because contingent consideration arrangements (1) often occur in situations where there is substantial
952 uncertainty about the future and in some of those cases the expected forecast is not close to the most
953 likely forecast, (2) often are based on non-traded financial metrics and (3) often include nonlinear
954 payoff structures, addressing these three elements can require significant effort.

955 The remainder of this section 5.2 will address the above three key contingent consideration valuation
956 elements as well as other elements of an income approach, including:

- 957 • The estimation of volatility in growth for the metric
- 958 • The mid-period discounting convention
- 959 • Counterparty credit risk and
- 960 • Multiple-currency structures.

961 *5.2.1 Estimating Contingent Consideration Payment Cash Flows*

962 There are several important differences between estimating the expected cash flows of a business and
963 of a contingent consideration arrangement.

964 First, the financial projections developed for the valuation of an earnout will be based on the
965 contractual definitions of the underlying metrics as specified in the earnout agreement. These
966 definitions may not coincide with the standard metric definitions used to value a business. The
967 definitions of the earnout metrics might be designed, for example, to best motivate certain desirable
968 seller behavior, to better shift or allocate risk related to specific types of future performance, or to
969 minimize post-transaction disputes. For example, a revenue-based earnout may focus on the revenue
970 associated with only a key portion of the business or might have its own, idiosyncratic definition of
971 “revenue.”

972 Furthermore, because the earnout is valued from the perspective of a market participant buying or
973 selling the standalone earnout post-transaction (with the relevant business under the new ownership
974 of the actual buyer), the financial projections developed for valuing an earnout often include buyer-
975 specific synergies.⁴⁰ In contrast, the financial projections developed for valuing an acquired business

⁴⁰ See Section 4.1 for a discussion of the market participants for contingent consideration. Buyer-specific synergies are included in the financial projections for valuing the earnout unless the relevant agreement specifically excludes such synergies from the definition of the earnout metric. There are also situations in which the earnout agreement deliberately excludes market participant synergies; in such situations, the earnout valuation might include *fewer* synergies than the valuation of the acquired business.

976 typically only include market participant synergies, excluding synergies that are unique to the buyer
977 and not available to other market participants.

978 Second, as discussed in Section 4.2, the estimation of the expected future contingent consideration
979 cash flow typically requires assumptions about the distribution of outcomes for the underlying metric.
980 There are two common methods used to develop the metric distribution assumptions.

981 One method is to develop future scenarios relevant to the underlying metric. The analysis would
982 include an estimation of the metric outcome under different scenarios and the scenario likelihood,
983 based on information known or knowable as of the measurement date. Assumptions about outcome
984 scenarios and their likelihoods may be based on, for example, analyses conducted by the parties during
985 the transaction process (e.g., in a deal model or board presentation), historical company or industry
986 experience (e.g., the observed track record of success in software integration for the buyer's past
987 acquisitions or industry data on the probability that a new drug in a certain therapeutic area receives
988 regulatory approval) or management assessments.

989 An alternative method commonly used for estimating the distribution of future outcomes for financial
990 metrics is to start from the mean (probability-weighted, expected case) financial projections for the
991 business, for example, the expected case projections⁴¹ used to value the business or its intangibles. A
992 typical process would be for the valuation specialist to:

- 993 • Identify the expected case projection for the relevant metric consistent with the expected case
994 cash flows of the business
- 995 • Adjust the metric projection if necessary to be consistent with the contractual definition of the
996 metric in the contingent consideration arrangement (including adjustment to include all
997 relevant buyer-specific synergies and to exclude any non-relevant market participant
998 synergies)
- 999 • Estimate the variance around the expected case projection of the metric
- 1000 • Assume a metric probability distribution based on the metric's estimated mean and variance.

1001 A combination of these two methods might also be used in certain situations, for example to address
1002 financial metric distributions that are difficult to represent with just a mean and variance due to the
1003 impact of diversifiable events, such as the results of R&D (e.g., the performance of a new product
1004 relative to its competitors). The valuation specialist often takes such diversifiable events into account
1005 via probability-weighting the payoffs in various scenarios, as described in more detail in Sections 5.4.3
1006 and 10.3.5.

1007 Whichever method is being used to develop a distribution of metric outcomes, the reliability of each
1008 data source should be considered and adjustments made as appropriate. For example, while a buyer's
1009 deal model might analyze only base case and downside scenarios if that was sufficient for the buyer
1010 to gain comfort with the transaction, there may be relevant upside scenarios as well. Assumptions
1011 based on historical experience may need to be adjusted for the facts and circumstances of the
1012 transaction. As another example, management might assess that the potential variability of
1013 performance around the base case is equal in all future years even though one might expect greater
1014 variability in later years.

1015 With respect to management assessments, the valuation specialist should consider using elicitation
1016 procedures that minimize the known biases associated with probability assessments. Such known

⁴¹ The "expected case" is not the base case or most likely scenario. The expected case is the probability-weighted mean across the potential outcomes.

1017 biases include anchoring on recent results or a prior projection, overconfidence (failing to consider a
1018 wide enough range of potential future outcomes), and conditioning estimates on hidden assumptions
1019 (such as no competitive reactions to a new product introduction).⁴² Debiassing techniques include
1020 counteranchors, counterexamples, assessing multiple scenarios (e.g., high, middle and low cases),
1021 contemplation of extreme scenarios, conducting pre-mortems, taking an outside perspective,
1022 crosschecks, and decomposition, among others.⁴³

1023 A commonly observed error in the context of contingent consideration valuation is for management
1024 to underestimate the range of outcomes for financial metrics such as revenue or EBITDA. For this
1025 reason, the volatility in growth rate for the metric implied by management's assessments is often tested
1026 for consistency with (1) the historical volatility in growth rate for the metric of the acquired business
1027 and/or comparable companies and (2) other risk measures such as the transaction IRR or acquired
1028 business WACC.

1029 Estimates of variance are often based on the historical volatility of the acquired business and/or
1030 comparable companies, considering either (1) historical variability of growth rates for the relevant
1031 metric, for example, variability in year-on-year quarterly growth in revenues or (2) historical
1032 variability of equity prices, adjusted for financial and operational leverage of the relevant metric
1033 relative to the long-term free cash flows to equity.⁴⁴ However, care should be taken when using such
1034 historical data to estimate the variance around the expected case projections. In many situations (e.g.,
1035 the acquisition of a young business), the motivation for creating the earnout is that the metric outcome
1036 is highly uncertain and therefore possibly more uncertain than implied by the historical data for public
1037 comparable companies. Just as it is useful to check management's assessments of variability around
1038 the expected case against the comparable companies, so too it is useful to check the historical volatility
1039 of the comparable companies against management's assessments of potential upside and downside
1040 scenarios.

1041 See Section 5.2.4 for detailed discussion of estimating volatility in growth rate for a metric.

1042 *5.2.2 Discount Rate and Market Risk Considerations*

1043 Contingent consideration payoffs are exposed to various types of risks. When selecting the discounting
1044 for the contingent consideration valuation, the valuation specialist should consider:

- 1045 • The time value of money – typically captured by the risk-free rate
- 1046 • Counterparty credit risk, which represents the risk that the obligor will not be able to fulfill its
1047 obligation if and when a payment becomes due
- 1048 • Exposure to the non-diversifiable risk associated with the metric
- 1049 • The impact on risk of the payoff structure.

1050 The first two items on the above list (the time value of money plus a credit spread for the counterparty
1051 credit risk) are applicable over the timeframe from the valuation date to the expected payment date(s).
1052 However, the latter two risks (non-diversifiable risk and payoff structure risk) are applicable only over
1053 the timeframe from the valuation date until the uncertainty associated with the metric is fully resolved.

⁴² See Tversky and Kahneman (1974), *Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* for a discussion of biases that influence probability assessments and other judgements.

⁴³ See, e.g., Montibeller and von Winterfeldt (2015) for best practices in eliciting outcome scenarios and risk assessments, including debiasing techniques for minimizing both conscious and unconscious biases. See also Soll, Milkman and Payne (2015) for a practical discussion of strategies for overcoming biases in thinking too narrowly about the future.

⁴⁴ It should be noted that reliance on historical volatility of the metric or of equity prices only produces a *proxy* for volatility of the earnout metric, as this data does not measure the volatility of metric growth *relative to management's forecast*.

1054 If, for example, the contingent consideration payoff depends on the level of revenue or earnings, such
1055 financial metrics are typically exposed to systematic risk only until the time at which the uncertainty
1056 is resolved, i.e., until the metric outcome, and hence the payoff amount, is known. However, even after
1057 the uncertainty about a payoff amount is resolved, the discounting should incorporate the time value
1058 of money and a premium for any exposure to counterparty credit risk until the date the payment is
1059 made. Systematic risk is the primary subject of this section. See Section 5.2.6 for a discussion of
1060 counterparty credit risk.

1061 An earnout metric can be exposed to non-diversifiable risk, diversifiable risk, or both. The level of
1062 exposure varies depending on the nature of the metric. The risk of certain nonfinancial milestone
1063 contingent consideration structures, where a payment is made upon occurrence of a company-specific
1064 event largely unrelated to market dynamics, would likely be considered predominantly diversifiable.
1065 In contrast, contingent consideration payments based on a company's revenue or earnings that depend
1066 on the general economy, and are therefore correlated with market movements, would include a higher
1067 level of systematic risk.

1068 The Required Metric Risk Premium (RMRP) is a measure of the excess return above the risk-free rate,
1069 or risk premium, that investors demand to bear the non-diversifiable risk associated with a metric.
1070 While our discussion of how to estimate the RMRP is set within the Adjusted CAPM framework
1071 introduced in Section 4.3.1 because that framework is commonly used in practice, the same principles
1072 would apply if one is using an alternative framework for capturing systematic risk.

1073 It is useful to begin a discussion of estimating the RMRP associated with an earnout metric with a
1074 discussion of estimating the RMRP applicable to long-term free cash flows to equity (LTFCFE), for
1075 which there are well-established and widely used methods, derived from the estimate of the cost of
1076 equity. We have the following standard definition (including the potential additional premiums as
1077 discussed in Section 4.3.1):

$$RMRP_{LTFCFE} = R_{LTFCFE} - LTRFR = \beta_{Equity} \times MRP + AP$$

1078 Where:

1080 $RMRP_{LTFCFE}$ = the Required Metric Risk Premium for LTFCFE

1081 R_{LTFCFE} = the required rate of return (i.e., discount rate) for LTFCFE

1082 LTRFR = the long-term risk-free rate

1083 β_{Equity} = the beta of the equity capital needed to generate the LTFCFE

1084 MRP = Market Risk Premium

1085 AP = Additional premiums (e.g., size premiums, country risk premiums, and company-specific
1086 premiums as discussed in Section 4.3.1)

1087 Since earnouts based on the long-term free cash flows to equity are rare, one generally needs to modify
1088 the estimate to account for the specific risk and return characteristics of the earnout metric.

1089 The above framework can be generalized to estimate the RMRP for the earnout metric (such as short-
1090 term EBITDA or revenue), as follows:

$$RMRP_{Metric} = R_{Metric} - R_{MRFR} \approx \beta_{Metric} \times MRP^{45} + AP_{Metric}$$

1091 Where:

⁴⁵ This formulation does not incorporate the impact that debt financing might have on the RMRP for the earnout metric. The valuation specialist should consider whether any adjustments are needed.

1093 $RMRP_{Metric}$ = the Required Metric Risk Premium for the metric
1094 R_{Metric} = the required rate of return (i.e. discount rate) for the metric
1095 R_{MRFR} = the risk-free rate over a term consistent with the metric exposure timeframe
1096 β_{Metric} = the beta of the metric
1097 MRP = the Market Risk Premium
1098 AP_{Metric} = the portion of the additional risk premiums applicable to the earnout metric
1099 The bottom-up method of estimating the RMRP (described in Section 5.2.3) relies on this framework.
1100 An alternative starting point for estimating the RMRP is the risk premium applicable to long-term free
1101 cash flows to the firm (LTFCFF), for which there are also well-established and widely used estimation
1102 methods. To estimate the RMRP for the earnout metric, the estimated RMRP applicable to LTFCFF
1103 is modified to account for differences between the specific risk and return characteristics of the earnout
1104 metric (such as short-term EBITDA or revenue) as follows:
1105 $RMRP_{Metric} = R_{Metric} - R_{MRFR} = RMRP_{LTFCFF} \times AF_{Metric} \approx (WACC^{46} - LTRFR) \times AF_{Metric}$
1106 Where:
1107 $RMRP_{Metric}$ = the Required Metric Risk Premium for the metric
1108 R_{Metric} = the required rate of return (i.e. discount rate) for the metric
1109 R_{MRFR} = the risk-free rate over a term consistent with the metric exposure timeframe
1110 $RMRP_{LTFCFF}$ = the Required Metric Risk Premium for LTFCFF
1111 $LTRFR$ = the long-term risk-free rate
1112 AF_{Metric} = the adjustment factor required to account for the differences in risk between
1113 LTFCFF and the earnout metric⁴⁷
1114 $WACC$ = the weighted average cost of capital for the earnout-relevant business
1115 The top-down method of estimating the RMRP (described in Section 5.2.3) relies on this framework.
1116 As can be seen from the equations for $RMRP_{LTFCFF}$ and $RMRP_{Metric}$, no matter which framework you
1117 are using, the risk premium for a metric will often not be the same as the risk premium associated with
1118 the long-term free cash flows to equity or to the firm. Therefore, even for an earnout with a linear
1119 payoff structure, the earnout discount rate will often not be the same as the IRR or the WACC for the
1120 business.
1121 The structure of the earnout does not impact the estimation of the RMRP. Importantly, however, the
1122 impact on the *value* of the earnout of *applying* the RMRP varies greatly based on the structure of the
1123 earnout. If the payoff structure is *linear*, the systematic risk exposure can be easily captured by

⁴⁶ This formulation explicitly incorporates the impact of the tax-related benefits associated with debt financing. The valuation specialist should consider whether such benefits are applicable to the RMRP for the earnout metric and whether any adjustments are needed.

⁴⁷ As an example, adjustments for operational leverage and for duration would be required for a short-term revenue-based earnout metric. An adjustment should also be considered for differences in risk between LTFCFF and for example, EBITDA, when there are significant cash flow adjustments for, e.g., depreciation and amortization, capital expenditures, or working capital requirements. The adjustment factor is often characterized as multiplicative when it is reasonable to adjust all risk premiums proportionately, but it may take other forms when the various risk factors require disproportionate adjustments. See Section 5.2.3 for a more in-depth discussion of methods of estimating the RMRP.

1124 discounting the future contingent consideration expected payoffs at the RMRP. However, as explained
1125 in Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, estimating a discount rate for a *nonlinear* payoff structure exposed to
1126 systematic risk is a challenge which can best be overcome by using a risk-neutral valuation framework.

1127 Returning to the discussion of how to account for the specific risk and return characteristics of the
1128 earnout metric, we note that estimation of the Market Risk Premium (MRP) has been well studied.
1129 There are numerous publications that estimate the currently expected equity return required by the
1130 market over and above the return associated with investments in risk-free securities.⁴⁸ The market risk
1131 premium that is estimated by using a broad-based index is typically considered a reasonable proxy for
1132 the risk premium required by an investor for a diversified portfolio of investments. Estimating the
1133 required premium associated with the *metric's* risk (i.e., the RMRP), however, is not always as simple
1134 a task.

1135 Estimating the RMRP *associated with the earnout metric* requires consideration of (1) the systematic
1136 risk factors associated with an investment in the metric (such as the correlation of the growth rate of
1137 the metric with market returns, the volatility of the growth rate for the metric, and the volatility in the
1138 rates of return required by investors for an investment with a duration matching that of the earnout⁴⁹)
1139 and (2) consistency with the rates at which comparable or related cash flows are being discounted for
1140 other purposes (such as a valuation of the intangible assets acquired in the same transaction).⁵⁰ At a
1141 fundamental level, estimating the RMRP involves a quantification of the amount of risk associated
1142 with an investment in the metric over the duration of the earnout.

1143 It is important to consider how the contingent consideration metric relates to the cash flows generated
1144 by the business. For instance, cash flows associated with the business are generally free cash flows,
1145 whereas many earnouts are based on metrics related to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT),
1146 EBITDA, revenue, etc. Each metric may have unique characteristics that impact the amount of
1147 systematic risk as compared to the long-term free cash flows to equity or the firm due to, for example,
1148 differences in financial and operational leverage or volatility.⁵¹

1149 If there is no non-diversifiable risk associated with the metric, then the RMRP is zero. This situation
1150 is common for earnouts based on nonfinancial milestone events with predominantly diversifiable risk,
1151 such as the success of a research and development (R&D) effort, the ability to meet a deadline for a
1152 software integration task, or the success in getting a specified percentage of the acquiree's existing
1153 customer base to agree to a contract modification in order to continue receiving services post-
1154 acquisition. (See Section 9.3 for an example of the valuation of an earnout based on a nonfinancial
1155 milestone event with predominantly diversifiable risk.) For financial metrics such as revenue or profit-
1156 based metrics, the RMRP is typically not zero, and an adjustment for the non-diversifiable risk
1157 associated with the metric is required.

⁴⁸ See, for instance, Duff & Phelps' estimation of the equity risk premium at <https://www.duffandphelps.com/CostofCapital>.

⁴⁹ As for the value of an investment in equity, the value of the earnout to a market participant is affected by two types of volatility: (1) the volatility of the forecast for the earnout metric around the expected case and (2) the volatility in the rates of return required by investors for an investment with a duration matching that of the earnout. The need to incorporate the second type of volatility may be more apparent if one considers the replicating portfolio derivation of options pricing theory, whereby a combination of a risk-free asset and the underlying security (whose value is affected both by changes in the forecast results and by changes in the market's required rates of return) is used to replicate the payoff of a financial derivative.

⁵⁰ Consistency does not mean that the discount rates are identical or even similar. See Section 7.2 for a discussion of consistency checks and some of the key differences between the valuation of a business or its intangibles and the valuation of contingent consideration.

⁵¹ See, e.g., Sections 10.3.1, 10.3.2, and 10.3.3 for discussions of alternative methodologies for addressing how to take differences in financial leverage, operational leverage, and volatility into account, when estimating a RMRP.

1158 A financial metric-based beta, such as an earnings-based beta or a revenue-based beta, is a measure of
1159 the systematic risk associated with the future performance for that financial metric, in a CAPM
1160 framework. While the literature on equity betas, asset betas, and the WACC is rather extensive,
1161 estimating a revenue beta (or a RMRP for revenue) may be a less familiar undertaking for many
1162 valuation specialists. Nevertheless, there are multiple methodologies that can be used for measuring
1163 systematic risk even for a revenue metric.

1164 Methods for estimating the RMRP for a financial metric are described in the next section, with
1165 earnings-based metrics (such as EBITDA) and revenue used as illustrative examples of a financial
1166 metric.

1167 *5.2.3 Methods for Estimating the Required Metric Risk Premium*

1168 The methods for estimating the RMRP (equivalently the methods for estimating the discount rate for
1169 risk-adjusting the metric projections) associated with financial metrics can be divided into two broad
1170 categories:


1171 1. The **top-down method** typically starts with the estimated risk premium implied by the discount
1172 rate for the long-term free cash flows to the firm (for example, the transaction IRR or the WACC
1173 estimate – the long-term risk-free rate), which is then adjusted for the differences in risk between
1174 the long-term free cash flows and the earnout metric. Adjustments are often made for the following
1175 items:

- 1176 a. The short-term nature of the earnout metric, potentially including differences in investor
1177 volatility for short-term free cash flows as compared to long-term free cash flows
- 1178 b. Differences in leverage⁵² between free cash flows and the earnout metric
- 1179 c. Differences attributable to which synergies are included or excluded by the definition of
1180 the earnout metric (for example, the inclusion of buyer-specific synergies)
- 1181 d. Other differences in risk (e.g., if using an Adjusted CAPM framework, differences in the
1182 size premium, country-risk premium, and company-specific premium) between the long-
1183 term free cash flows of the relevant business and the earnout metric. For example, if starting
1184 from a WACC derived from comparable public companies where for purposes of valuing
1185 the business a size premium was added, adjustments might be made to incorporate the
1186 portion of that size premium that is applicable to the earnout metric. As another example,
1187 if starting from the IRR associated with the transaction for the relevant business,
1188 adjustments might need to be made to remove the portion of the size premium (or any other
1189 additional risk premiums) that is not applicable to the earnout metric.

1190 2. The **bottom-up method** starts (in the Adjusted CAPM framework) by estimating the earnout
1191 metric's beta, based on (a) the volatility in growth of the metric relative to the volatility of a proxy
1192 for the market and (b) the correlation between growth in the metric and in the market. Adjustments
1193 are then made to incorporate the portion of the additional risk premiums (i.e., size premiums,
1194 country-risk premiums, and company-specific premiums) applicable to the earnout metric.
1195 Adjustments could also be considered for the availability of debt financing.

⁵² Financial leverage is typically accounted for in the WACC. Operational leverage is not accounted for in the WACC or IRR and therefore top-down methods should adjust for operational leverage for a metric such as revenues. In addition, the valuation specialist should consider whether there are other differences in leverage for the earnout metric as compared to the long-term free cash flows. For example, depending on the earnout metric, adjustments might be considered if there are substantial differences in leverage due to depreciation, amortization, capital expenditures, or working capital requirements.

1196 Figure 9 below illustrates these two methods for estimating the RMRP, in an Adjusted CAPM
 1197 framework. Figure 9 also illustrates that when starting with the WACC or IRR, the discount rate
 1198 appropriate for the metric replaces the long-term risk-free rate with a risk-free rate commensurate with
 1199 the duration of the earnout.



1200 The following example illustrates (in an Adjusted CAPM framework) how the top-down and bottom-
 1201 up methods can be used to estimate the RMRP associated with an earnout metric.

- 1202 *Example:* Consider the following situation:
- 1203 • Long-term risk-free rate = 4%
 - 1204 • Market Risk Premium = 5%
 - 1205 • Equity beta for the business = 1.0
 - 1206 • Size premium for the business = 10%
 - 1207 • Debt/equity ratio = 0.

1208 With this fact pattern, the WACC for the business could be estimated to be 19% (computed as
 1209 4% + 1.0×5% + 10%). The Required Metric Risk Premium for the long-term free cash flows
 1210 to the firm (RMRP_{LTFCFF})⁵³ is 15% (computed as 1.0×5% + 10%, or equivalently, WACC –
 1211 long-term risk-free rate = 19% – 4%).

1212 Now suppose that the earnout for this transaction is based on revenues over the next year. How
 1213 can the top-down and bottom-up methods be used to estimate the RMRP associated with this
 1214 earnout?

1215 1. Top-Down Method:

1216 The valuation specialist considers what adjustments are needed to the RMRP_{LTFCFF} of 15% to
 1217 account for the differences in risk between the long-term free cash flows to the firm and the
 1218 short-term free cash flows over the earnout period. For the purposes of this example, assume

⁵³ Note, as debt is assumed to be zero in this example, RMRP for the long-term free cash flows to the firm = RMRP for the long-term free cash flows to equity = (WACC – long-term risk-free rate).

1219 that the valuation specialist concludes that no adjustments are needed for duration. Next, the
1220 valuation specialist considers whether there are significant differences in financial leverage as
1221 compared to the leverage taken into account by the WACC analysis. Assume for purposes of
1222 this example that, after due consideration, the valuation specialist concludes that there are no
1223 significant differences in risk caused by, for example, capital expenditures, depreciation,
1224 amortization, or working capital requirements. In combination with the assumption of no debt,
1225 this analysis leads the valuation specialist to conclude that no adjustments to the $RMRP_{LTFCFF}$
1226 are needed for financial leverage. Next, the valuation specialist estimates the operating
1227 leverage ratio applicable to the first year of revenue post-close, perhaps using one of the
1228 methods described in Section 10.3.2. For the purposes of this example, assume that the
1229 leverage ratio estimate is 50%. After due consideration, the valuation specialist concludes that
1230 it is appropriate to apply the leverage ratio adjustment to the entire risk premium, i.e.,
1231 proportionately adjusting the market risk and size premiums that are applicable to the one-year
1232 revenue metric. With these assumptions, the RMRP for one-year revenue is calculated as 15%
1233 $\times 50\% = 7.5\%$.

1234 2. Bottom-Up Method:

1235 The valuation specialist estimates the beta for one-year revenue, perhaps using one of the
1236 methods described in Section 10.3.3, to be 0.5. Assume that after due consideration, the
1237 valuation specialist concludes that it is appropriate to use the ratio of the revenue beta to the
1238 equity beta ($0.5 \div 1.0$) to estimate the portion of the additional size premium applicable to the
1239 one-year revenue metric (i.e., half the 10% size premium is applicable to the revenue metric).
1240 Finally, because debt is zero in this example, the valuation specialist concludes that no further
1241 adjustment is needed for the availability of debt financing. With these assumptions, the RMRP
1242 for one-year revenue is also 7.5% (computed as $0.5 \times 5\% + 10\% \times 50\%$).

1243 Note also that, whether using a top-down or a bottom-up method, the risk-free rate used in the
1244 remainder of the analysis will *not* be the long-term risk-free rate of 4% that is included in the
1245 WACC for the business. The risk-free rate (and any counterparty credit risk premium, see
1246 Section 5.2.6) used in the earnout valuation should be commensurate with the time period from
1247 the valuation date to the expected payment date(s).

1248 In both the top-down and bottom-up methods, consideration should be given to the extent to which
1249 any additional risk premiums (e.g., size premiums, company-specific premiums, country risk
1250 premiums or other additional premiums representing non-diversifiable risk)⁵⁴ incorporated in the
1251 estimated WACC for the relevant business are applicable to the earnout metric. Typically, the
1252 valuation specialist will consider the rationale for including each of the additional premiums in the
1253 WACC build-up, and then assess whether and to what degree the same rationale applies to the risk
1254 associated with the earnout metric. Sample considerations are provided below.

- 1255 • In assessing the portion of any size premium applicable to the earnout metric, one consideration
1256 might be the extent to which the business relevant to the earnout is anticipated to be integrated
1257 with the acquirer over the term of the earnout. The more integrated the business, the more the
1258 size premium applicable to the RMRP would resemble the size premium for the *acquirer's*
1259 business (post-transaction).

⁵⁴ Methods such as the Fama-French five-factor model (see Fama and French (2015)) include other measures of systematic risk. The principles articulated in this Valuation Advisory should generally be applicable to any premiums intended to capture non-diversifiable risk.

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- The portion of a company-specific premium applicable to the earnout metric can be challenging to gauge. If there is support that the earnout metric is, for example, 20% less risky than the long-term free cash flows of the related business, then including the additional premiums used in the WACC proportionately reduced by 20% might be a reasonable and practical methodology. However, if the company-specific premium is included in the WACC solely to reflect the higher risk of aggressive projections for *long-term* future cash-flows (but not higher risk over the course of the earnout period), then a lower company-specific premium may be appropriate for the earnout metric's RMRP. Similarly, if the rationale for the company-specific premium is to address significant near-term risk or aggressive projections relevant to the earnout metric over the earnout period, then including the full company-specific premium may be appropriate for the earnout metric's RMRP.
- 1271
- For country risk premiums, in addition to the extent to which such a premium is relevant to the earnout metric, another consideration might be whether the earnout payoff is derived from the relevant countries in the same proportions as the long-term free cash flows for the business.
- 1272
- 1273

1274 In the example provided earlier in this section, for the top-down method, the operating leverage ratio
1275 adjustment proportionately reduced both the size premium and the market risk premium included in
1276 the WACC. For the bottom-up method, the portion of the size premium deemed applicable to the
1277 revenue metric was chosen to be proportional to the ratio of the revenue beta to the equity beta. When
1278 there is no clear support for fully including or fully excluding an additional premium, it is not
1279 uncommon for a valuation specialist to consider it reasonable to include a proportion of the additional
1280 premium in accordance with the relative risk of the earnout metric and long-term free cash flows to
1281 equity.

1282 Given the above considerations regarding size, country-specific and company-specific premiums, the
1283 additional premiums incorporated in an earnout metric's Required Metric Risk Premium will generally
1284 be less than or equal to the additional premiums associated with the long-term free cash flows of the
1285 business. Similarly, due to financial and operational leverage and the typically shorter time horizon
1286 for an earnout, the metric beta for an earnings-based or revenue-based earnout is also typically less
1287 than the beta for the long-term free cash flows to equity. As a result, an earnout metric's RMRP will
1288 often be less than the risk premium built into the WACC minus the long-term risk-free rate (LTRFR)
1289 for the related business.⁵⁵ The earnout metric's RMRP will generally be less than (WACC – LTRFR)
1290 for a revenue-based metric, due to operational leverage. Even for an earnings-based metric such as
1291 EBITDA, the earnout metric's RMRP may be less than (WACC – LTRFR), due to the difference in
1292 duration or, for example, when capital expenditures add significant leverage.

1293 Ultimately, the objective is to estimate a RMRP that reflects the market participant view of the non-
1294 diversifiable risk associated with the earnout metric, while ensuring consistency with the transaction
1295 economics and market conditions as of the measurement date.

1296 The next sections discuss the RMRP estimation process using the top-down and bottom-up methods
1297 for two common contingent consideration financial metrics: earnings-based metrics and revenue-
1298 based metrics. After the discussion of these RMRP estimation methodologies, this section concludes

⁵⁵ An exception could occur, for example, if the expected earnout cash flow is riskier than the cash flows of the business from a market participant point of view (e.g., due to the inclusion in the earnout of riskier buyer-specific synergies that are not included in the market participant WACC for the business).

1299 with a discussion of whether and when to incorporate tax effects into the estimate of the RMRP for a
1300 pre-tax metric.⁵⁶

1301 5.2.3.1 Top-down Methods for Earnings-Based RMRP Estimation

1302 The top-down method for estimating an earnings-based RMRP such as EBIT typically⁵⁷ starts with
1303 the estimated risk premium implied by the discount rate for the long-term free cash flows to the firm
1304 for the relevant business (i.e., typically the transaction IRR or the WACC for the business, less the
1305 long-term risk-free rate), which is then adjusted for differences in duration and in leverage between
1306 the long-term free cash flows to the firm and the earnout metric.⁵⁸

1307 Many methodologies for estimating earnings-based discount rates start with the assumption that the
1308 risk associated with the earnings of the firm is reasonably comparable to the risk associated with the
1309 underlying assets of the firm. In the CAPM framework,⁵⁹ an asset beta (or “unlevered” equity beta,
1310 i.e., unlevered to remove the effect of financial leverage) is assumed to be a reasonable proxy for an
1311 EBIT beta. Furthermore, in many circumstances an EBIT beta is considered a reasonable
1312 approximation for other earnings-based betas such as EBITDA betas.⁶⁰ That is, in many circumstances
1313 it is considered reasonable to assume that

$$1314 \beta_{EBITDA} \approx \beta_{EBIT} \approx \beta_{Asset}^{61}$$

1315 In certain circumstances in which the leverage introduced by taxes and cash flow adjustments such as
1316 tax depreciation and amortization, capital expenditures, and working capital requirements is minimal,
1317 it may be considered a reasonable approximation to use the same RMRP implied by the discount rate
1318 applied to the long-term free cash flows of the business (as estimated by, for instance, the WACC)⁶²
1319 as an estimate of the RMRP for EBITDA.

$$1320 WACC - LTRFR \approx RMRP_{EBITDA} \approx RMRP_{EBIT}$$

1321 However, in the less common situation when taxes are not linearly related to pre-tax earnings (e.g., if
1322 there are substantial net operating losses or tax credits in some of the earnout years) or when there are
1323 substantial cash flow adjustments due to, e.g., depreciation, amortization or capital expenditures over
1324 the earnout timeframe, an adjustment may be required for the related difference in risk between an

⁵⁶ Pre-tax earnings typically have comparable risk to post-tax earnings, although there are instances in which taxes introduce significant financial leverage and therefore significant differences in risk, as explained in Section 5.2.3.7.

⁵⁷ The top-down method could also start with the estimated risk premium implied by the discount rate for long-term free cash flows to equity, which would require additional adjustments to account for financial leverage. See Section 10.3.1.

⁵⁸ For simplicity of exposition, in this and similar succeeding sections, we will assume that the expected cash flow for the earnout has been adjusted to reflect all relevant synergies (including any earnout-relevant buyer-specific synergies), and that there are no differences in the metric risk due to any differences caused by the inclusion or exclusion of synergies in the calculation of the earnout payoffs.

⁵⁹ While the discussion of the adjustments to the RMRP in this section illustrates the concepts in the CAPM framework, the underlying theory of adjusting for financial leverage in estimating an earnings-based RMRP should apply to most other models for quantifying non-diversifiable risk. See Section 4.3.1 for a description of the CAPM framework and the Adjusted CAPM framework.

⁶⁰ The approximate equivalence of the EBIT beta and the EBITDA beta generally holds, except when there are significant fixed depreciation or amortization expenses. In such circumstances, the asset beta can be adjusted by using the de-levering techniques described in Section 10.3.2, but instead of de-levering for fixed costs as compared to EBIT, the valuation specialist would instead de-lever only for the fixed portion of depreciation or amortization in EBITDA as compared to EBIT. Alternatively, this distinction can be captured directly using the bottom-up method. Similarly, while the asset beta is usually a reasonable approximation for the EBIT beta, adjustments might be required for businesses with a significant amount of fixed capital expenditures.

⁶¹ More generally, when a business has both debt and equity funding, the long-term asset beta implied by the WACC may often be approximated as $(WACC - \text{long-term risk-free rate}) / MRP$. Such an estimate of the asset beta assumes that the financial leverage adjustments incorporated in the WACC are approximately comparable to the financial leverage adjustments required for the relevant earnings-based metric (such as EBIT or EBITDA).

⁶² Such an estimate should already capture aspects of the financial leverage difference between free cash flows to equity and total free cash flows.

1325 earnout metric such as EBIT and the long-term free cash flows to the firm. See Sections 10.3.1 and
1326 10.3.2 for a discussion of de-leveraging methodologies that could be used to adjust for these types of
1327 differences in risk.

1328 As discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.3, in an Adjusted CAPM framework, only the portion of
1329 any additional risk premiums included in the WACC for the relevant business (e.g., size premiums,
1330 country-risk premiums, and company-specific premiums) that are applicable to the earnout metric over
1331 the earnout period should be included in the RMRP.

1332 When applying top-down methods, it is important to consider whether any adjustments may be
1333 warranted to account for differences in the earnings metric for the earnout as compared to the long-
1334 term free cash flows of the business. For instance, typically asset betas are based on estimates of long-
1335 term equity betas, and as such relying on them produces estimates of long-term EBIT betas. However,
1336 many earnouts are short term in nature. There is some empirical evidence that long-term betas may
1337 generally be higher than short-term betas,⁶³ consistent with the greater exposure in the long term to
1338 the impact of shifts in macroeconomic drivers of the market.⁶⁴ In cases where the earnout is short term,
1339 each of the components of the WACC build-up can be replaced with short-term assumptions, thereby
1340 at least partially adjusting for the short-term nature of the earnout metric versus the long-term free
1341 cash flows of the business. However, short-term earnings-related results may also be more related to
1342 idiosyncratic, largely diversifiable, company-specific factors that may be specific to the acquisition
1343 (such as integration risks, timing of achievement of cost or cross-sell synergies, or timing of product
1344 launch) than they are related to long-term earnings growth; further adjustments might be appropriate
1345 in such a situation.

1346 When applying top-down methods, it is also important to consider whether there are any differences
1347 in risk due to differences in the definition of what is included in the earnout metric. For instance, an
1348 earnings-based earnout metric that includes buyer-specific synergies may be riskier than the cash flows
1349 excluding those synergies.

1350 Adjustments could also be appropriate to address volatility-related issues associated with the short-
1351 term nature of the earnout. For example, volatility might be lower (e.g., if a portion of the future results
1352 will be derived from contracts already in place) or higher (e.g., if management has assessed an
1353 unusually large uncertainty regarding future results) than implied by comparable company asset betas.
1354 See Section 5.2.4 for a further discussion of volatility estimation.

1355 Additionally, estimates of both the equity and asset betas include the volatility in returns required by
1356 investors for investments in equity securities. Top-down methods that rely on the equity or asset beta
1357 therefore assume that the risk characteristics (i.e., beta and volatility in a CAPM framework) for EBIT
1358 are the same as the risk characteristics of a hypothetical security that generates EBIT, including the
1359 volatility in returns required by investors for such securities. Since equities are typically longer-term
1360 investments, and the volatility in the value investors place on investments generally increases with the
1361 time horizon,⁶⁵ this method can overestimate systematic risk for earnout metrics. The overestimate is
1362 normally small for long-term earnouts, but may be significant for short-term earnouts. Furthermore,
1363 an earnings metric such as EBIT is a flow variable⁶⁶ that is earned over the course of the earnout

⁶³ It is typically assumed that betas are mean-reverting and that the term structure of betas is flat.

⁶⁴ See Allen, Myers, and Brealey, *Principles of Corporate Finance*, 11th ed. (2013), pp. 228-229.

⁶⁵ For instance, there is significant volatility in U. S. treasury bonds with a 20-year remaining term, even though the underlying cash flows associated with those treasury bonds are considered to be risk-free. However, this volatility drops dramatically as the remaining term approaches zero, with e.g. negligible volatility for a 20-year U.S. treasury bond with one year remaining on its term.

⁶⁶ A metric that is earned over a fixed time period (e.g., EBITDA or revenue for a year) is referred to as a flow variable. In contrast, a stock variable includes all value to be received over an infinite future time horizon.

1364 period, whereas an equity value (from which the asset beta is derived) is a stock variable, i.e. a forward-
1365 looking point estimate of the future value of returns on investment in the company. As just one
1366 example of the impact of this difference on systematic risk and volatility, any new information that
1367 substantially changes the long-term outlook for a business would affect the equity (and asset) value,
1368 but unless that new information substantially affects earnings over the course of the earnout period,
1369 the value of an earnout based on the flow variable EBIT would be less impacted or even possibly
1370 unaffected. An adjustment could also be considered to account for these issues.

1371 If, instead of starting with the WACC – long-term risk-free rate, the valuation specialist chooses to
1372 start with the cost of equity, then an adjustment should be considered for financial leverage. There are
1373 many methods for de-levering the equity risk premium to estimate the RMRP for earnings-based
1374 metrics such as EBIT, including but not limited to:

- 1375 • The Hamada Method
- 1376 • The Modigliani-Miller Generalized Beta Method
- 1377 • The Practitioners' Method
- 1378 • Volatility-Based Method.

1379 See Section 10.3.1 for a discussion of the above de-levering methodologies and for considerations
1380 when choosing among these methods for a specific valuation assignment.

1381 *5.2.3.2 Top-down Method for Revenue RMRP Estimation*

1382 The top-down method for estimating a revenue-based⁶⁷ RMRP typically⁶⁸ starts with the estimated
1383 risk premium implied by the discount rate for the long-term free cash flows to the firm for the relevant
1384 business (i.e., typically the transaction IRR or the WACC for the business, less the long-term risk-free
1385 rate),⁶⁹ which is then adjusted for differences in risk between the long-term free cash flows to the firm
1386 and the revenue-based earnout metric over the earnout-relevant time horizon.

1387 Many top-down methodologies start with the WACC less the long-term risk-free rate, make any
1388 needed adjustments for duration and/or leverage differences as described in Section 5.2.3.1, and then
1389 adjust for operational leverage to account for the impact of fixed costs. Such methods start with the
1390 same assumptions used for discounting the cash flows of the business, ensuring a consistent starting
1391 point and incorporating the appropriate adjustments for financial leverage.

1392 In the CAPM framework,⁷⁰ revenue betas can also be derived from estimated asset betas by adjusting
1393 for the impact of fixed costs. This adjustment captures the impact of operational leverage in addition
1394 to the financial leverage already captured by the asset beta.

1395 As discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.3, in an Adjusted CAPM framework, only the portion of
1396 any additional risk premiums included in the WACC for the relevant business (e.g., size premiums,
1397 country-risk premiums, and company-specific premiums) that are applicable to the earnout metric over
1398 the earnout period should be included in the RMRP.

⁶⁷ While the discussion in the next few paragraphs focuses on revenue, similar points could be made for other metrics that are subject to operational leverage, such as gross profit.

⁶⁸ The top-down method could also start with the estimated risk premium implied by the discount rate for long-term free cash flows to equity, which would require additional adjustments to account for financial leverage using, for example, methods such as those described in Section 10.3.1.

⁶⁹ For simplicity of exposition, we will assume that the expected long-term free cash flows to the firm have been adjusted to reflect all relevant synergies, and that there are no differences in the metric risk due to any differences in synergies.

⁷⁰ While the discussion in this section illustrates the concepts in a CAPM framework, the underlying theory of adjusting for operational leverage should apply to most other methods for quantifying non-diversifiable risk for a revenue-based metric.

1399 When applying top-down methods, it is important to consider whether any additional adjustments may
1400 be warranted to account for differences in the revenue metric as compared to the long-term free cash
1401 flows of the business. For instance, typically asset betas (and the WACC) are based on estimates of
1402 long-term equity betas, and as such adjusting them for operational leverage produces estimates of
1403 long-term revenue betas. However, many earnouts are short term in nature. There is some empirical
1404 evidence that long-term betas may be higher than short-term betas,⁷¹ consistent with the greater
1405 exposure in the long term to the impact of shifts in macroeconomic drivers of the market.⁷² In cases
1406 where the earnout is short term, each of the components of the WACC build-up can be replaced with
1407 short-term assumptions, thereby at least partially adjusting for the short-term nature of the earnout
1408 metric versus the long-term free cash flows of the business. However, short-term revenue-related
1409 results may also be more related to idiosyncratic, largely diversifiable, company-specific factors that
1410 may be specific to the acquisition (such as integration risks, timing of cross-sell synergies, or timing
1411 of product launch) than they are related to long-term earnings growth.

1412 When applying top-down methods, it is also important to consider whether there are any differences
1413 in risk due to differences in the definition of what is included in the earnout metric. For instance,
1414 revenues that include buyer-specific synergies may be riskier than the revenues excluding those
1415 synergies.

1416 Adjustments could also be appropriate to address volatility-related issues associated with the short-
1417 term nature of the earnout. For example, volatility might be lower (e.g., if a portion of the future
1418 revenues will be derived from contracts already in place) or higher (e.g., if needed to address unusually
1419 large uncertainty regarding future results) than implied by comparable company asset betas. See
1420 Section 5.2.4 for a further discussion of volatility estimation.

1421 Additionally, estimates of both the equity and asset betas (and of the WACC), which the top-down
1422 methods can use as a starting point to estimate the RMRP for revenue, include the volatility in returns
1423 required by investors for investments in equity securities. As discussed in more detail in Section
1424 5.2.3.1, the top-down methods can therefore overestimate systematic risk for earnout metrics. The
1425 overestimate is normally small for long-term earnouts, but may be significant for short-term earnouts.

1426 While less well known than methods for estimating earnings-based RMRPs, there are methods for de-
1427 leveraging the RMRP for an EBIT metric for operational leverage over the term of the earnout, including:

- 1428 • The Fixed Costs vs. Assets Method
- 1429 • Volatility-Based Method.

1430 See Section 10.3.2 for a discussion of the above methodologies and for considerations when choosing
1431 between these methods for a specific valuation assignment. A third method (the Modified Harris-
1432 Pringle Method) is also discussed briefly in Section 10.3.2. However, the Working Group does not
1433 recommend the Modified Harris-Pringle Method for the estimation of a revenue RMRP.

1434 *5.2.3.3 Bottom-Up Method for Estimating RMRP for Earnings-Based or Revenue-Based Metrics*

1435 The Required Metric Risk Premium for a financial metric can also be estimated from the bottom-up
1436 by direct estimation, rather than by starting from (and adjusting as appropriate) the risk premium
1437 appropriate to long-term free cash flows.

⁷¹ It is typically assumed that betas are mean-reverting and that the term structure of betas is flat.

⁷² See Allen, Myers, and Brealey, *Principles of Corporate Finance*, 11th ed. (2013), pp. 228-229.

1438 In the CAPM framework,⁷³ a metric beta can be built up using estimates of the volatility of that metric
1439 and of the correlation between the growth in that metric and the market.⁷⁴ See Section 10.3.3 for more
1440 information regarding the bottom-up method for estimating a beta for an earnout metric and Section
1441 5.2.4 on estimating volatility.

1442 As discussed in Section 5.2.3, only the portion of any additional risk premiums included in the WACC
1443 for the relevant business (e.g., size premiums, country-risk premiums, and company-specific
1444 premiums) that are applicable to the earnout metric over the earnout period should be incorporated in
1445 the RMRP. For example, if a size premium was included in the WACC, then a portion of that size
1446 premium will likely need to be included in the RMRP.

1447 In circumstances where there is significant debt in the capital structure, the valuation specialist should
1448 consider whether it would be appropriate to make an adjustment to the estimated RMRP due to the
1449 impact of the availability of debt financing.

1450 For earnings-based metrics, the bottom-up estimation of the RMRP using the underlying metric itself
1451 allows for capturing the intricacies of the differences in risk associated with different types of earnings,
1452 e.g., earnings before tax (EBT) vs. EBIT vs. EBITDA. However, estimation of an earnings-based beta
1453 can be challenging. Early stage companies are often the subject of acquisitions involving earnouts,
1454 and historical data for such companies can involve negative or very small positive earnings.
1455 Comparing growth rates in such cases to market returns may not result in reasonable correlation
1456 estimates. Nevertheless, one may be able to overcome these difficulties through careful selection of
1457 comparable companies with earnings that are sufficiently positive.

1458 For revenue-based earnouts, the bottom-up method allows for capturing the intricacies of the
1459 differences in risk associated with different types of revenue (e.g., management fees versus
1460 performance fees, the latter of which may be significantly more volatile).

1461 For both revenue and earnings-based metrics, estimation of the correlation between growth in the
1462 metric and growth in the market requires care. For example, there are some indications that the returns
1463 in the stock market might be a leading indicator of revenue and earnings growth for certain industries,
1464 which would indicate that one may need to investigate lagged effects to obtain a proper estimate of
1465 correlation. As another example, if estimating correlation or volatility based on quarterly data, growth
1466 in the metric for a quarter should be measured on a year-on-year basis, so that (predictable) seasonality
1467 effects do not depress correlation estimates or inflate volatility estimates.

1468 The bottom-up method can easily accommodate alternative methods for estimation of future volatility
1469 into the RMRP, such as incorporating management assessments or historical differences between
1470 forecasts and actual results. As discussed in Section 5.2.4, these two methods directly estimate the
1471 desired quantity, which is the volatility of metric growth *relative to management's forecast*. Other
1472 methods, such as de-levering equity volatility (often used in top-down methods) or using historical
1473 metric growth of comparable companies, only estimate a proxy for volatility of the earnout metric.
1474 (They estimate the volatility of growth in the metric, not the volatility of metric growth relative to
1475 management's forecast.) Such a proxy estimate for volatility may not always produce reasonable
1476 results.

⁷³ While this discussion of the bottom-up method illustrates the concepts in the CAPM framework, the underlying theory of how to develop a bottom-up, metric-appropriate discount rate should apply to most other methods for quantifying systematic risk.

⁷⁴ See Hull, *Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives*, 8th ed. (2011), pp. 766-768.

1477 Finally, bottom-up methods do not include the volatility in returns required by investors and therefore
1478 can result in an underestimate of systematic risk for earnouts. The underestimate is normally small for
1479 short-term earnouts, but may be significant for long-term earnouts.

1480 *5.2.3.4 Ensuring Reasonableness of the Concluded Required Metric Risk Premium*

1481 Regardless of which method the valuation specialist uses to estimate a RMRP for a financial metric,
1482 it is important to ensure that the concluded estimate is reasonable. Certain methodologies are subject
1483 to potential measurement challenges or theoretical shortcomings, while others may require adjustment
1484 for duration or differences in volatility or systematic risk between the starting point (equity risk
1485 premium) and the earnout metric. When concluding on financial metric RMRPs, one should consider
1486 how the RMRP compares to other discount rates used in the valuation.

- 1487 • A comparison of the respective discount rates and the related risk factors (e.g., beta and any
1488 additional risk premiums if working in an Adjusted CAPM framework) should confirm that
1489 they are all reasonable relative to one another, and that the differences are reasonable relative
1490 to differences in the underlying risk (e.g., leverage, duration, etc.)
- 1491 • A high risk premium for the (WACC – long-term risk-free rate) is often associated with a
1492 commensurately high RMRP for an earnings-related metric. While there could be reasons for
1493 differences between the two (e.g., shorter duration, leverage differences, etc.), there should be
1494 a reasonable explanation behind any significant difference.
- 1495 • The RMRP for revenue would typically be less than the (WACC – long-term risk-free rate),
1496 due to the removal of the effect of operational leverage. The estimated RMRP for revenue
1497 during the earnout period could be *far* lower than the (WACC – long-term risk-free rate), but
1498 if so there should be a reasonable explanation for why the systematic risk is so much lower for
1499 the earnout metric (e.g., shorter duration, leverage, proportion of booked business, etc.)
- 1500 • If the earnout metric is tied to cash flows that differ from the cash flows generated by the
1501 standalone acquired business, then the relative risk of those different cash flows should be
1502 considered. For example, if the earnout metric over the earnout period is tied to performance
1503 of a consolidated business unit into which the acquired entity is merged or is affected by buyer-
1504 specific synergies,⁷⁵ that different risk profile should be reflected in the estimate of the RMRP.

1505 *5.2.3.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Top-Down Method*

1506 Advantages of the Top-Down Method:

- 1507 • The top-down method typically starts with the transaction IRR or estimated WACC of the
1508 relevant business, both of which have well-established measurement frameworks.
- 1509 • The top-down method ensures consistency of a business valuation or transaction price with an
1510 earnout that is based on the long-term free cash flows of the business. For example, the top-
1511 down method ensures that the value of an earnout that is based on 10% of the free cash flows
1512 of the business in perpetuity reconciles to 10% of the value of the business.
- 1513 • The reference WACC/IRR have often been calculated for other purposes and are therefore
1514 readily available.
- 1515 • By starting with the reference IRR or WACC, the top-down method creates a bridge between
1516 the RMRP and the discount rates used in the valuation of the relevant business.

⁷⁵ See Section 4.1 for a discussion of buyer-specific synergies.

1517 Disadvantages of the Top-Down Method:

- 1518 • There is no well-established method for adjusting long-term discount rates or IRRs to reflect
1519 the short-term nature of most earnouts. One might expect short-term betas, or IRRs from short-
1520 term investments, typically to be lower than those estimated or implied by the transaction
1521 IRR/WACC.
- 1522 • There are challenges associated with measuring the operational leverage ratio used to de-lever
1523 the risk premium associated with the long-term free cash flows to estimate the RMRP for
1524 revenue-based metrics. Also, the general assumptions used to de-lever for financial leverage
1525 may not be appropriate when adjusting for operational leverage. In particular, the methods
1526 used to de-lever the RMRP for long-term free cash flows for financial leverage often assume
1527 that correlation with the market is not affected by leverage.
- 1528 • The top-down method typically uses adjusted risk characteristics of equity prices as a proxy to
1529 measure the risk characteristics of the earnout metric. While the use of equity prices to estimate
1530 risk characteristics is widely accepted when discounting a stream of long-term, perpetual free
1531 cash flows, it may not be suitable when the underlying metric is a short-term subset of free
1532 cash flows.
- 1533 • The top-down method assumes that the three main differences between the long-term free cash
1534 flows of the relevant business and the underlying metric are differences in term, financial
1535 leverage and operational leverage. The impact of other differences, such as the intricacies of
1536 differences in risk associated with different types of earnings (e.g., EBT vs. EBIT vs.
1537 EBITDA), may not be adequately captured using the top-down method.
- 1538 • Additional adjustments may be required to achieve consistency with the situation-specific
1539 volatility of the underlying metric in the short term (especially in the case of higher-than-usual
1540 uncertainty, which is common for earnout metrics).
- 1541 • The disadvantages of the top-down method are more prominent for revenue-based earnouts,
1542 due to the relative difficulty of estimating the magnitude of and adjusting for operating
1543 leverage.

1544 *5.2.3.6 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Bottom-up Method*

1545 Advantages of the Bottom-up Method:

- 1546 • The bottom-up method is flexible in that it can cater to any underlying metric that has
1547 sufficiently reliable historical data. It can, for example, quantify the differences in risk
1548 associated with different types of earnings (e.g., EBT vs. EBIT vs. EBITDA) or different types
1549 of revenue (e.g., management fees vs. performance fees).
- 1550 • The procedure for calculating the RMRP of the underlying metric is reasonably straightforward
1551 and is similar to the well-established procedure for calculating historical equity betas.
- 1552 • The bottom-up method can directly measure the risk characteristics of the relevant metric using
1553 historical data, facilitating the recognition of any necessary adjustments to ensure consistency
1554 with the situation-specific volatility of the underlying metric, including the flow variable nature
1555 of a metric.

1556 • The bottom-up method can easily accommodate alternative methods for estimation of future
1557 volatility into the RMRP, such as incorporating management assessments or historical
1558 differences between forecasts and actual results.⁷⁶

1559 Disadvantages of the Bottom-up Method:

1560 • Estimating betas based on historical growth in financial metrics versus the market is not widely
1561 used or well researched.

1562 • There may be measurement challenges associated with estimating betas using historical
1563 financial metrics, including:

1564 ○ Accounting anomalies associated with financial metrics (particularly for earnings metrics)

1565 ○ A mismatch between historical financial metrics that reflect realized historical results
1566 versus the value of market indices that reflect forward looking (future) expectations by
1567 investors⁷⁷

1568 ○ Historical experience might need adjustment for the facts and circumstances of the
1569 situation (e.g., sometimes the factors that drive the parties to put an earnout in place imply
1570 that the outcome is more [or less] uncertain than historical results);

1571 ○ The need to estimate appropriate time-lags to best fit the growth in realized financial
1572 metrics to the growth in market indices.

1573 • Beta estimates based on the bottom-up method exclude the volatility in required rates of return
1574 of investors, and thus may underestimate the RMRP. The underestimate is typically small for
1575 short-term earnouts, but an adjustment might be appropriate for long-term earnouts.

1576 • Beta estimates based on the bottom-up method for the free cash flows of the firm are often
1577 very different from betas estimated for the same free cash flows of the firm in the typical
1578 WACC estimate. For example, the bottom-up method will typically result in a gap between the
1579 value of an earnout that is based on 10% of the free cash flows of the business and 10% of the
1580 value of the business. There is no well-established framework to bridge such a gap.

1581 • The disadvantages of the bottom-up method are more prominent for earnings-based metrics,
1582 as the earnings data for comparable companies is more prone to measurement issues such as
1583 negative earnings and changes in accounting policies.

1584 *5.2.3.7 Incorporating Tax Effects into the RMRP*

1585 In deriving a discount rate for an earnout based on a pre-tax, financial metric (such as EBITDA or
1586 revenue), adjustments for tax effects are not typically warranted because in most situations taxes do
1587 not significantly impact risk, as they are linearly related to pre-tax earnings. For instance, if
1588 corporate taxation is anticipated to be a fixed percentage of pre-tax profits (as is often the case), and
1589 if pre-tax earnings are anticipated to have a *de minimis* likelihood of being negative (as is usually the
1590 case for earnouts based on an earnings metric), a pre-tax earnings metric will not be subject to
1591 substantially different leverage than the related post-tax earnings metric simply due to taxes.⁷⁸ Under

⁷⁶ Alternative methods for estimation of volatility are discussed in Section 5.2.4.

⁷⁷ The Working Group is aware of efforts to address this issue by relying on historical data related to (forward looking) analyst projections, rather than on historical outcomes. This type of research, if successfully completed, could partially mitigate this disadvantage.

⁷⁸ However, if (1) there is a significant chance of pre-tax earnings being negative, (2) there are significant net operating losses or tax credits, (3) a large, fixed tax payment is anticipated, or (4) pre-tax and post-tax cash flows differ due to, for instance, the inclusion or exclusion of large amounts of depreciation or amortization, then the relationship between pre-tax and post-tax earnings could be nonlinear, especially over a short time horizon. In such a situation, an adjustment might need to be made to account for the resulting

1592 this assumption, taxes typically would not have a significant impact on systematic risk of the metric
1593 (especially in the short term). In such cases, it would usually not be necessary to make a tax
1594 adjustment to the Required Metric Risk Premium (or to the discount rate) for an earnout based on a
1595 pre-tax financial metric.

1596 Note that it is generally not appropriate to use what are often referred to as “pre-tax discount rates”
1597 to capture tax effects in the context of the valuation of contingent consideration. Using a discounted
1598 cash flow method to estimate the *value of a business* one can either discount post-tax expected cash
1599 flows at a post-tax discount rate, or discount pre-tax expected cash flows at a pre-tax discount rate.
1600 In the latter case, the higher pre-tax discount rate is used to compensate for the expected cash flows
1601 excluding corporate tax to obtain an equivalent present value of the business. However, *when*
1602 *valuing an earnout*, the valuation specialist is not attempting to obtain an equivalent present value of
1603 after-tax cash flows, but instead is attempting to estimate the systematic risk applicable to the pre-tax
1604 metric (e.g. revenue or EBITDA) itself. Therefore, it is not appropriate to apply a pre-tax discount
1605 rate to the earnout metric, even if it is a pre-tax metric.

1606 When applying a top-down method to estimate the RMRP, the valuation specialist should also consider
1607 whether there are any tax effects that impact the discount rate for the business (e.g., the IRR for the
1608 transaction) that would not impact the systematic risk associated with the underlying metric. For
1609 example, there may be instances in which the transaction IRR is higher due to specific tax benefits
1610 associated with the transaction. Any such tax-related increases in the discount rate should be removed
1611 from the estimated RMRP for a pre-tax metric.

1612 5.2.4 Estimating Volatility

1613 Volatility is a key element for valuation of many contingent consideration arrangements. Whenever
1614 the earnout has a nonlinear payoff structure, it is essential to quantify how much uncertainty there is
1615 around the expected case forecast for the metric because (as explained in Section 4.2) the expected
1616 payoff for the earnout will not be the same as the payoff at the expected outcome for the metric. In the
1617 context of an option pricing model (discussed further in Section 5.4), this uncertainty is often captured
1618 by estimating the volatility (or standard deviation)⁷⁹ of the change in the underlying metric over an
1619 appropriate length of time. In addition, some of the methods used to estimate the RMRP for an earnout
1620 involve estimating the volatility of the earnout metric.

1621 For an earnout with a nonlinear payoff, the volatility estimate can have a significant impact on value.
1622 Consider the example in Section 9.5, in which the earnout payoff is 30% of the excess of the acquiree’s
1623 annual EBITDA above 2,000 in the first year post-close. Assuming the other inputs remain the same
1624 (which may or may not be reasonable, as a higher volatility would generally be related to a higher
1625 RMRP), an increase in the volatility from 50% to 55% would increase the value of the earnout by
1626 11.6% from 66.1 to 73.8, whereas a decrease in volatility from 50% to 45% would decrease the value
1627 by 11.7% to 58.4. In general, the degree of sensitivity of the value to changes in the volatility
1628 assumption will depend on where the expected case forecast is relative to the earnout thresholds and
1629 caps (the moneyness of the earnout, as explained in Section 4.5) and the time remaining from the
1630 valuation date to the end of the earnout period.

difference in risk. The methods discussed in Section 10.3.2 could be used to adjust the RMRP to address the differences in leverage (and therefore risk) caused by any such nonlinearities.

⁷⁹ Distributions typically used in practice, such as the lognormal distribution, have two parameters—a mean and standard deviation (or volatility).

1631 There are numerous methods for estimating volatility associated with a metric, including:⁸⁰

- 1632 1. De-lever the historical and/or implied equity volatility of the subject company and/or
1633 comparable companies (the “Deleveraging Equity Volatility Method”)
- 1634 2. Rely on historical variability in the metric growth rate for the subject company and/or
1635 comparable companies (the “Historical Metric Variability Method”)
- 1636 3. Utilize management’s estimates of the potential variation in alternative future outcomes, in
1637 conjunction with bias mitigation techniques (the “Management Assessment Method”).

1638 The remainder of this section provides a more in-depth discussion of each of these methods, along
1639 with a discussion of adjustments to the estimated volatility to account for any additional risks captured
1640 in the RMRP, such as size premiums and/or company-specific risk premiums. The section concludes
1641 with a discussion of how to cross-check the volatility estimate for reasonability.

1642 *5.2.4.1 The Deleveraging Equity Volatility Method*

1643 One way to estimate the volatility of the earnout metric is to begin with an annualized⁸¹ equity
1644 volatility based on the company’s (or comparable companies’) historical equity returns and/or implied
1645 volatilities from traded options commensurate with the term of the earnout. Next, the equity volatility
1646 is de-levered in the same fashion that betas are de-levered in the top-down methods presented in
1647 Sections 10.3.1 and 10.3.2. For example, the equity volatility is de-levered for financial leverage for
1648 EBIT-based earnouts, and is de-levered for both financial and operational leverage for revenue-based
1649 earnouts.

1650 Equity values, unlike most earnout metrics, are point estimates reflecting the total estimated future
1651 value of the equity investment. Moreover, historical or implied equity volatilities are often annualized
1652 to reflect the volatility of returns over a full year. However, most earnout metrics are exposed to risk
1653 over the period during which they are earned, with the average exposure typically at the mid-period.
1654 Therefore, if the volatility in growth rate for the metric is estimated by de-levering an annualized
1655 equity volatility, the metric’s modelled risk exposure⁸² should be adjusted to reflect the period over
1656 which the metric is earned. While the implementation of this adjustment can depend on the
1657 methodology employed, typically the valuation specialist would incorporate the estimated volatility
1658 in growth rate for the metric from the valuation date to the middle of the initial earnout period,
1659 followed by the volatility from that mid-period to the mid-period of the second period, and so forth.
1660 For example, if using Geometric Brownian Motion for an earnout based on revenue in each of the first
1661 three years post-close, the valuation specialist might incorporate a half-year of volatility for the first
1662 period and a full year of volatility for each of the second and third periods. See the example in Section

⁸⁰ This list is not meant to be exhaustive. For instance, one alternative method for estimating volatility would be to rely on the differences between historical analyst forecasts for comparable company performance as compared to actual results. Like the method that relies on management’s assessments of alternative future outcomes, this method has the advantage of directly measuring the uncertainty around a future forecast, i.e., it is a direct measurement of the desired input. However, adequate data might not be available to support this method, analyst forecasts are developed with less information than is available to management (or to market participants), and it might be difficult to adjust for any biases in analyst forecasts, as these might not be stable over time. If implementing this method, care needs to be taken to align the timeframe for the forecast to the current forecast timeframe (e.g., an analyst forecast of calendar year 2017 results as of December 31, 2016 would be comparable to a forecast as of deal close for Year 1 post-close) and to adjust for (1) the information disparity between analyst and management forecasts and (2) the tendency for optimism in analyst forecasts. Another method for estimating volatility around a forecast would be to rely on the differences between historical management forecasts for performance of the earnout-relevant business as compared to actual results. However, adequate data is typically not available to support a robust estimate using this method, and like all methods using historical data, past volatility might not provide a good estimate of the volatility of the business post-transaction.

⁸¹ If starting from historical equity volatilities based on daily or weekly data, it is important to annualize the volatility estimate.

⁸² In an option pricing context, a typical model for the underlying metric assumes Geometric Brownian Motion, which has a time-varying volatility assumption of $\sigma^2 \times t$ where σ is an annualized volatility of returns/growth rates.

1663 9.10 for an illustration of this mid-period adjustment to the volatility estimated by deleveraging an
1664 annualized equity volatility.

1665 The resulting volatility estimate includes both the volatility of the growth rate for the metric and
1666 volatility in returns required by investors. Since equities are typically longer-term investments, and
1667 under normal circumstances the volatility in the value investors place on investments generally
1668 increases with the time horizon,⁸³ this method typically overestimates volatility for short-term
1669 earnouts.

1670 Note also that this method only estimates a proxy for volatility of the earnout metric, and may not
1671 always produce reasonable results, as it is attempting to measure volatility of growth in the metric, not
1672 the volatility of metric growth relative to management's forecast. The valuation specialist should
1673 consider using the volatility implied by management's assessments of multiple future scenarios (where
1674 available and ideally after employing debiasing techniques, as discussed in Section 5.2.1) as a
1675 reasonability cross-check. Such a check helps to guard against underestimates of volatility in cases of
1676 higher uncertainty for the earnout-relevant business over the earnout timeframe than for the equity
1677 prices of comparable companies.

1678 *5.2.4.2 The Historical Metric Variability Method*

1679 To estimate the volatility of the growth in the earnout metric, one can look at the historical standard
1680 deviation in the metric growth for the company (or comparable companies⁸⁴) and use this historical
1681 evidence as guidance for an estimate for future metric growth rate volatility. Consideration should be
1682 given as to how historical variation in the growth of the metric of the company (or comparable
1683 companies) compares to the uncertainty around the expected case for the subject company's metric.
1684 For example, a company that has had historically steady growth rates may not provide a reasonable
1685 comparable for estimating volatility for an earnout metric related to an early stage business anticipated
1686 to evolve rapidly or to launch "bet the business" new products.

1687 If historical volatilities based on year-on-year growth of the metric are used to estimate the volatility
1688 of the earnout metric, then one has a direct estimate of the volatility over the course of a year, already
1689 adjusted for the metric's exposure to risk during that one-year period. To be consistent with the
1690 estimation process, one should generally use a full period of volatility in historical metric growth.
1691 (Using a half-period of volatility would underestimate the variation around the expected case.)

1692 As for the Deleveraging Equity Volatility Method, the Historical Metric Variability Method only
1693 estimates a proxy for the volatility of the earnout metric. It may not produce reasonable results in some
1694 cases, as it assumes that the average growth rate in the metric is as good a predictor of next year's
1695 results as is management's forecast. The valuation specialist should consider using the volatilities
1696 implied by management's assessments of multiple future scenarios (where available and ideally after
1697 employing debiasing techniques, as discussed in Section 5.2.1) as a reasonability cross-check. Such a
1698 check helps to guard against underestimates of volatility in cases of higher uncertainty for the earnout-
1699 relevant business than historically for comparable companies.

⁸³ For instance, there is significant volatility in U. S. treasury bonds with a 20-year remaining term, even though the underlying cash flows associated with those treasury bonds are considered to be risk-free. However, this volatility drops dramatically as the remaining term approaches zero, with negligible volatility for example, for a 20-year U.S. treasury bond with one year remaining on its term.

⁸⁴ Theoretically, if sufficient historical data is available for the subject company (or even better, if sufficient historical management projections were also available), one could estimate volatility from subject company data. However, availability of adequate subject company data is uncommon, the presence of the earnout agreement itself might signal greater than usual uncertainty around the expected case forecast, and the requisite assumption that the subject company's future volatility (post-transaction) will be similar to its historical volatility may not be met.

1700 If relying on quarterly historical data to estimate volatility in growth rate for the metric, the valuation
1701 specialist would typically use year-on-year quarterly growth (e.g., Q1 of the current year vs. Q1 of the
1702 prior year) rather than quarter-on-quarter growth (e.g., Q1 of the current year vs. Q4 of the prior year)
1703 to avoid having seasonality artificially impact the volatility estimates.

1704 It may be necessary to adjust the historical volatilities to account for the risks specific to the metric
1705 during the period of the earnout. For instance, if the metric-based earnout is short-term revenue and a
1706 significant portion of the first-year revenue is reasonably certain due to contracts already in place, it
1707 is possible that the first-year volatility should be less than the historical volatility. On the other hand,
1708 if deal model scenarios indicate greater uncertainty related to potential outcomes for the acquired
1709 company than has been observed historically for the comparables, or if the rationale for putting the
1710 earnout into place is to share the risk associated with an unusually large uncertainty about the metric
1711 outcome, it is possible that the volatility should be higher than that of the comparables.

1712 The volatility estimate resulting from this method does not include any volatility in returns required
1713 by investors and therefore may underestimate volatility.

1714 *5.2.4.3 The Management Assessment Method*

1715 A third method for estimating the volatility associated with an earnout is to utilize management's
1716 estimated variation in potential outcomes associated with high case and low case projections. One can
1717 fit a distribution around assessments of high case, base case, and low case projections,⁸⁵ and calculate
1718 an implied volatility based on these assessments.

1719 If management's high, base and low case projections are used to estimate the volatility of an earnout
1720 metric, a full period of volatility should be incorporated, as management's assessments already take
1721 into account that the metric is earned over the period. (Using a half-period of volatility would
1722 underestimate the variation around the expected case.)

1723 On the plus side, this volatility estimate is tied specifically to management's forward-looking
1724 estimated variation around the expected case, rather than to historical volatility that may or may not
1725 be comparable to the risk of the metric over the earnout period. Indeed, if management's assessments
1726 imply a much higher volatility with a sound rationale, it is likely that historical or comparable company
1727 analyses would underestimate the volatility in growth rate for the metric in the relevant timeframe.

1728 Also, of the three volatility estimation methods discussed in this section, this method is the only one
1729 that directly estimates the relevant volatility (variability around the expected case forecast) rather than
1730 relying on a proxy (variability in the metric or in equity returns). As discussed above, the proxies relied
1731 upon by the Deleveraging Equity Volatility Method and the Historical Metric Variability Method do
1732 not always produce reasonable results.

1733 On the downside, management assessments can be subject to certain well-known assessment biases,
1734 including anchoring on recent results or a prior projection, overconfidence (failing to consider a wide
1735 enough range of potential future outcomes), and conditioning estimates on hidden assumptions (such
1736 as no competitive reactions to a new product introduction).⁸⁶

1737 To mitigate these potential issues, it can be useful to employ the probability assessment debiasing
1738 techniques discussed in Section 5.2.1 and to compare the volatility estimates implied by management's
1739 assessments to historical subject company or comparable company data. For example, the volatility

⁸⁵ A typical set of percentiles for which to obtain management assessments are the 10th percentile, expected case, and 90th percentile. In the context of an option pricing model, the distribution typically fit is a lognormal distribution.

⁸⁶ See Tversky and Kahneman (1974), *Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* for a discussion of biases that influence probability assessments and other judgements.

1740 implied by management’s assessments generally shouldn’t be substantively less than the historical
1741 metric growth rate volatility of comparable companies, without good reason (such as having an
1742 unusually mature business or an unusually high proportion of business already booked.) Such a cross-
1743 check helps to guard against management underestimates of volatility due to anchoring on the base
1744 case or overconfidence.

1745 Finally, the volatility estimate resulting from this method typically would not include any volatility in
1746 returns required by investors and therefore may underestimate volatility.

1747 *5.2.4.4 Adjusting Volatility for Additional Risk Premiums*

1748 If the valuation specialist uses either of the first two methods (the Deleveraging Equity Volatility
1749 Method or the Historical Metric Variability Method), it may be necessary to adjust the estimated
1750 volatility to account for additional risks captured in the RMRP, such as size premiums and/or
1751 company-specific risk premiums. For example, if the earnout-relevant business is a different size than
1752 the comparable companies used to estimate volatility, adjustments may be required to factor in the
1753 difference in volatility associated with the relative size of the business.⁸⁷ Below are examples of a few
1754 different techniques (not intended to be an exhaustive list) by which the valuation specialist might
1755 choose to adjust volatility estimates to address differences in size between the earnout-relevant
1756 business and the comparable companies used to estimate volatility.

1757 • Select a volatility at a percentile of the range of comparable companies based on the size of
1758 the earnout-relevant business relative to the size of the comparable companies. For example,
1759 if the earnout-relevant business is smaller than the average company in the comparables list,
1760 and the smaller companies in the comparables list tend to have higher volatility than the larger
1761 companies on the list, one might select a volatility in the upper half of the range rather than the
1762 median.

1763 • Adjust the volatility estimate for each comparable company based on the following ratio:

$$\frac{\text{(the RMRP including a size premium for the subject company)}}{\text{(the RMRP replacing the size premium with that for the comparable company)}}$$

1766 For example, assume that the subject company has a RMRP of 10%, of which 5% is due to a
1767 size premium. Assume there are three comparable companies, with corresponding size
1768 premiums of 0%, 2.5%, and 5%. This method would adjust the volatilities for these companies
1769 by 2x, 1.33x, and 1x, respectively.

1770 • Adjust the volatility estimate for each comparable company based on broader empirical data
1771 on the average volatility by size of companies.⁸⁸ More specifically, adjust the volatility
1772 estimate for each comparable company by the following ratio:

$$\frac{\text{(average volatility of companies in the size category for the earnout-relevant business)}}{\text{(average volatility of companies in the size category for the comparable company)}}$$

1775 If other additional risk premiums (such as company-specific risk premiums or country-specific risk
1776 premiums) are included in the RMRP, consideration should be given as to whether to make a
1777 corresponding adjustment to the volatility. For instance, depending on the rationale behind including
1778 a company-specific risk premium in the RMRP, it may or may not be appropriate to adjust the

⁸⁷ There is empirical evidence that smaller companies tend to have higher equity volatility than larger companies. See, for example, Herr (2008), “Size Adjustments for Stock Return Volatilities.”

⁸⁸ Sources of such empirical data include Grabowski et al. (2017) *Valuation Handbook U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital* and *Valuation Handbook International Guide to Cost of Capital*.

1779 estimated volatility in growth rate for the metric. As an example, if the rationale for adding a company-
1780 specific risk premium to the RMRP is that short-term revenues are highly uncertain due to the planned
1781 launch of important new products, it would be appropriate to increase the estimated volatility to
1782 address this additional source of variability around the expected case.

1783 *5.2.4.5 Volatility Reasonability Cross-Checks*

1784 Regardless of which volatility estimation method is selected, the valuation specialist should confirm
1785 that the calculated volatility is reasonable given the underlying risk associated with the metric, and
1786 therefore that the concluded volatility is consistent with the risk inherent in the estimated RMRP. For
1787 instance, if working in a CAPM framework, one reasonability cross-check is to compare the assumed
1788 volatility to the theoretical minimum volatility:

$$1789 \quad \sigma_{Metric} \geq (RMRP \div MRP) \times \sigma_{Market}$$

1790 Where:

1791 *RMRP* = the Required Metric Risk Premium

1792 *MRP* = the Market Risk Premium

1793 σ_{Metric} = the volatility of the growth in the metric

1794 σ_{Market} = the volatility of the return on a broad market index.

1795 The equation above relies on the relationship between volatility and risk associated with the standard
1796 CAPM measurement of beta. When working in an Adjusted CAPM framework, the assumption is that
1797 this relationship extends to any additional risk premiums added to the traditional CAPM, which may
1798 not be a reasonable extension of the CAPM conclusions. The cross-check also implicitly assumes that
1799 the volatility in returns required by investors for a long-term investment should also be included in the
1800 volatility in metric growth, which may not be reasonable for short-term earnout metrics. As such,
1801 while it is useful to perform this cross-check, the relationship may not hold in all circumstances.

1802 Similarly, regardless of which volatility estimation method is selected, the valuation specialist might
1803 consider comparing the calculated volatility to the historical subject business experience with volatility
1804 of actual results versus business plan forecasts (where available). Unless the earnout-relevant business
1805 is substantially more mature or predictable than it had been historically, the variability around the base
1806 case projections would often be expected to be at least as large as the historical variability of actual
1807 results versus business plan forecasts.

1808 As another possible cross-check, the valuation specialist might consider why the particular earnout
1809 metric was chosen and, more generally, the rationale behind the earnout structure. For instance, if the
1810 earnout was put in place in part to mitigate or share an unusually high risk, then the valuation specialist
1811 should verify that the selected metric volatility is consistent with this fact pattern.

1812 *5.2.5 In-Period Discounting Convention*

1813 The practice of discounting cash flows using a mid-period convention is well known and widely used
1814 as a practical approximation to allow for the time value and risk of financial metrics that are earned
1815 over a period, as opposed to at a single point in time. For example, if forecast revenue earned for the
1816 next year is estimated to be 100, discounting for a full year assumes that the entire 100 is earned at the
1817 end of the period. Predicting the timing of when the revenue of 100 will be earned can be difficult,
1818 and therefore valuation specialists often assume that, on average, the financial metric is earned at the
1819 midpoint of the period to which it applies.

1820 Earnout payoffs based on financial metrics can be very risky and hence command very high discount
 1821 rates (for example, when the functional form of the earnout subjects the payoffs to significant
 1822 leverage). As such, the period convention applied when discounting can have a significant impact on
 1823 the value of the earnout.

1824 For example, consider an earnout that has a payoff equal to 100% of the excess of future EBITDA
 1825 earned over the next year above 100:

- 1826 • Payoff of earnout = $\text{Max}(\text{Future EBITDA in 1 year} - 100, 0)$;
- 1827 • Assume:
 - 1828 ○ Forecast (expected value) for EBITDA earned over 1 year = 120;
 - 1829 ○ Discount rate applicable to forecast 1-year EBITDA = 10%;
 - 1830 ○ Achievement of future of EBITDA of at least 100 is nearly certain;⁸⁹
 - 1831 ○ 1-year risk-free rate = 1%.

1832 The present value of this earnout can vary significantly depending on the in-period convention used
 1833 to discount EBITDA.⁹⁰ To illustrate this concept, Table 3 below shows the impact of two different
 1834 period conventions on the value of the earnout: EBITDA is earned at the end of the year (full period)
 1835 or is earned on average at the middle of the year (i.e. mid-period). The analysis follows the procedure
 1836 discussed in Section 4.5.

TABLE 3: Example of the Impact of Full Period Versus Mid-Period Discounting

	Period (p)	Value of 120 ($120 \div 1.1^p$)	Value of 100 ($100 \div 1.01^p$)	Earnout Value
Full Period	1.0	109.09	99.01	10.08
Mid-Period	0.5	114.42	99.50	14.99

1837 In addition to the potentially significant impact that the in-period discounting convention can have on
 1838 the earnout value, it is important to maintain consistency throughout the analysis. If, for example, mid-
 1839 period discounting is used in the valuation of the business because the cash flows are earned on average
 1840 at the mid-point of each period, then mid-period discounting for the metric's exposure to non-
 1841 diversifiable risk should also be maintained in an earnout valuation based on financial metrics that
 1842 similarly are earned on average at the mid-point of each measurement period specified for that earnout.

1843 Note, however, that the earnout *payment* is made later, typically after the conclusion of the relevant
 1844 period for measuring the earnout metric. A mid-period convention is not used for discounting the
 1845 payment for the time value of money and any counterparty credit risk. Discounting the payment for
 1846 the time value of money and any counterparty credit risk uses the time horizon from the valuation date
 1847 to the expected payment date(s).

⁸⁹ This assumption is only made so that the payoff can be assumed to be approximately linear, in order to illustrate the impact of in-period discounting. The same results are obtained if we assume that EBITDA can be below 100, but assume that the payoff of the earnout is strictly linear i.e. equal to Future EBITDA in 1 year – 100, (with no payment floor and a clawback if EBITDA is negative). Since forecast EBITDA is risky and the threshold of 100 is contractual, the applicable discount rates are 10% and 1%, respectively.

⁹⁰ The in-period convention is only applicable to EBITDA and not to the contractual threshold of 100, because the threshold is a fixed quantity, not subject to risk.

1848 *5.2.6 Counterparty Credit Risk*

1849 An earnout arrangement generally represents a contingent obligation to make future payments. As
1850 such, the counterparty credit risk (or default risk) of the legal obligor (typically the buyer for an earnout
1851 and the sellers for a clawback) should be considered, taking into account the seniority of the earnout
1852 claim in the obligor’s capital structure and the expected timing of the payment. The obligor’s own
1853 specific credit risk is considered in determining fair value (as opposed to the credit risk of a market
1854 participant) because ASC 820 (and IFRS 13) presumes the contingent liability is transferred to a
1855 market participant with a similar credit standing.⁹¹ Also, considering the fair value of the earnout from
1856 the perspective of a market participant that holds the identical item as an asset, such a market
1857 participant would consider the credit risk associated with the specific obligor (typically for an earnout,
1858 the buyer) being able to make the future payments if and when they become payable.

1859 An earnout often represents a subordinate, unsecured obligation of the buyer. To capture the time
1860 value of money and non-performance risk, the valuation specialist would typically use a pre-tax cost
1861 of debt that aligns with the term and seniority of the obligation. The seniority of the earnout payment
1862 in the obligor’s capital structure should be evaluated based on discussions with management and/or a
1863 review of the purchase documentation, because seniority can have a significant impact on the
1864 counterparty credit risk.⁹²

1865 There are, however, mechanisms where the counterparty credit risk is either partially or fully
1866 mitigated, including:

- 1867 • Fully or partially funding the potential earnout obligation by depositing cash (or other
1868 collateral) into an escrow account
- 1869 • Increasing the seniority and/or securitization of the obligation by structuring the earnout as a
1870 note issued by the buyer, specifying the increased seniority ranking of the earnout obligation
- 1871 • Obtaining a guarantee from a bank or other external party.⁹³

1872 There are also circumstances where the counterparty credit risk may be considered to have already
1873 been incorporated (fully or partially) into the valuation through the allowance for the risk of the earnout
1874 metric. These circumstances can arise where the earnout is based on the future performance of the
1875 acquired business and in the (typically) upside scenarios in which the earnout is paid, the performance
1876 of the acquired business is significantly positively correlated with the performance of the buyer, or
1877 with the buyer’s ability to fulfill its obligation to pay the earnout. Such a situation is not typical, but
1878 can arise when:

- 1879 a) the acquired business represents a sizeable portion of the post-acquisition company
- 1880 b) the acquired business is maintained as a separate entity that is responsible for the payment and
1881 it is not guaranteed by the parent

⁹¹ ASC 820-10-35-17 states that “[t]he fair value of a liability reflects the effect of nonperformance risk. Nonperformance risk includes, but may not be limited to, a reporting entity’s own credit risk. Nonperformance risk is assumed to be the same before and after the transfer of the liability.” Similarly, per IFRS 13:42 “The fair value of a liability reflects the effect of non-performance risk. Non-performance risk includes, but may not be limited to, an entity’s own credit risk (as defined in IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures). Non-performance risk is assumed to be the same before and after the transfer of the liability”.

⁹² In general, contingent consideration payoffs tend to be unsecured subordinated claims. However, this is not always spelled out in the agreements. The valuation specialist should consider the impact of cross-default provisions, subordination, and explicit priority of payment when selecting a credit spread.

⁹³ Depending on facts and circumstances, credit risk mitigation mechanisms such as a guarantee by a third party may be accounted for separately, rather than as part of the consideration transferred. The specific accounting rules for determining whether a credit risk enhancement is a characteristic of the contingent consideration liability or asset are beyond the scope of this Valuation Advisory.

- 1882 c) the success of the acquired business is dependent on the success of the buyer's business and/or
1883 d) the success of the acquired business and the buyer are both largely driven by the same
1884 uncertainty (for example, when both businesses do significantly better when the economy for
1885 a certain industry or customer set is robust).

1886 In such cases, the credit risk associated with the future payments may be lower in the upside scenarios
1887 in which the earnout payments are due.

1888 *Example:* A pre-revenue company acquires another pre-revenue company. The purchase
1889 consideration includes an earnout with 5 million payable when annual revenues of the acquiree
1890 reach 100 million. The acquirer's cost of debt at the time of acquisition is very high. However,
1891 the acquirer is likely to be in a significantly stronger financial position to pay 5 million upon
1892 achieving 100 million of revenues. The counterparty credit risk used in the valuation of the
1893 earnout should reflect this stronger position. For example, the counterparty credit risk could be
1894 estimated assuming annual revenues of at least 100 million for the combined entity at the time
1895 of payment.

1896 The above discussion highlights the need to consider the counterparty credit risk associated with
1897 making the future payments if and when they become payable. In rare cases, such as when the
1898 contingent payment is a large multiple of revenue or EBITDA (perhaps intended to reflect the impact
1899 on future value of the growth in business over the first few years), the obligation associated with the
1900 payment of the earnout may even be large enough that it affects the creditworthiness of the obligor.

1901 The form of payment of the earnout obligation may also affect the counterparty credit risk applied to
1902 the valuation of the earnout obligation. For example, an earnout payment that is specified as a *fixed*
1903 number of shares of the buyer's common stock is unlikely to require an incremental allowance for the
1904 buyer's credit risk since the buyer will be able to use its shares as currency and satisfy the earnout
1905 obligation regardless of the value of those shares.

1906 As an alternative example of settlement in stock, if the earnout payment is specified as a monetary
1907 amount that is settled in the form of the buyer's common stock of equal value (i.e., the earnout payment
1908 is settled in an equivalent *variable* number of shares of the buyer's common stock), then the earnout
1909 obligation is still subject to the buyer's credit risk as if it were settled in cash. In this case, since the
1910 earnout obligation is specified as a monetary amount, the form of the settlement does not impact credit
1911 risk.

1912 To summarize this section, when considering the amount of counterparty credit risk to incorporate in
1913 the valuation of contingent consideration, issues to consider include the credit risk of the obligor over
1914 the relevant timeframe, the seniority of the contingent consideration obligation in the obligor's capital
1915 structure, mitigation of non-payment risk via e.g. the use of an escrow account or guarantee, and the
1916 correlation between the likelihood or amount of contingent consideration paid and the obligor's ability
1917 to pay (i.e., the obligor's ability to pay *in the scenarios in which the payment is due*).

1918 *5.2.7 Multiple-currency Structures*

1919 Earnouts are often structured with performance thresholds, payment caps, and other features that are
1920 contractually specified in monetary terms. Occasionally these features involve more than one currency
1921 or are denominated in a different currency than is specified for the payment. For earnout arrangements
1922 that span multiple currencies, one can often avoid the need to explicitly model future foreign exchange
1923 rates by carefully choosing the currency in which the analysis is performed.

1924 Since the contractual terms of an earnout determine its *future* payoff, for earnouts that span multiple
1925 currencies one needs to consider *future* foreign exchange rates when converting these monetary
1926 contractual terms to another currency. Where the contractual terms have a linear relationship with the
1927 earnout payment, one may be able to convert the contractual terms using the forward foreign exchange
1928 rate⁹⁴ at the time of measurement. This is not true for contractual terms that have a nonlinear
1929 relationship with the earnout payment (such as thresholds, caps, tiers, etc.), which would typically
1930 require the use of a stochastic foreign exchange rate model to perform the currency conversion within
1931 the valuation analysis. To avoid this complexity, the valuation analysis can be performed in the
1932 currency in which the thresholds, caps, tiers and other contractual monetary terms (the nonlinear
1933 structural features) of the earnout are specified.

1934 *Example:* A U.S. company acquires a Brazilian company. If the revenue of the acquired
1935 business exceeds 10 million Brazilian Real in the first year post-close, the sellers will receive
1936 an earnout payment equal to 10% of the revenues above that threshold. However, the earnout
1937 will be settled in equivalent U.S. Dollars (i.e. the payments are calculated in Brazilian Real
1938 and then converted to *equivalent* U.S. Dollars as of the settlement date.)

1939 The valuation analysis is typically more easily performed in Brazilian Real.⁹⁵ The fair value
1940 of the earnout can then be converted from Brazilian Real to U.S. Dollars, if necessary, at the
1941 appropriate spot foreign exchange rate as of the measurement date.

1942 *Example:* A German company acquires a U.S. company that produces revenue through
1943 subsidiaries in the U.S. and Japan. The earnout will pay €1 million if the first-year post-close
1944 revenues of the U.S. business exceed €10 million and the first-year post-close revenues of the
1945 Japanese business exceed €5 million. The forecasts for the business are provided in U.S.
1946 Dollars (for the U.S. subsidiary) and Japanese Yen (for the Japanese subsidiary.)

1947 The valuation analysis is most easily performed by converting the revenue forecasts to the
1948 currency of the structural feature that has a nonlinear effect on risk, i.e., the currency of the
1949 thresholds, which are denominated in euros. Since revenue in dollars (or yen) converts linearly
1950 to euros, one can convert the revenue forecasts to euros at the term-matched forward foreign
1951 exchange rates. The valuation analysis is then performed entirely in euros.

1952 There are rare cases when the parties to the transaction structure an earnout with the contractual
1953 monetary terms (the nonlinear structural features) spanning multiple currencies. If the multiple
1954 currency features do not interact with one another, the evaluation can be performed separately for each
1955 country, in its own currency. However, if multiple currency features interact, for example through an
1956 aggregate cap, additional complexities can arise. In such a case, the valuation specialist may need to
1957 explicitly model future foreign exchange rates, to accurately capture the impact of the interaction.
1958 Given the complexity involved in modeling future foreign exchange rates, the valuation specialist
1959 should consider whether any such cross-currency exposure is likely to have a significant impact on
1960 the earnout value.

⁹⁴ The forward foreign exchange rate is equivalent to the (risk-neutral) expected future foreign exchange rate. In general, one can only use the forward foreign exchange rate to convert an underlying metric from one currency to another, or to convert contractual terms that have a *linear* impact on the earnout payment from one currency to another. For currencies that do not have liquid forward markets, alternative methods may be needed. Typical approaches to estimate forward exchange rates are based on the relative nominal interest rates or inflation rates in each respective currency.

⁹⁵ If one were to perform the analysis in U.S. Dollars, then due to the nonlinear impact of the performance threshold, the valuation specialist would need to consider a stochastic model for future foreign exchange rates to convert the performance threshold to U.S. Dollars.

1961 When estimating the value of an earnout, the assumptions are currency-specific. For example, if the
1962 earnout valuation analysis is carried out in Brazilian Real, the assumptions used in the analysis should
1963 all be specific to Brazilian Real. That is, the metric forecasts should be denominated in Brazilian Real
1964 and the volatility, RMRP (or discount rate), counterparty credit risk and risk-free rate should all be
1965 estimated to be appropriate for Brazilian Real.

1966 **5.3 The Scenario-Based Method (SBM)**

1967 The SBM is a method under which the valuation specialist identifies multiple outcomes, probability-
1968 weights the contingent consideration payoff under each outcome, and discounts the result at an
1969 appropriate rate to arrive at the expected present value of the contingent consideration.

1970 The Working Group recommends the use of SBM for valuing contingent consideration when:

- 1971 a) The risk of the underlying metric is diversifiable, e.g., for achievement of diversifiable
1972 nonfinancial milestones or
- 1973 b) The payoff structure is linear (e.g., a fixed percentage of revenues or EBITDA with no
1974 thresholds, caps, tiers, or carry-forwards).⁹⁶

1975 As described in more detail in Section 5.3.1, the Working Group does not recommend the use of SBM
1976 for nonlinear payoff structures involving a contingent consideration metric with non-diversifiable risk.

1977 The first step of the procedure for applying the SBM is relatively simple in concept. In each period
1978 relevant to the earnout, the valuation specialist calculates the expected payoff as the weighted average
1979 of the earnout payoffs across the possible scenarios for that period. The weights are equal to the
1980 probabilities assigned to these possible scenarios. Identifying the scenarios and estimating the
1981 probabilities can be a complex exercise, as discussed in more detail below.

1982 In the second step of the procedure for applying the SBM, the valuation specialist discounts the
1983 expected payoff. The SBM discount rate addresses the time value of money (risk-free rate) over the
1984 relevant time horizon, the Required Metric Risk Premium, the impact of the earnout payoff structure
1985 on risk, and any counterparty credit risk.

1986 The sections that follow address:

- 1987 • When the SBM is most appropriate
- 1988 • Considerations for developing the scenarios and estimating the discount rate
- 1989 • Applying the SBM to the valuation of a linear earnout payoff structure or a diversifiable
1990 nonfinancial milestone payment
- 1991 • Handling path dependencies or multiple interdependent metrics
- 1992 • Conclusions about the use of SBM in the context of valuing contingent consideration.

1993 **5.3.1 When the SBM is Most Appropriate**

1994 The SBM is appropriate for pricing contingent consideration when:

- 1995 a) The risk of the underlying metric is largely diversifiable (e.g., nonfinancial metrics such as
1996 achievement of regulatory approvals, degree of R&D success, resolution of legal disputes,
1997 completion of a software integration project prior to a deadline, etc.) and/or

⁹⁶ For payoff structures based on a fixed percentage of an earnings metric (for example, EBITDA), if there is a significant chance that EBITDA will be negative and there is no clawback mechanism, then zero EBITDA serves as an implicit threshold, resulting in a nonlinear payoff structure. However, if negative EBITDA outcomes have a de minimis impact on the expected payoff, it is reasonable to assume such a structure is linear.

2037 *5.3.2 Developing the Scenarios*

2038 The valuation specialist's primary goal when developing scenarios is to adequately represent the
2039 metrics' probability distribution over the relevant time period(s), considering the region of the
2040 probability distribution that may require more granular consideration due to the nature of the payoff
2041 structure. For example, it may be sufficient to only have two scenarios for a payment contingent upon
2042 at least 80% of certain software development tasks being completed (in the first year post-close).
2043 Meanwhile, an earnout with multiple tiers, for example, an earnout with differing levels of payment
2044 for the first 80%, for the next 10% (between 80 and 90%), and for the final 10% (between 90 and
2045 100%) of such software development tasks completed in the first year post-close, would require more
2046 scenarios.

2047 From a statistical standpoint, the more granular the scenarios the better. However, the valuation
2048 specialist should balance the need for statistical accuracy with the additional subjectivity introduced
2049 by estimating many scenarios and probabilities. One possibility is to fit a continuous distribution
2050 around a small number of assessed scenarios in order to estimate the likelihood of outcomes falling in
2051 between the discrete scenarios that have been assessed.

2052 It is recommended that the valuation specialist rigorously examine management's assessments,
2053 challenge whether management has adequately considered both the probability of various scenarios as
2054 well as a wide enough range of potential outcomes, and challenge the consistency of these scenarios
2055 and probabilities with other assumptions in the analysis. As discussed in Section 7.1 and 7.2, care
2056 should be taken that there is consistency between the scenarios, probabilities, and expected metric
2057 outcomes used to value the earnout and the assumptions used to value the business, its intangibles and
2058 any in-process research and development (IPR&D).

2059 Section 5.2.1 provides a more in-depth discussion around developing the expected payoff cash flow,
2060 including a discussion of elicitation procedures that can help to minimize the known biases associated
2061 with management's assessment of scenario probabilities.

2062 *5.3.3 Discount Rate Considerations*

2063 When estimating a discount rate, the valuation specialist should consider the time value of money, the
2064 Required Metric Risk Premium, the impact of the earnout payoff structure on risk, and counterparty
2065 credit risk. The goal for the valuation specialist is to select a discount rate that is commensurate with
2066 a market participant view of the risks in the expected contingent consideration payoff.

2067 Thus, the considerations for a discount rate for contingent consideration contain elements of the
2068 following:

- 2069 • The time value of money – typically captured by the risk-free rate
- 2070 • Counterparty credit risk, which represents the risk that the obligor will not be able to fulfill its
2071 obligation if and when a payment becomes due, as discussed in Section 5.2.6
- 2072 • Required Metric Risk Premium – market participants require a premium in excess of the risk-
2073 free rate that captures the metric's exposure to systematic risk and the portion of any additional
2074 risk premiums (e.g., size premiums, country-risk premiums, and company-specific premiums)
2075 relevant to the contingent consideration metric, as discussed in Section 5.2.2
- 2076 • The impact of the contingent consideration structure on risk, if the structure is nonlinear (see
2077 Section 4.4).

2078 The first two items on the above list (the time value of money and counterparty credit risk) are
2079 applicable over the timeframe from the valuation date to the expected payment date(s). However, the

2080 latter two risks (RMRP and payoff structure risk) are applicable only over the timeframe from the
2081 valuation date until the uncertainty associated with the metric is fully resolved.

2082 Prior to the publication of this Valuation Advisory, many practitioners would select the WACC or the
2083 IRR of the transaction as the discount rate for the expected contingent consideration payoff. The
2084 selection of the WACC or IRR as the discount rate was typically justified by reasoning that if the
2085 projected cash flows are subject to the risk of the acquiree's business, then the contingent consideration
2086 payoffs resulting from these cash flows are subject to the same risk. This argument is flawed for almost
2087 all contingent consideration valuations.

2088 First, if an earnout metric is not directly (and linearly) related to the value of the assets, then the WACC
2089 (or IRR) will not correctly represent the risk profile of either the metric or the contingent consideration
2090 payoff structure.⁹⁸ Even for a linear earnout payoff structure, differences between the riskiness of the
2091 long-term free cash flows for the business and the riskiness of the earnout metric should be reflected
2092 in a difference between the discount rate for the business and the discount rate for the earnout. Issues
2093 to address include differences in volatility, correlation with the market, financial and operational
2094 leverage, additional risk premiums, and relevant timeframe. See Section 5.2.2 for a more detailed
2095 discussion.

2096 Second, when the scenarios in which payment occurs are more certain (typically, 90 to 100%
2097 probability), the payments become more comparable to deferred payments, i.e., they are lower risk.
2098 One might consider the context in which the contingent payoff was agreed to (e.g., a large entity
2099 acquiring a smaller entity with the intention to delay a portion of the payment vs. the intention to share
2100 the risk associated with the success of a young product line) when considering the level of certainty to
2101 attribute to the payoff.

2102 For additional discussion of the difficulty of estimating discount rates for use in an SBM when the
2103 payment structure is nonlinear and the metric has non-diversifiable risk, see Section 4.5.

2104 *5.3.4 Applying the SBM to a Linear Payoff Structure*

2105 As discussed earlier, the SBM is appropriate, and often the simplest method, for valuing contingent
2106 consideration arrangements with a linear payoff structure.

2107 *Example Earnout Payoff Structure*

2108 Company A will be required to pay 30% of the acquiree's EBITDA earned over the following one-
2109 year period. Assume the likelihood of EBITDA being negative is *de minimis*.⁹⁹ The payment is due
2110 three months after the end of the year.

2111 *Assumptions*

2112 Management provided estimates for future annual EBITDA under three scenarios.¹⁰⁰ The outcomes
2113 and corresponding probabilities are as follows:

2114 Low scenario: 1,500 with probability 25%

⁹⁸ Note that even if the WACC would be an appropriate discount rate for the metric (which it generally is not, due to differences in duration and leverage between the earnout metric and the long-term free cash flows for the business), the WACC is still not an appropriate rate to be used for discounting the contingent consideration payments, unless the payoff structure is linear. See Section 4.4.

⁹⁹ If the likelihood of EBITDA being negative is substantial, and if there is no clawback of 30% for negative EBITDA, then the earnout payoff structure would not be linear. In this case, OPM might be a more appropriate methodology.

¹⁰⁰ For illustrative purposes, this example assumes three scenarios were considered by management. This is not meant to suggest that three is always the correct number of scenarios to consider.

2115 Base scenario: 2,000 with probability 50%

2116 High scenario: 2,500 with probability 25%

2117 The RMRP associated with the acquiree's EBITDA is 9.5%, the risk-free rate consistent with the
2118 timeframe to payment of the earnout is 0.5% (so the discount rate applicable to future EBITDA is
2119 10%), and the credit spread of Company A for a subordinated obligation such as this earnout is 3.0%
2120 (all these rates are per annum, continuously compounded). We also assume that the correlation
2121 between the acquiree's business and Company A's business post-acquisition is not so large that the
2122 credit risk of Company A would be significantly affected by the success of the acquiree's business.¹⁰¹

2123 *Valuation Methodology*

2124 Since the contingent consideration's payoff function is linear, the SBM is appropriate. Moreover, the
2125 implication of linearity is that the contingent consideration payoff has the same risk as the metric, in
2126 this case EBITDA. Thus, ignoring counterparty credit risk, the discount rate that is applicable to future
2127 EBITDA is also applicable to the contingent consideration payoff.

2128 The first step of the valuation is to calculate the expected earnout payoff, as illustrated in Table 4
2129 below.

TABLE 4: Calculating the Expected Earnout Payoff

Scenario	EBITDA (a)	Earnout Payoff (b) = 30% × (a)	Probability (c)	Probability Weighted Earnout Payoff (d) = (b) × (c)
Low	1,500.0	450.0	25%	112.5
Base	2,000.0	600.0	50%	300.0
High	2,500.0	750.0	25%	187.5
Total			100%	600.0

2130 For this example, assume that the continuously compounded discount rate for a linear function of
2131 EBITDA is estimated to be 10% per annum. Consistent with the valuation of the cash flows of the
2132 business and the fact that EBITDA is earned over the course of the year, the present value is calculated
2133 as of the mid-period. Thus, the equivalent risk-adjusted future value for this amount of EBITDA over
2134 the one-year period is given by:

2135
$$570.7 = 600 \times \exp(-10\% \times 0.5)$$

2136 However, the earnout is not paid out over the course of the year, i.e., it is not paid on average at the
2137 mid-point of the year. The payoff happens 1.25 years after the valuation date. The present value of the
2138 earnout cash flow therefore is calculated taking into account (1) the time value of money for the
2139 additional 0.75 years from the mid-period to the payment date and (2) the credit spread of Company

¹⁰¹ This situation is uncommon but could happen, for example, if the acquiree's business were large in comparison to Company A's business. See Section 5.2.6 for a discussion of counterparty credit risk.

2140 A, for the 1.25 years from the valuation date to the payment date:¹⁰²

$$2141 \quad 547.7 = 570.7 \times \exp(-0.5\% \times 0.75) \times \exp(-3.0\% \times 1.25)$$

2142 *5.3.5 Applying the SBM to a Diversifiable Nonfinancial Milestone*

2143 As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the SBM is appropriate and is often the simplest method for valuing
2144 contingent consideration based on metrics that have no substantial systematic risk (i.e., in a CAPM
2145 framework, metrics with a beta close to zero). Such metrics include technical milestones such as
2146 achievement of product development targets and other idiosyncratic, diversifiable events not based on
2147 financial metrics (e.g., resolution of legal disputes).

2148 *Example Earnout Payoff Structure*

2149 The acquiree has a drug under development and Company A (the buyer, a much larger company with
2150 numerous drugs both launched and under development) will be required to pay the sellers an amount
2151 of 2,000 in the event the acquiree's drug currently under development receives regulatory approval
2152 within a year. The payment is due three months after the end of the year.

2153 *Assumptions*

2154 Company A's management estimates a probability of 50% that the acquiree's drug currently under
2155 development will receive regulatory approval within a year. The risk-free rate commensurate with the
2156 time to payment of the earnout is 0.5% per annum (continuously compounded) and the credit spread
2157 of Company A for a subordinated obligation such as this earnout is 3.0% per annum (continuously
2158 compounded). We also assume that the credit risk of the much larger Company A will not be
2159 significantly affected by the approval of the acquiree's drug under development.

2160 *Valuation Methodology*

2161 Since the earnout metric's risk is predominantly diversifiable, the SBM is appropriate. The implication
2162 of the diversifiable metric (i.e., no systematic risk affects the payoff function) is that the discount rate
2163 is the risk-free rate plus an adjustment for the credit risk of the obligor (in this case, Company A).

2164 The expected payoff at the end of the year is:

$$2165 \quad 1,000 = 2,000 \times 50\% + 0 \times 50\%$$

2166 The payment's expected present value is calculated taking into account the credit risk of Company A:

$$2167 \quad 957.2 = 1,000 \times \exp(-(3.0\% + 0.5\%) \times 1.25)$$

2168 *5.3.6 Using Simulation to Handle Path Dependency or Multiple Interdependent Metrics in SBM*

2169 As discussed in Section 3.2.2, earnout payoff structures that span multiple periods with features that
2170 create path dependency or that involve multiple, interdependent metrics will often require the use of a
2171 technique such as Monte Carlo simulation.¹⁰³ Applied in the context of an earnout valuation, each

¹⁰² Equivalently, one could grow the value of the EBITDA (570.7) by a half year at the risk-free rate (0.5%) to get 572.2 (this is the value after discounting for the Required Metric Risk Premium for EBITDA but before accounting for any of the time value of money), then discount for the full 1.25 years by (risk-free rate + credit spread = 3.5%). The answer is the same.

¹⁰³ An exception occurs if the path-dependency or multi-metric interdependent nature of the payoff structure is due to its dependence in a relatively simple way on the outcome for a diversifiable metric. For example, if the likelihood of achieving a technical milestone in year two depends on the degree of technical success achieved with respect to a year one technical milestone, the analysis might only require the use of conditional or joint probabilities, rather than a simulation, to address the interdependency. Similarly, for a payoff based on both revenues and technical success, if the expected revenues depend on the degree of technical success achieved in year one, the analysis might only require the use of scenarios for year one technical success to address the interdependency.

2172 iteration or trial of the Monte Carlo simulation draws a value from the assumed (joint) distribution for
2173 each earnout metric, for each period of the earnout. As part of the specification of the joint distribution,
2174 the valuation specialist must also estimate the correlation between outcomes from one period to the
2175 next and/or the cross correlations among metrics.

2176 The earnout payoffs are calculated based on the “path” for the simulated metrics and the contractual
2177 terms of the earnout arrangement and are discounted to present value at a rate that reflects the risk
2178 associated with the earnout payoffs (risk associated with the earnout metrics and structure, time value
2179 of money, counterparty credit risk, etc., as explained in Section 5.2.2.) The value of the earnout is
2180 estimated to be the average present value of the earnout payoffs over all iterations of the simulation.

2181 Many iterations are typically required to get reliable results from a simulation. The standard error of
2182 the simulation mean is a statistical measurement that can be used to determine how many iterations
2183 are necessary.

2184 *5.3.7 Conclusions Regarding SBM*

2185 The main advantages of the SBM are its simplicity and transparency (when used appropriately), and
2186 the relative ease of understanding the model and modifying the inputs. The main disadvantage of the
2187 SBM is that estimating a discount rate adjustment to incorporate the impact on risk of a nonlinear
2188 payoff structure for a metric with non-diversifiable risk is neither simple nor intuitive, nor is the
2189 Working Group aware of any reasonable “rules of thumb” for such an adjustment.

2190 For the above reasons, the Working Group recommends the use of SBM for valuing contingent
2191 consideration when:

- 2192 a) The risk of the underlying metric is diversifiable, e.g., for achievement of certain nonfinancial
2193 milestone events or
- 2194 b) The payoff structure is linear (e.g., a fixed percentage of revenues or EBITDA with no
2195 thresholds, caps, tiers, or carry-forwards).

2196 However, the Working Group does not recommend the use of SBM if the payoff structure has
2197 thresholds, caps, tiers, carryforwards, or other significant nonlinearities and the risk of the underlying
2198 metric is non-diversifiable.

2199 *5.4 The Option Pricing Method (OPM)*

2200 The purpose of this section is to describe the method recommended by the Working Group for use in
2201 valuing contingent consideration for which the payoff structure is nonlinear and involves a metric or
2202 event with non-diversifiable risk.¹⁰⁴ As illustrated in Section 3.2.1, the payoff functions for common
2203 contingent consideration arrangements that have a nonlinear structure are option-like (e.g., resemble
2204 calls, caps, collars, cash-or-nothing, asset-or-nothing, etc. options) in that payments are triggered if
2205 certain thresholds are met. Ample literature is available that supports the use of the OPM in pricing
2206 instruments with nonlinear payoff functions. Some of the earliest contributions to the field of option
2207 pricing theory are the papers by Louis Bachelier (1900), Robert C. Merton (1973), Fisher Black and
2208 Myron Scholes (1973), and John C. Cox, Stephen A. Ross and Mark Rubinstein (1979). See Section
2209 10.3.7 for a further discussion of the academic support for the use of option pricing methods for non-
2210 traded metrics.

¹⁰⁴ This section complements Section 5.3, which addressed the method recommended by the Working Group for use in valuing contingent consideration based on metrics that have a linear payoff structure or for which the underlying risk is diversifiable—the SBM.

2211 The essence of the OPM is to adjust the contingent consideration metric forecast for risk, or to create
2212 a “risk-neutral” metric forecast, by applying a risk-adjusting discount rate to the metric forecast and
2213 then to evaluate the contingent consideration payoff function using the risk-neutral framework (see
2214 Section 4.6). Section 5.2.3 provides a discussion of how to estimate the Required Metric Risk Premium
2215 for the metric. Once the metric forecast has been adjusted for risk, the expected contingent
2216 consideration payoff is calculated based on the risk-neutral distribution (typically lognormal) of the
2217 metric, and discounted at the risk-free rate plus any adjustment for counterparty credit risk¹⁰⁵ from the
2218 expected payment date(s) to the valuation date.

2219 The OPM thus uses a risk-neutral framework to avoid the difficulties of estimating the adjustment to
2220 the RMRP to address a nonlinear contingent consideration payoff structure.

2221 *5.4.1 When the OPM is Most Appropriate*

2222 The OPM is most appropriate for valuing contingent consideration with nonlinear payoff structures
2223 that are based on metrics for which the underlying risk is non-diversifiable. In such cases, the OPM
2224 provides a framework by which the impact of the payoff structure on the non-diversifiable risk of the
2225 metric can be easily modeled.¹⁰⁶ However, the OPM might add unnecessary complexity and
2226 unnecessary assumptions (e.g., lognormal distribution) if the valuation specialist is valuing either (a)
2227 an earnout with a linear payoff structure or (b) an earnout based on metrics with fully diversifiable
2228 risks. In these two cases, an SBM may be simpler and will suffice.

2229 *5.4.2 OPM Implementation in the Risk-Neutral Framework*

2230 In the context of contingent consideration, the implementation of OPM requires a risk adjustment to
2231 account for the fact that the metric (e.g., revenue, EBITDA, etc.) has non-diversifiable risk. See
2232 Sections 4.3 and 4.6 for a discussion of non-diversifiable risk and risk-neutral valuation. See Sections
2233 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 for a discussion of how to estimate the risk adjustment (i.e. the Required Metric Risk
2234 Premium).

2235 Management usually provides an expected (mean) forecast for the metric(s) over the earnout period.
2236 These forecasts are adjusted for risk by applying a risk-adjusting discount rate¹⁰⁷ commensurate with
2237 the non-diversifiable risk embedded in each metric, and then used as an input into a closed-form
2238 solution or a simulation depending on the payoff function. There are two equivalent ways to perform
2239 this risk adjustment (also known as “forecast risk-adjustment methods”). Assuming for simplicity of
2240 exposition a single time period, these two methods are:

- 2241 1. Discount the metric forecast by a risk-adjusting discount rate to create a risk-neutral time zero
2242 (or present) value of the metric. The time zero risk-neutral metric is then grown at the risk-free
2243 rate over the considered time period; or
- 2244 2. Adjust management’s forecasted growth rate of the metric over the considered time period
2245 downward by the Required Metric Risk Premium.¹⁰⁸

2246 See Section 10.3.4 for a more detailed discussion of these two different ways of implementing forecast
2247 risk-adjustment methods and their equivalence.

¹⁰⁵ A discussion of counterparty credit risk is provided in Section 5.2.6.

¹⁰⁶ As discussed in Section 5.3.1, due to the need to consider simultaneously the implications of the structure, the metric, the volatility, and the positioning of the metric mean relative to the payoff threshold, it is difficult to estimate a discount rate for a nonlinear payoff structure based on a non-diversifiable metric in an SBM framework.

¹⁰⁷ Using continuous growth rates and continuously compounded discount rates is best practice when implementing OPM.

¹⁰⁸ In some cases, this adjustment will make the growth rate negative.

2248 *5.4.3 Using OPM When the Metric Distribution is Not Lognormal*

2249 Typically, the OPM is implemented assuming a lognormal distribution or Geometric Brownian Motion
2250 (GBM)¹⁰⁹ for the earnout metric(s) due to mathematical tractability and ease of use. Section 10.3.5
2251 provides a discussion of some common criticisms of the use of the lognormal distribution for financial
2252 investments and notes its wide usage despite some of these criticisms being well-founded.

2253 Although textbooks and other literature have addressed option pricing with non-traded underlying
2254 metrics since at least the 1990s, the literature on the application of option pricing specifically to the
2255 valuation of contingent consideration is limited; see Section 10.3.7 for a detailed discussion. However,
2256 because (a) the application of the lognormal distribution to a company's stock price is widely used in
2257 practice, (b) alternative distributions for traded assets do not seem to provide significantly different
2258 results,¹¹⁰ and (c) typical non-diversifiable earnout metrics such as EBITDA and revenue tend to be at
2259 least somewhat correlated with a company's equity value, GBM is typically also used for non-traded
2260 financial metrics.

2261 Revenue or EBITDA may not be lognormally distributed. As discussed below, many of the most
2262 significant deviations from a lognormal distribution involve (a) diversifiable risks or (b) profit
2263 outcomes that are negative—each of which can often be addressed in a straightforward manner in the
2264 valuation. Setting aside these cases, the Working Group believes that the choice of using a lognormal
2265 distribution for a financial (non-diversifiable) metric does not often significantly affect the valuation.
2266 In the rare cases where the risk associated with the financial metric is non-diversifiable and the metric's
2267 distribution is known to be far from lognormally distributed in a manner that could significantly affect
2268 the valuation, an adjustment may be appropriate. However, consideration should be given to the trade-
2269 off between computational complexity vs. a more accurate representation of the real-world metric
2270 distribution.

2271 Fortunately, many of the most significant deviations between a lognormal distribution and the
2272 distribution of typical (short-term, non-diversifiable, financial) earnout metrics are due to
2273 contingencies related to *diversifiable* events. For example, future revenues might depend on whether
2274 a key product development effort is very successful or only modestly successful. (Indeed, this might
2275 be one of the prime reasons for putting the earnout in place—to allow the seller to share in the upside
2276 and the buyer to mitigate the downside associated with this product development uncertainty.) In such
2277 a situation, the valuation model can be separated into two different scenarios, each with their own
2278 mean forecast and volatility (a higher mean for the “very successful” scenario in this example), and
2279 with a management-assessed probability for each of the two possible resolutions of that diversifiable
2280 risk. Similarly, if a closed-form model is appropriate, the results of two such closed-form models could
2281 be weighted in proportion to the likelihood of these different scenarios for product development
2282 success.

2283 The second common issue with the lognormal assumption is that a lognormal distribution does not
2284 capture outcomes below zero, which can occur with profit-based earnout metrics such as EBITDA or
2285 EBIT. Fortunately, a typical profit-based earnout is generally only paid (or receives the vast majority
2286 of its payoff) when profits are substantially positive—making it most important to correctly capture

¹⁰⁹ See Section 10.3.6 for an in-depth discussion of the properties of a GBM, and suggestions for alternatives to consider when these properties do not hold.

¹¹⁰ For traded shares or market indices, the use of GBM and its assumption of a lognormal distribution has become widely accepted due to several academic papers published in peer-reviewed journals. These papers considered alternative distributions and/or processes (e.g., arithmetic Brownian motion, jump-diffusion processes) with reported results that are not significantly different from those obtained under the lognormal distribution assumption. The computational burden required for these alternative specifications is, however, considerably increased.

2287 the likelihood of various upside outcomes. Thus, for earnouts, the overall impact of excluding negative
2288 outcomes, or treating them as slightly positive, will not often be significant. In the rare cases (including
2289 clawbacks) where contingent consideration is paid for negative profit outcomes or the impact of
2290 excluding negative outcomes is significant, there are a few methodological solutions the valuation
2291 specialist could apply.

2292 Often the simplest technique to address significant negative earnings outcomes is for the valuation
2293 specialist to convert the analysis to an alternative (but related) metric that is unlikely to go negative.
2294 For example, the valuation specialist can apply an OPM using Monte Carlo simulation of future
2295 *revenues* (assuming a lognormal distribution of revenues) and then estimate the profit associated with
2296 the revenues and the corresponding contingent consideration payoff, in each simulation path. If
2297 conversion to an alternative metric such as revenues is problematic, there are other techniques
2298 available. Section 10.3.6 discusses these techniques, along with suggestions for addressing other, less
2299 common issues, such as significant discrete drops or jumps in the metric distribution due to non-
2300 diversifiable risks, and (for multi-time period earnouts) correlation over time that differs from that
2301 implied by GBM, or time-varying volatility.

2302 To summarize, in an OPM used to value an earnout, the distinction in riskiness between traded shares
2303 and the (non-traded) earnout metric is captured by the difference between their respective required
2304 risk premiums. However, the valuation specialist should also consider whether to explicitly address
2305 any substantial difference between a lognormal distribution and the metric distribution.

2306 *5.4.4 Using Simulation to Handle Path Dependency or Multiple Interdependent Metrics in an* 2307 *OPM*

2308 As discussed in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, contingent consideration structures that span multiple periods
2309 with features that create path dependency or that involve multiple, interdependent non-diversifiable
2310 metrics¹¹¹ will generally require the use of a technique such as Monte Carlo simulation. Applied in the
2311 context of an earnout valuation, each iteration or trial of the Monte Carlo simulation draws a value
2312 from the assumed (joint) distribution for the metrics, for each period of the earnout. As part of the
2313 specification of the joint distribution, the valuation specialist should consider what assumptions are
2314 appropriate for the correlation between outcomes from one period to the next (if there is path
2315 dependency) and for the correlation between metrics (if there are multiple, interdependent metrics).

2316 For the correlation between outcomes from one period to the next, if a single GBM process is
2317 employed, as is often the case for an OPM, the assumption is one of relatively strong positive period-
2318 to-period correlation (more than 50%). As discussed in Section 10.3.6, the valuation specialist can
2319 choose a different correlation by modeling each period as a separate GBM.

2320 For estimating the correlation between two or more metrics, the methods include:

- 2321 • **Historical Metric Correlation Method:** estimation based on the observed historical correlation
2322 between the metric growth rates for the earnout-relevant business (where sufficient data is
2323 available), for comparable companies, and/or for the industry. Adjustments can be made if the
2324 future metric correlation is expected to differ from the historical relationship. For example, the
2325 correlation between licensing revenue and maintenance revenue may change post-transaction
2326 if the acquirer will modify the term of the license or maintenance contracts. Note that if using

¹¹¹ If the structure involves dependencies only for example between a diversifiable metric and a non-diversifiable metric, this situation can also sometimes be handled by creating outcome scenarios for the diversifiable metric, applying OPM within each scenario (taking into account the impact of that scenario on the mean and volatility for the non-diversifiable metric), and weighting the scenarios by their likelihoods to estimate the average risk-neutral payoff.

2327 quarterly data, the analysis should use year-on-year quarterly growth (e.g., Q1 of the current
2328 year vs. Q1 of the prior year) rather than quarter-to-quarter growth (e.g., Q1 of the current year
2329 vs. Q4 of the prior year) to avoid artificial impacts of seasonality on the correlation estimate.
2330 • Management Assessment Method: estimation based on management’s assessment of the
2331 correlation between metric growth rates. Direct assessment of correlation is challenging but is
2332 often employed where adequate historical data does not exist, or where the metrics or the
2333 company-specific correlation between them is unique. It is also good practice to use
2334 management assessments as a cross-check. For example, it is appropriate to ask management
2335 whether the observed historical correlation between the metrics is reasonable as an estimate
2336 for the earnout-relevant business post-acquisition.

2337 Once the correlation between the metrics has been estimated, the valuation specialist can incorporate
2338 the correlation into the simulation.

2339 *Example:* The buyer agrees to pay the sellers of an asset management company 10% of
2340 management fees in excess of 100 million, and 15% of performance fees in excess of 40 million
2341 in the first year after the acquisition, with an overall cap of 20 million. Historically, the
2342 correlation in the growth of these two metrics for the subject company has been 50%.
2343 Management agrees that 50% is a reasonable projection for the future correlation of growth in
2344 these metrics. A Monte Carlo simulation is set up. For each iteration of the simulation, two
2345 draws are made from a standard normal distribution, x_1 and x_2 . The random draw used to
2346 simulate management fees is x_1 and the random draw used to simulate (the correlated)
2347 performance fees is $(0.5 \times x_1) + (x_2 \times \sqrt{1 - (0.5)^2})$.¹¹²

2348 After risk-adjusting the metric forecasts to a risk-neutral framework, the earnout cash flow is
2349 calculated based on the “path” for the simulated metrics and the contractual terms of the earnout
2350 arrangement and are discounted from the expected payment date(s) to the valuation date at the risk-
2351 free rate plus any adjustment for counterparty credit risk. The value of the earnout is estimated to be
2352 the average present value of the earnout payments over all iterations of the simulation.

2353 Many iterations are typically required to get reliable results from a simulation. The standard error of
2354 the simulation mean is a statistical measurement that can be used to determine how many iterations
2355 are necessary. See the example in Section 9.10 for an illustration of a Monte Carlo simulation in the
2356 context of a multi-period earnout with a catch-up feature.

2357 *5.4.5 Using a Binomial Lattice to Handle Buyer or Seller Choices*

2358 As discussed in Section 3.2.4, earnouts may be structured with the ability of the buyer or seller to
2359 make decisions over the term of the earnout that impact its payoff. In these cases, a binomial tree (or
2360 more generally a lattice or finite-difference technique) can be used to incorporate optimal decisions
2361 into the earnout valuation.

2362 A binomial tree, whose branches represent potential future metric paths, is constructed based on
2363 assumptions for future volatility in a risk-neutral framework. That is, the risk-neutral probability
2364 distribution of future metric outcomes is modeled at successive time steps. The optimal decision
2365 feature can then be incorporated by working backwards through the tree, from the end of the earnout
2366 term to the valuation date, by minimizing (in the case of the buyer’s decision) or maximizing (in the
2367 case of the seller’s decision) the expected present value of the payoff.

¹¹² More generally, Cholesky decomposition can be used to simulate two or more correlated metrics. See Hull, *Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives*, 8th ed. (2011), p. 450 for further detail.

2368 The use of a binomial tree is restrictive, however, since it may cause difficulties in addressing certain
2369 path-dependent features. Valuing earnouts that have both path-dependent and optimal decision
2370 features generally requires the use of a Monte Carlo simulation in conjunction with an algorithm to
2371 address the buyer or seller decision for each iteration of the simulation.¹¹³

2372 5.4.6 Conclusions Regarding OPM

2373 The main advantage of the OPM is that the impact of the risk associated with a nonlinear payoff
2374 structure based on a metric with non-diversifiable risk can be appropriately and readily incorporated
2375 into the valuation using a risk-neutral framework. The main disadvantages of the OPM are its
2376 complexity, lack of transparency, and that it is not widely understood. OPM also generally assumes a
2377 lognormal assumption; substantive deviations from this assumption can be addressed when required,
2378 but sometimes at the cost of additional complexity.

2379 Therefore, the Working Group recommends the use of OPM for valuing contingent consideration if
2380 the risk of the underlying metric is non-diversifiable AND the payoff structure is nonlinear (e.g., has
2381 a threshold, cap, tiers, or carry-forwards). However, the Working Group recommends the simpler
2382 SBM where there are no difficulties associated with estimating the impact on risk of the payoff
2383 structure, i.e., when the payoff structure is linear or the risk of the underlying metric is diversifiable.

2384 5.5 Comparison of SBM versus OPM

2385 The SBM and OPM described in the preceding sections 5.3 and 5.4 are both applications of the income
2386 approach, whereby the expected future earnout payments are discounted to the valuation date. Both
2387 methods are similar in that they incorporate the Required Metric Risk Premium, time value of money,
2388 and counterparty credit risk into their respective methodologies for discounting/adjusting for risk.



2389 The differences between these methods relate to (a) the assumption about the distribution for the
2390 growth rate of the earnout metric and (b) the way the risk associated with the payoff structure of the
2391 earnout is incorporated into the valuation. OPM typically assumes that the growth rate of the earnout
2392 metric is normally distributed¹¹⁴ and the risk associated with the structure of the earnout is
2393 incorporated into the valuation using a risk-neutral framework. SBM is more flexible about the
2394 distribution for the growth rate of the earnout metric, but requires an assessment of the impact on risk
2395 of the payoff structure—which is challenging when the payoff structure is nonlinear and the risk of
2396 the underlying metric is non-diversifiable.

2397 A comparison of the SBM versus OPM is summarized in Table 5 below.

¹¹³ In some situations, the algorithm can be a relatively simple decision rule assessed by management. For more complex situations such as a path-dependent early exercise option, there are many algorithms and techniques that have been developed. See for example, F.A. Longstaff and E.S. Schwartz, “Valuing American options by simulation: A simple least-squares approach” (2001).

¹¹⁴ Equivalently, the method assumes that the underlying metric is lognormally distributed or follows a GBM process. However, as discussed in Section 5.4.3, “lumpy” distributions caused by events with diversifiable risks can easily be incorporated into an OPM.

TABLE 5: Comparison of SBM and OPM

	Scenario-Based Method (SBM)	Option Pricing Method (OPM)
Approach	Income approach	Income approach
Model for Underlying Metric	Assessment of the distribution of the underlying metric, based on estimated forecasts, scenarios, and probabilities: 	Lognormal assumption for the underlying metric distribution, based on estimated forecasts and volatility: 
Discount Rate / Risk Adjustment		
Metric Risk	Required Metric Risk Premium	Required Metric Risk Premium
Payoff Structure Risk	Assessment (challenging for nonlinear payoff structures associated with non-diversifiable risks)	Built into OPM's risk-neutral framework ¹¹⁵
Time Value of Money	Risk-free rate over relevant time horizon until payment	Risk-free rate over relevant time horizon until payment
Counterparty Credit Risk	Obligor's credit spread	Obligor's credit spread

2398 *5.5.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of the SBM*

2399 SBM Advantages:

- 2400 • The SBM is the simplest, most transparent and most appropriate model for earnouts where the
2401 earnout metric does not have systematic risk or the payoff is linear.
- 2402 • The SBM may be more consistent with how acquirers value earnouts when building deal
2403 models that inform the consideration paid in the acquisition.
- 2404 • The SBM is flexible in that it can easily model any distributional assumption for the underlying
2405 metric, including distributions that are not lognormal, such as:
 - 2406 ○ Asymmetric outcomes – for example, when there are more downside than upside
2407 possibilities (or vice versa) associated with a young business
 - 2408 ○ “Lumpy” distributions, based on varying levels of success or strength of competition
 - 2409 ○ Outcomes that cannot exceed certain levels due to capacity constraints

¹¹⁵ OPM implicitly accounts for the risk associated with the structure of the contingent consideration, there is no need for an explicit additional adjustment to the discount rate for that risk. The RMRP is used to risk-adjust the forecast. See Section 10.3.4 for a discussion of this procedure. By using a risk-neutral framework (see Section 4.6), OPM accounts for the risk associated with the contingent consideration structure, regardless of how complex that structure is.

- 2410 ○ A beta distribution, which is useful for approximating the outcome of repeated trials with
2411 a probability of winning – often the fundamental nature of revenue generation
- 2412 ○ Negative earnings for earnouts based on earnings-based metrics.
- 2413 ● The SBM inputs (scenarios and probabilities) are generally provided by management and,
2414 while relatively subjective, are easier for management to understand.

2415 SBM Disadvantages:

- 2416 ● The impact of the risk associated with nonlinear payoff structures is often significant and
2417 difficult to correctly assess qualitatively. Moreover, the Working Group is not aware of any
2418 well-established framework to directly estimate the appropriate discount rate associated with
2419 nonlinear payoff structures based on metrics with non-diversifiable risk.
- 2420 ● Estimating scenarios and probabilities (or a distribution) consistent with the valuation of the
2421 business and its intangibles can be challenging.
- 2422 ● Given the qualitative (and in many cases subjective) nature of the input assumptions, the
2423 valuation based on an SBM can be difficult to support and can be susceptible to biases that
2424 underestimate risk.

2425 *5.5.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of the OPM*

2426 OPM Advantages:

- 2427 ● The OPM is widely used to value financial instruments with nonlinear payoff structures similar
2428 to nonlinear contingent consideration payoff structures.
- 2429 ● The impact of the risk associated with nonlinear payoff structures based on non-traded metrics
2430 with non-diversifiable risk can be appropriately and readily incorporated into the valuation
2431 using a risk-neutral framework.
- 2432 ● The volatility structure of a GBM is consistent with the typical assumption that the uncertainty
2433 of future projections increases with time.
- 2434 ● The OPM has been extensively researched and there are widely used formulas to value many
2435 of the payoffs typically used to structure earnouts.

2436 Disadvantages:

- 2437 ● The OPM is less transparent and more difficult for management to understand than SBM.
- 2438 ● The OPM relies on complex mathematics and therefore OPM can be more costly and difficult
2439 to implement for those not versed in option pricing theory.
- 2440 ● The growth of the underlying metric is generally assumed to follow a normal distribution,
2441 which may not adequately fit the distribution of possible outcomes.¹¹⁶
- 2442 ● The implied discount rate associated with an OPM, and therefore the concluded fair value, can
2443 be unintuitive and difficult to explain.

¹¹⁶ However, the diversifiable risks that typically drive lumpy distributions can be incorporated into an OPM, as described in Section 5.4.3.

2444 **5.6 Summary of Key Recommendations Regarding the Valuation of Contingent**
2445 **Consideration**

2446 For valuing contingent consideration, the market approach is rarely used due to the lack of an active
2447 trading market. Even in the unusual case where a market exists for contingent consideration (such as
2448 in the market for CVRs), the market often exhibits low trading volume, trades between related parties,
2449 and/or perceived information asymmetries. The valuation specialist would need to consider these
2450 factors along with other typical market approach reliability indicators to determine if the market
2451 approach is useful, even in the rare case where market data on the value of contingent consideration is
2452 available.

2453 The cost approach is also typically not appropriate, because (1) there often is no obvious way to
2454 estimate a replacement cost for a contingent consideration arrangement and (2) the cost approach does
2455 not consider future expectations.

2456 The Working Group has observed two income approach methods commonly used in practice to value
2457 contingent consideration: SBM and OPM. Other methods also may exist or be developed in the future.

2458 No single income approach method for valuing contingent consideration appears to be superior in all
2459 respects and circumstances. Each of SBM and OPM has merits and challenges, these methods differ
2460 in level of complexity, and there are trade-offs in selecting one method over the other.

2461 However, the Working Group has concluded that there are contingent consideration types for which
2462 each method is typically most appropriate. For the reasons articulated earlier in this section, the
2463 Working Group recommends the following to select a method for valuing contingent consideration:

- 2464 a) If the risk of the underlying metric is diversifiable, e.g., for achievement of a product
2465 development milestone, choose SBM
- 2466 b) If the payoff structure is linear (e.g., a fixed percentage of revenues or EBITDA with no
2467 thresholds, caps, or tiers), choose SBM
- 2468 c) If the risk of the underlying metric is non-diversifiable *and* the payoff structure has thresholds,
2469 caps, tiers, or other nonlinearities, choose OPM
- 2470 d) If the payoff structure is path dependent (e.g., a carry-forward feature, a catch-up provision or
2471 a multi-year cap) or is based on multiple interdependent metrics, choose SBM or OPM as
2472 recommended above, using a technique that can handle these complexities (such as Monte
2473 Carlo simulation).

2474 The Working Group does not recommend the use of SBM for nonlinear payoff structures involving a
2475 metric with non-diversifiable risk. In this situation, the SBM discount rate would have to be adjusted
2476 to account for the impact of the nonlinear payoff structure. However, the amount of the discount rate
2477 adjustment cannot be easily intuited and the Working Group is not aware of any reasonable “rules of
2478 thumb” for developing such adjustments. It is for this reason that OPM is recommended over SBM in
2479 this situation.

2480 Whether applied to the expected payoff cash flow (as in SBM) or to create a risk-neutral expected
2481 payoff cash flow (as in OPM), the discount rate should incorporate a risk premium associated with
2482 and appropriate to the underlying metric for the contingent consideration. The Required Metric Risk
2483 Premium will often differ from the risk premium used to value the associated business, due to
2484 differences in risk between the metric (such as revenue or EBITDA) and long-term free cash flows of
2485 the business. For example, long-term free cash flows of the business are generally riskier than revenue,

2486 due to operational leverage. Thus, even for a linear payoff structure, the contingent consideration
2487 discount rate will often differ from the WACC and from the transaction IRR.

2488 Because the earnout is valued from the perspective of a market participant buying or selling the
2489 standalone earnout post-transaction (with the relevant business under the new ownership of the actual
2490 buyer), the financial projections developed for valuing an earnout should include buyer-specific
2491 synergies unless the earnout agreement specifically excludes them from the definition of the metric.

Section 6: Clawbacks

2492 There are cases where the parties to a transaction will structure the contingent consideration so that
2493 the buyer may be entitled to a clawback (or refund) of a portion of the initial purchase consideration
2494 from the seller. In these cases, the buyer has essentially taken out insurance that is payable by the seller
2495 if the acquired business underperforms or to mitigate specific risks. Clawbacks are therefore
2496 contingent assets to the buyer that reduce the fair value of the total purchase consideration.

2497 *Example:* The sellers agree to pay the buyer one million if the EBITDA of the acquired
2498 business falls below three million in the first year after the acquisition.

2499 In general, the valuation considerations for clawbacks are the same as for earnouts. The valuation
2500 specialist should consider the risk of and expectations for the underlying metric, the impact of the
2501 clawback payoff structure on risk (especially if the structure is nonlinear), as well as any counterparty
2502 credit risk.

2503 6.1 Underlying Metrics for Clawbacks

2504 Clawbacks tend to be structured to mitigate the risk of the acquired business underperforming over a
2505 specified future period. As such, the underlying metrics or payment triggering events observed in
2506 practice for clawbacks are generally the same as for earnouts, including:

- 2507 • Financial or business metrics with systematic risk: revenue, EBITDA and net income, number
2508 of units sold, etc.
- 2509 • Nonfinancial milestone events (for a clawback, usually based on failure to achieve milestones
2510 or negative events): regulatory approvals, resolution of legal disputes, execution of certain
2511 commercial contracts or retention of customers, completion of certain software tasks or
2512 construction projects, etc.

2513 Therefore, the valuation considerations related to the underlying metrics or events for clawbacks are
2514 typically the same as for earnouts. However, the impact on the valuation of the payoff structure of a
2515 clawback can be significantly different from an earnout, as discussed in the following section.

2516 6.2 The Impact of the Payoff Structure of Clawbacks on the Discount Rate

2517 Unlike earnout payments, which are typically triggered as a result of outperformance or successfully
2518 achieving certain milestones, clawback payments are often triggered as a result of underperformance,
2519 failure to achieve certain milestones, or negative resolution of uncertainty. As a result, the value of a
2520 clawback tends to increase as the anticipated performance of the underlying metric deteriorates. That
2521 is, the value of a clawback is usually negatively correlated with the performance of the underlying
2522 metric. Such a clawback can resemble a financial instrument with a negative beta, often resulting in a
2523 negative discount rate applied to the expected future payments associated with the clawback.

2524 Clawbacks resemble insurance contracts or put options. Just as the value of an insurance contract
2525 increases as the likelihood of the downside event increases, so too does the value of a clawback
2526 increase as the likelihood of poor performance or a negative triggering event increases.

2527 A negative discount rate can arise naturally when valuing a clawback using an OPM, which often takes
2528 the form of a put option (see the example in Section 9.11).

2529 **6.3 Counterparty Credit Risk for Clawbacks**

2530 In general, clawbacks are typically an obligation of the seller to make future contingent payments to
2531 the buyer. As such, the allowance for counterparty credit risk should be specific to the seller,
2532 considering the seller's credit risk and the expected timing of the payoff. This is different from a
2533 typical earnout, where the buyer is typically the obligor and it is the buyer's credit risk that is
2534 considered.

2535 In practice, since the sellers' company no longer exists as a standalone entity post-transaction and the
2536 obligors are often the individual former shareholders, the counterparty credit risk of the seller is often
2537 mitigated through the use of an escrow account (or other credit risk mitigation mechanism as discussed
2538 in Section 5.2.6). If present, the credit risk mitigation mechanism could cause the valuation specialist
2539 to reduce or even remove the allowance for counterparty credit risk, depending on the extent of the
2540 risk mitigation mechanism.

2541 If the maximum possible clawback payment is not placed in escrow (and no other credit risk mitigation
2542 mechanism is used), the credit risk of the seller in the typical scenarios in which the clawback will be
2543 paid should be considered. Clawbacks are typically paid when the acquired business fails to perform
2544 as expected. If such downside scenarios predominantly occur when the economy is notably poor or
2545 are otherwise correlated with financial stress on the seller, the likelihood of seller default in such
2546 downside scenarios may be larger than the overall credit risk associated with the seller.

Section 7: Assessing the Reasonability of a Contingent Consideration Valuation

2547 The valuation of contingent consideration requires the estimation of a number of key inputs and
2548 assumptions. It is important to maintain internal consistency among the assumptions used in the
2549 contingent consideration valuation as well as to assess consistency with the assumptions for the
2550 valuation of the overall business and/or related intangibles and with historical and market data. Finally,
2551 it is important to consider the reasonableness of the total purchase consideration.

2552 The remainder of this section addresses these considerations for assessing the reasonability of the
2553 valuation of contingent consideration in more detail.

2554 7.1 Consistency of the Earnout Metric Forecast in Single vs. Multi-scenario Valuation

2555 Given the nature of contingent consideration, multiple scenarios will often be used to arrive at the
2556 expected outcome for the earnout metric and also occasionally (depending on methodology) to
2557 estimate the volatility for the metric and/or the expected payoff cash flow. In contrast, a business
2558 valuation will often rely on only one scenario: typically, the deal model expected case scenario
2559 (representing in principle the mean, i.e., the probability-weighted average of the possible scenarios for
2560 future cash flows).

2561 Using a different number of scenarios for the earnout computations versus the business valuation is
2562 not, on its own, problematic. However, consistency between these two valuation techniques should be
2563 evaluated. For instance, if the expected outcome for the earnout metric using multiple scenarios is
2564 significantly different than the corresponding estimate in the single-scenario model used for the
2565 valuation of the business, there could be a lack of consistency between the assumptions for the two
2566 valuation models. Such an inconsistency, if significant, would imply that either the valuation of the
2567 earnout or the valuation of the business is incorrect.

2568 More generally, assuming the same measurement date and valuation basis, the expected value of the
2569 projections for the earnout metric based on the probability distribution used in the earnout analysis
2570 should equal the forecast of the same earnout metric implied by the expected cash flows used to value
2571 the business or its intangibles (excluding any impact of buyer-specific synergies). If not, significant
2572 distortions can arise.

2573 For example, consider an earnout with a payoff equal to the excess of future EBITDA above 100,
2574 where the EBITDA forecast used in the valuation of the business is 100. Assume there are no buyer-
2575 specific synergies and no differences due an idiosyncratic definition of “EBITDA” for purposes of the
2576 earnout. Recognizing that a deeper understanding of the distribution of EBITDA outcomes is required
2577 to value the earnout, the valuation specialist gathers additional information, resulting in the probability
2578 distribution for EBITDA to be used in the earnout analysis presented in Table 6.

TABLE 6: Example Probability Distribution

Scenario	Probability	EBITDA	Earnout payoff (Max (EBITDA-100,0))
1	2.5%	200	100
2	15%	160	60
3	20%	140	40
4	25%	100	0
5	20%	80	0
6	15%	70	0
7	2.5%	60	0
Expected value		110	19.5

2579 The *expected value* (mean) of EBITDA for the earnout analysis is 110 (calculated as the probability-
2580 weighted average across the scenarios).¹¹⁷ This value is different from the forecast of 100 used in the
2581 business valuation.¹¹⁸ This mismatch between the EBITDA forecast for the business and the expected
2582 value of the probability distribution for EBITDA assumed for the earnout can be problematic. It likely
2583 means that using this distribution will cause the expected value of the earnout payoff (19.5 in this
2584 example) to be overstated or that the valuation of the business is not using expected cash flows and
2585 may therefore be understating value.

2586 7.2 Consistency with Valuation of the Business, the Intangibles, and IPR&D

2587 The assumptions made for the contingent consideration valuation should be consistent with those made
2588 for valuation of the business and, when applicable, its intangible assets. The evaluation of consistency
2589 should also allow for the different treatment of buyer-specific synergies for business valuation as
2590 compared to contingent consideration valuation. Table 7 summarizes some of the key differences
2591 between the valuation of a business and of an earnout; additional differences are described throughout
2592 this guide. These key differences and other considerations are discussed in more detail in the remainder
2593 of this section.

¹¹⁷ Specifically, the computation to arrive at the expected EBITDA is $(200 \times 2.5\%) + (160 \times 15\%) + (140 \times 20\%) + (100 \times 25\%) + (80 \times 20\%) + (70 \times 15\%) + (60 \times 2.5\%) = 110$.

¹¹⁸ The assumed EBITDA probability distribution does have its *most likely* scenario equal to the forecast of 100. However, best practice is for the valuation of the business to use expected cash flows. If expected cash flows are not used in the valuation of the business, an adjustment—which is typically not easy to estimate—would have to be made to the discount rate for the valuation of the business to account for any difference in risk between the expected cash flows and the most likely cash flows.

TABLE 7: Comparison of Business Valuation (Income Approach) to Earnout Valuation		
	Business Valuation	Earnout Valuation
Projections		
Level of detail	Typically uses expected cash flows; does not require assumptions about the probability distribution around the mean	Unless linear payoff structure, requires assumptions about the probability distribution for future outcomes for the earnout metric
Synergies	Includes market participant synergies, excludes buyer-specific synergies	Includes all synergies relevant to the calculation of the payoff
Discount Rate		
RFR	Long-term RFR	RFR based on the time until the earnout payment(s) are made
Counterparty credit risk	Not relevant	Typically, obligor's credit spread for subordinated debt in the scenarios in which, and over the timeframe until, the earnout payment(s) are made
Risk premium	Risk premium for long-term free cash flows (i.e., WACC or IRR less RFR)	RMRP for the earnout metric
Impact of earnout structure	Not relevant	For a metric with non-diversifiable risk, nonlinear payoff structures impact the effective discount rate

2594 Consistency with Business Projections: As discussed in Section 7.1, projections for the business in
2595 principle should use the expected case cash flows (a single set of cash flows approximating the
2596 probability-weighted average of the possible scenarios for the future). Typically, the same set of
2597 projections should be considered as the starting point when valuing the contingent consideration.
2598 However, earnout valuations typically require a probabilistic analysis,¹¹⁹ including an assumption
2599 about the distribution of future outcomes for the earnout metric. The methods described in Section 5
2600 generally require (1) the use of multiple scenarios (for the SBM, e.g., for nonfinancial milestone
2601 payments with predominantly diversifiable risk) and/or (2) the expected value for the metric and a
2602 volatility around that expected value (for the OPM, assuming a lognormal distribution). Thus, for the
2603 valuation of most earnouts, it is imperative to start with a full understanding of the probability
2604 distribution for the metric outcome.

2605 The projections used for the earnout valuation should be consistent with the projections used for the
2606 business valuation, after allowing for any differences due to buyer-specific synergies or to the
2607 definition of the earnout metric. A qualitative assessment of consistency with the projections for the
2608 business should thus be performed. The example below illustrates how performing a consistency check
2609 can identify a necessary revision to the assumptions.

¹¹⁹ The only situation in which an earnout valuation might not require understanding the probability distribution of the underlying metric is when the earnout payoff has a linear structure, as explained in Section 4.4.

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Example: An asset management company was acquired. One year from the acquisition date, the sellers are entitled to an earnout payment of one million if the client retention rate is 95% or higher. Except in times of an economic downturn, it is uncommon for client retention rates to be below 95%. Revenues are projected to grow by 2% over the next year, whereas typical prior growth had been about 10% per year.

The valuation specialist planned to assume a probability of 90% that the 95% retention threshold will be achieved, based on the historical retention rates. However, when management is asked about the reasonability of the 90% assumption, the valuation specialist learns that the lower projected growth in the next year is due to the anticipated loss of a key principal in the firm and as a result, 20% of the clients are at high risk to depart post-acquisition.¹²⁰ Therefore, the 90% probability estimate for achieving the earnout payment is quite possibly inconsistent with the assumptions used to forecast revenue for the company in the first year.

Consistency with Intangible(s) Projections: One may also need to assess the contingent consideration assumptions relative to the assumptions for valuation of the intangible assets of the subject business. For example, as part of valuing the intangible assets associated with an acquisition, a pharmaceutical company may develop projections for a drug candidate under development. The projections used for valuing an earnout contingent upon the success of that drug candidate should use consistent assumptions for the probability of success and for performance estimates (revenues, units sold, timing assumptions, etc.)

Consistency with Methodology for Valuing Assets and Liabilities of the Business: In some cases, assets or liabilities of the business might involve nonlinear payoff structures. For example, a company might pay (or receive payment of) royalty rates that are tiered at different rates based on future sales. As another example, real estate leases might have contingencies based on the revenue of the lessee or other nonlinear payoff structures. There is a potential for inconsistency if such assets or liabilities are valued using a different methodology than is recommended in this Valuation Advisory for the valuation of (related¹²¹) contingent consideration.

Market Participant Assumptions/Buyer-Specific Synergies: The forecast assumptions for the earnout metric and subject business may vary due to differences in the assumptions related to synergies. In terms of the fair value of the business, the value is estimated based on what market participants would assume about the expected cash flows for the business. These assumptions are hypothetical and exclude assumptions unique to one buyer, such as buyer-specific synergies.

However, as explained in Section 4.1, for that same transaction the market participant assumptions for the earnout valuation can be different. Market participants evaluating the standalone earnout would include in the calculation of the earnout cash flow any buyer-specific synergies that would affect the payoff outcome for the earnout metric.

For this reason, buyer-specific synergies should be identified and, unless they are excluded from or irrelevant to the definition of the earnout metric, included in the financial projections used for the earnout valuation. Any such buyer-specific synergies should, however, be excluded from the valuation of the business and its assets. The fact that buyer-specific synergies can impact the value of the

¹²⁰ Note that because this issue also affects the value of customer relationships, it would typically be addressed in the process of valuing those relationships.

¹²¹ For example, the contingent consideration valuation is related to the valuation of such assets and liabilities if the contingent consideration metric is related (in our examples) to sales of the products that have the tiered royalty rates or to the lease revenues.

2649 transaction consideration but not the value of the business can also affect the check on the
2650 reasonableness of the transaction IRR (see Section 7.5).

2651 Discount Rates: The discount rate used for the contingent consideration valuation (either directly as
2652 in an SBM or in the risk-neutral adjustment to the metric growth forecast in an OPM) should be
2653 consistent with those used to value the business and its intangibles, after taking into account
2654 differences such as those noted in Table 7. For example, if additional premiums (e.g., size, country, or
2655 company-specific premiums) are added to the discount rate for the business valuation, appropriate
2656 proportions of such additional premiums (with adjustments for differences in risk between the earnout
2657 metric and the long-term free cash flows of the business, as discussed in Section 5.2.2) should be
2658 considered for addition to the Required Metric Risk Premium.

2659 Note, however, that the discount rate for the earnout will generally not be the same as the discount rate
2660 for the business. The Required Metric Risk Premium will incorporate adjustments for differences in
2661 risk between the contingent consideration metric and the long-term free cash flows of the business.
2662 These differences in risk often include factors such as duration, volatility, correlation with the market,
2663 and leverage. Further differences in risk are present if there are nonlinearities in the earnout payoff
2664 structure associated with a financial metric (or other metric with non-diversifiable risk).

2665 Volatility: Thought should also be given to maintaining consistency between the discount rates used
2666 for the business and its intangible assets and the volatility assumed for the earnout metric. It is
2667 commonly assumed that companies and assets with higher discount rates exhibit higher risks in their
2668 earnings or cash flows, and therefore also would have higher volatilities. Empirical evidence supports
2669 this assumption in some cases. For example, smaller companies (which on average have a higher
2670 WACC than larger companies) also tend to experience higher volatility in net income, EBITDA, and
2671 sales.¹²²

2672 Therefore, for example, it might be inconsistent to use the historical volatility of comparable
2673 companies as a proxy for the volatility of growth in the earnout metric, if the subject business has a
2674 higher discount rate than those comparables. See Section 5.2.4 for methods for adjusting the estimated
2675 volatility in the growth rate for the earnout metric to account for common differences between acquired
2676 businesses and public company comparables, such as size premiums or company-specific risk
2677 premiums.

2678 Further, consistency should be maintained between the estimated Required Metric Risk Premium for
2679 the earnout metric and the estimated volatility in growth rate for the earnout metric. For example, a
2680 RMRP of 20% and a metric growth rate volatility of 5% are likely not consistent.

2681 Counterparty Credit Risk: When estimating counterparty credit risk for contingent consideration, one
2682 should consider the credit risk specific to the obligor, not to a market participant. The valuation
2683 specialist should consider the yield, if observable, on traded debt instruments for the obligor. When
2684 assessing consistency, it is understood that differences may exist between the yield on these debt
2685 obligations and the contingent consideration counterparty credit risk assumption due to differences in
2686 duration and seniority of the obligations, correlation between financial stress and contingent
2687 consideration payment scenarios, and potentially other significant differences between the debt and
2688 the contingent consideration obligation.

¹²² See, for instance, Grabowski et al. (2017) *Valuation Handbook U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital and Valuation Handbook International Guide to Cost of Capital*.

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Example: An acquisition occurs with potential annual earnout payments over a five-year period. The acquirer has senior notes trading at a current market yield of 4.2% and subordinated notes trading at a current market yield of 5.5%; both notes have a five-year remaining term. The five-year risk-free rate as of the valuation date is 2.0%. The contingent consideration is subordinated to the acquirer's subordinated debt. The valuation specialist (incorrectly, as described below) assumes a blended rate of 5.0% as a proxy for the cost of debt. After subtracting the 2.0% risk-free rate, a counterparty credit risk adjustment of 3.0% is estimated.

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This calculation ignores that the contingent consideration is a subordinated obligation to the subordinated debt. Therefore, the estimated cost of debt should be higher than 5.5%. After subtracting the 2.0% risk-free rate, the counterparty credit risk adjustment would have to be larger than 3.5% to be consistent with the current market yield of the obligor's existing debt.

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7.3 Consistency with the Rationale for Including Contingent Consideration in the Transaction

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It is often the case that management or its mergers & acquisitions team, as a part of the acquisition process, would have prepared either a deal model or management presentation outlining the buyer's expectations for the acquired company. Such documents, along with discussions with management, can provide insights into the rationale for incorporating an earnout arrangement as part of the transaction, for the choice of earnout metric, and for the chosen payoff structure.

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As discussed in Section 1.3, the rationale for an earnout can include bridging the gap between the buyer and seller perceptions of prospects for the business, incenting seller behavior post-transaction, sharing of risks and rewards, and/or deferring a portion of the purchase consideration. The assumptions related to risk and uncertainty associated with the earnout metric should be consistent with the rationale for structuring the earnout arrangement. For example, if the earnout has been structured primarily to share a significant risk related to revenues in year one, it could potentially be inconsistent for the volatility of revenues in year one to be low. Indeed, in such a situation, one might expect the acquiree's volatility of revenues in year one to be higher than the volatility observed for comparable public companies. On the other hand, if the primary rationale is for the earnout to serve as a form of seller financing of the transaction (deferring payment for a year), then the volatility of revenues for comparable companies might be an appropriate assumption for the acquiree's business.

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7.4 Consistency with Historical and Market Data

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In assessing the riskiness of the projected cash flows and scenario probabilities for valuing contingent consideration, historical and market data should be considered. From a market participant point of view, relevant factors to consider might include, for example:

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- Historical financial performance of the subject business and comparable companies
- The reasonableness of the acquired company's projected growth and profitability expectations, and the risks of achieving those projections, in light of historical company and market data
- The risks of achieving anticipated technical milestones and/or acquisition synergies, as benchmarked against historical experience for the subject business, the acquirer, and comparable companies
- Historical subject business experience with volatility of actual results versus business plan forecasts
- The discount rates and volatilities of comparable companies.

2731 *Example:* The projections for the acquired business contain 50% revenue growth for the next
2732 three years and a profit margin of 30%. The company’s historical revenue growth rates were
2733 between 5% and 10% per year with a profit margin of about 10%. The acquisition rationale
2734 includes offering the acquired company’s products to the buyer’s customer base, which could
2735 result in significant revenue increases and higher profit margins due to increased scale. The
2736 buyer has achieved similar revenue growth rates for similar past transactions. However, the
2737 buyer’s and other comparable companies’ profit margins are in a relatively tight range around
2738 15%.

2739 In this case, given the acquirer’s historical success with previous deals, the projected revenue
2740 growth rates could be reasonable. However, the projected margins are significantly above all
2741 the benchmarks and, therefore, this assumption would need to be evaluated further.¹²³

2742 7.5 Reasonableness of the Total Purchase Consideration and IRR

2743 In the context of a business combination, contingent consideration is required to be valued initially
2744 pursuant to ASC Topic 805 or IFRS 3R, Business Combinations. According to ASC 805-30-25-5 and
2745 IFRS 3:39, “The acquirer shall recognize the acquisition-date fair value of contingent consideration as
2746 part of the consideration transferred in exchange for the acquiree.”

2747 One way of assessing the reasonableness of the contingent consideration value is to evaluate the total
2748 purchase consideration inclusive of the value of the contingent consideration, relative to what a market
2749 participant would be willing to pay for the business. This fair value estimate can be arrived at using
2750 the measurement framework and guidance of ASC Topic 820 or IFRS 13, Fair Value Measurement.
2751 For example, the market approach could be used to compare the implied multiple from the transaction
2752 to those of comparable public companies or comparable acquired companies.

2753 Another common method used to assess the reasonableness of the total consideration is an IRR
2754 analysis for the transaction. IRR analysis is discussed in the Appraisal Practices Board’s *Valuation*
2755 *Advisory #1: Identification of Contributory Assets and Calculation of Economic Rents* (the
2756 “Contributory Asset Guide”). The Contributory Asset Guide describes an IRR analysis as follows:
2757 “the IRR in a transaction is the discount rate at which the present value of the prospective financial
2758 information (PFI) of the acquired entity (adjusted if necessary for market participant assumptions) is
2759 equal to the purchase price ... because of potential adjustments to the purchase price and to the PFI,
2760 the valuation specialist’s IRR may not be consistent with management’s internal assumptions.” If the
2761 IRR doesn’t seem reasonable compared to other marketplace transactions, the valuation specialist
2762 would typically review the assumptions leading to that IRR—including those underlying the
2763 contingent consideration valuation, the expected case financial projections, etc.—and would also
2764 consider whether there might be a bargain purchase or an overpayment situation.

2765 The value of the contingent consideration will affect the overall purchase price (typically increasing
2766 it, for an earnout). As a result, if there is an earnout, the IRR would need to be lowered in order for the
2767 higher purchase price to equal the sum of the present value of the projected cash flows. To the extent
2768 that the IRR was relied upon to assist in the estimation of a company-specific risk premium for the
2769 transaction, this lowering of the IRR could also result in a lower discount rate for the earnout metric.¹²⁴

¹²³ This issue should also be identified when valuing the business and its intangibles.

¹²⁴ In rare cases, where the inclusion of buyer-specific synergies in the earnout significantly increases the value of the total purchase consideration to a level that is inconsistent with other marketplace transactions, the valuation specialist should identify the reasons and be able to reasonably explain why the acquirer is willing to pay for its own unique synergies. An IRR that doesn’t seem reasonable compared to other marketplace transactions may indicate that the expected achievement level for the buyer-specific synergies included in the earnout valuation might be overly optimistic.

2770 The interaction between the value of the earnout and the IRR thus creates a circular relationship, i.e.,
2771 adding the fair value of the earnout to the purchase price lowers the IRR and therefore lowers the
2772 estimated company-specific risk premium, which lowers the earnout discount rate, raises the fair value
2773 for the earnout, and further increases the purchase price. The higher purchase price, in turn, would
2774 result in the valuation specialist needing to repeat the IRR analysis. While this circular relationship
2775 causes some added level of complexity (and often, the need to iteratively recalculate the value of the
2776 earnout and the IRR until the analysis converges on an estimate of the company-specific risk
2777 premium), the Working Group believes that this relationship must be, and can be, addressed properly
2778 and in a manner where the IRR is consistent with the earnout valuation. The need to iteratively
2779 recalculate the value of the earnout may also impact other parts of the valuation analysis, such as the
2780 weighted average return on assets (or “WARA,” also discussed in the Contributory Asset Guide) or
2781 the estimated return on certain intangible assets (e.g., IPR&D).

Section 8: Updating Contingent Consideration Valuation

2782 Typically, an earnout will result in the acquirer recognizing a liability on its balance sheet, measured
2783 at fair value. Under U.S. GAAP or IFRS, for contingent consideration classified as an asset or a
2784 liability, at each subsequent reporting date prior to the contingent consideration being resolved, the
2785 fair value of the asset or liability is remeasured. However, if the contingent consideration is classified
2786 as equity, the carrying value (i.e., the acquisition date fair value) of the contingent consideration is not
2787 remeasured subsequent to the acquisition date.

2788 While the process of updating the fair value of an earnout at a subsequent reporting period is similar
2789 to the process used in the initial measurement, there are important nuances to consider.

2790 8.1 Valuation Methodology for Updating the Fair Value of Contingent Consideration

2791 This Valuation Advisory outlines various methods that might be used in estimating the fair value of
2792 an earnout. At the initial measurement date, the valuation method or methods anticipated to provide
2793 the most reliable estimate of fair value and that are most appropriate given the structure of the earnout
2794 would be utilized to estimate the fair value of the earnout. The Working Group believes that, while
2795 there may be exceptions, the methodology used in updating the fair value of an earnout should
2796 generally be consistent with the methodology used in the initial measurement. An example of such an
2797 exception is when enough uncertainty has been resolved that the structure of the earnout is no longer
2798 relevant to the choice of methodology (e.g., the amount of the payment is known with near certainty,
2799 the structure has become linear because the only nonlinearity—a cap—is now known to not be active,
2800 or there is only one period left so the carryforward is known and the earnout is no longer path
2801 dependent.) Judgment should be applied in determining whether a change in methodology is
2802 appropriate at subsequent dates based on the facts and circumstances.

2803 8.2 Updating the Valuation Inputs

2804 As described in previous sections, the valuation of an earnout at initial measurement may require the
2805 estimation of multiple inputs based on the facts and circumstances existing (known or knowable) on
2806 the transaction date, including certain assumptions and expectations regarding the possible payoff of
2807 the contingent consideration arrangement. At subsequent measurement dates, the fair value of the
2808 earnout liability should be measured based on the updated information available as of each respective
2809 date. To the extent the facts and circumstances have changed and additional relevant information is
2810 available, the inputs used in the earnout valuation methodology should be updated.

2811 While there might be exceptions (for example due to improvements in methodology or where certain
2812 information sources are no longer available or relevant), consistency should generally be maintained
2813 in the methodology for estimating inputs. A similarly rigorous process to estimate the expected
2814 outcome for the earnout metric, volatility, and discount rate should be utilized for the subsequent
2815 valuations as was used for the initial valuation. Moreover, the updated inputs should be consistent with
2816 the original inputs, after taking into account any relevant new information, uncertainty resolution,
2817 business evolution, and the passage of time.

2818 Included below are some of the valuation issues that may need to be considered for valuations
2819 performed subsequent to the initial measurement date.

2820 8.2.1 Actual Results Related to the Earnout Metric

2821 Actual results regarding the earnout metric(s) may be available at subsequent measurement dates. For
2822 instance, if the earnout payment is contingent on financial performance, actual results may now be

2823 available for a portion of the earnout period, even if an earnout payment is not yet contractually
2824 required. The valuation model should take these actual results into account. The actual results may be
2825 such that some of the uncertainty regarding the earnout payoff is resolved.

2826 *Example:* An earnout is based on the cumulative revenue over the first two years post-close.
2827 When updating the earnout value at the end of year one, the actual year one revenue would
2828 now be known; it is no longer subject to systematic risk or uncertainty. As such, there is no
2829 longer a need to estimate year one revenue and the year one revenue in the earnout valuation
2830 model would be updated based on the actual revenue.

2831 *8.2.2 Updated Forecast for the Earnout Metric*

2832 In addition to the possibility that actual results may have resolved some of the uncertainty regarding
2833 the earnout metric, market participant assumptions regarding the expectations for the unresolved
2834 portion of the earnout may also have changed, and these changes in expectations should be reflected
2835 in the updated valuation.

2836 *Example:* Continuing with the prior example, assume that based on the positive results for year
2837 one revenue and higher demand anticipated within the industry, the company expects revenue
2838 to be 10% higher for year two than was anticipated at the initial earnout measurement date.
2839 This updated expectation for year two revenue would be incorporated into the valuation model
2840 along with the actual results for year one.

2841 From a consistency perspective, it is advantageous if the updated expected case for the earnout metric
2842 is forecast in a similar manner as for the original valuation. This can be challenging if the company
2843 does not have as robust a set of projection scenarios from which to compute the expected case as of a
2844 subsequent period as at the initial transaction date. Nevertheless, it is important to ensure that the
2845 forecast used for the contingent consideration valuation update is still estimated based on the expected
2846 case at the time of the update.

2847 Further, the updated forecast should be consistent with the original forecast, in light of any resolution
2848 in the initial uncertainty and any evolution in expectations for the business. If the relevant portion of
2849 the business has outperformed, one would typically expect the forecast to have increased, and if it has
2850 underperformed, one would typically expect the forecast to have declined. For example, continued
2851 optimism with respect to future projections when the initial results have fallen far short of the
2852 projections at the time of the deal close might warrant extra scrutiny. More generally, if a trend is
2853 observed in actual results to date, the valuation specialist should consider whether the updated
2854 projections should be consistent with a continuation of that trend.

2855 *8.2.3 Updated Discount Rate and Volatility for the Earnout Metric*

2856 When updating the earnout metric discount rate (or Required Metric Risk Premium), the estimation
2857 process should take into account changes related to the risk of the earnout metric, updated market-
2858 based inputs (e.g., risk-free rates, estimated betas and other inputs into the estimation of the RMRP)
2859 and changes as a result of the passage of time. For instance, if the transaction IRR was used as a
2860 starting point for estimating the RMRP at the initial transaction date, then facts and circumstances
2861 should be considered to determine whether the IRR is still a relevant starting point at the subsequent
2862 measurement date. Even if so, if adjustments to the IRR were made, these adjustments would need to
2863 be reconsidered and updated based on information available as of the subsequent measurement date.
2864 For example, if the IRR was adjusted for a shorter timeframe based on the relative U.S. Treasury yields
2865 at the initial measurement date, a similar adjustment would need to be made based on market risk-free
2866 rates at the subsequent measurement date.

2867 In addition to updating the market-based components of the earnout metric discount rate, if a company-
2868 specific risk premium was included as a component of the RMRP at initial measurement, judgment
2869 should be applied in determining whether market participants would perceive the same degree of
2870 company-specific risk at the subsequent measurement date. The company-specific risk premium
2871 should be adjusted accordingly. For example, if a significant portion of the uncertainty about the
2872 success of post-transaction integration activities has been resolved at the subsequent measurement date
2873 and this uncertainty was a key driver of the company-specific risk at initial measurement, then the
2874 discount rate used in updating the fair value of the contingent consideration should reflect the lower
2875 risk.

2876 Similar to the discount rate, if an option pricing method is utilized, volatility assumptions will need to
2877 be updated for the portion of the earnout period that remains. The volatility estimate could be impacted
2878 by updated market conditions, the shorter length of time remaining in the earnout period, and actual
2879 results, among other factors.

2880 Even if the actual results are not available for the entire earnout period, there may be updated
2881 information that significantly changes the assessment of risk for the remaining portion of the earnout
2882 period. For instance, continuing with the prior example, if year one revenue is now known and the
2883 company has backlog for year two revenue that will result in cumulative year one and year two revenue
2884 being sufficient to ensure at least 75% of the maximum earnout payment, there may be much less risk
2885 and also less volatility assumed in the update valuation than at the initial measurement.

2886 *8.2.4 Updated Counterparty Credit Risk*

2887 Counterparty credit risk should be updated based on an updated assessment of the risk associated with
2888 the obligor being unable to make the contingent consideration payments if and when they fall due,
2889 taking into account the updated forecasts, the current market conditions, and the financial position of
2890 the obligor as of the subsequent valuation date.

Section 9: Examples of Valuation of Common Contingent Consideration Payoff Structures

2891 The following is a series of examples that illustrates the estimation of the fair value of contingent
 2892 consideration with payoff structures commonly found in practice. The input assumptions in these
 2893 examples are presumed to be known. Also, for all examples with financial metrics we have assumed
 2894 (1) that the financial metrics follow a GBM and (2) the mid-period convention, i.e., that the financial
 2895 metric is earned at the midpoint of the period to which it applies. All discount rates are assumed to be
 2896 annual, continuously compounded. In addition, for all examples we have assumed zero correlation
 2897 between the scenarios in which contingent consideration payments are due and the scenarios in which
 2898 the acquirer is unable to fulfill its contingent consideration payment obligations.

2899 9.1 Example: Linear Payoff Structure (EBITDA)

2900 *Earnout Payoff Structure*


2901 Company A will be required to pay 30% of the acquiree’s EBITDA earned over the subsequent
 2902 one-year period. The payment is due three months after the end of the year.

2903 *Assumptions*

2904	Forecast annual EBITDA:	2,000
2905	Discount rate applicable to future EBITDA:	10%
2906	Risk-free rate over payment period:	0.5%
2907	Required Metric Risk Premium:	9.5% { = 10% – 0.5% }
2908	Credit spread of Company A:	3%

2909 *Valuation Methodology*

2910 Since the earnout is a linear function of
 2911 EBITDA, only the expected case EBITDA is
 2912 needed to estimate the expected future cash flow
 2913 of the earnout. Also, a risk-neutral framework is
 2914 not needed to incorporate the impact of the
 2915 structure on the discount rate. For illustration
 2916 purposes, and to compare with more complex
 2917 structures, we will perform the analysis in both
 2918 an SBM (using the expected case) and an OPM
 2919 framework.



2920 *Calculations Using SBM*

2921	[1] Expected future value of earnout payment:	600.00	{ = 2,000 × 30% }
2922	[2] Discount factor for risk of EBITDA (mid-period)	0.95123	{ = exp(-10.0% × 0.5) }
2923	[3] Discount factor for time from mid-period to payment:	0.99626	{ = exp(-0.5% × (1.25 - 0.5)) }
2924	[4] Discount factor for credit risk*:	0.96319	{ = exp(-3.0% × 1.25) }
2925	Value of earnout:	547.67	{ = [1] × [2] × [3] × [4] }

2926 *Calculations Using OPM*

2927	[5] Expected present value of EBITDA:	1,902.46	{ = 2,000 × exp(-10% × 0.5) }
2928	[6] Expected future value of EBITDA (risk-neutral):	1,907.22	{ = [5] × exp(0.5% × 0.5) }
2929	[7] Equivalent RMRP-adjusted forecast:	1,907.22	{ = 2,000 × exp(-9.5% × 0.5) }
2930	[8] Expected future earnout cash flow (risk-neutral):	572.17	{ = [6] × 30% }

2931	[9] Discount factor for credit risk and time value*:	<u>0.9572</u>	{ = $\exp(-3.0\%+0.5\%) \times 1.25$ }
2932	Value of earnout:	547.67	
2933	<i>Expected future value of earnout payment:</i>	600.00	{ = [1] }
2934	<i>Implied discount rate, excluding credit risk</i>	10.0%	{ = $\log_e([1]/[8])/(1 - 0.5) + 0.5\%$ }
2935	*Credit risk and time value of money from the valuation date to the payment date.		

2936 9.2 Example: Linear Payoff Structure (Revenue)

2937 This example is the same as Example 9.1, except the earnout is based on the first year of *revenue*
 2938 rather than EBITDA. For this reason, the Required Metric Risk Premium differs between these two
 2939 examples.

2940 *Earnout Payoff Structure*

2941 Company A will be required to pay 30% of the acquiree's revenue earned over the subsequent
 2942 one-year period. The payment is due three months after the end of the year.

2943 *Assumptions*

2944	Forecast annual revenue:	2,000	
2945	Discount rate applicable to future revenue:	5%	
2946	Risk-free rate over payment period:	0.5%	
2947	Required Metric Risk Premium:	4.5%	{ = $5\% - 0.5\%$ }
2948	Credit spread of Company A:	3%	

2949 *Valuation Methodology*


2950 Since the earnout is a linear function of revenue,
 2951 only the expected case revenue is needed to
 2952 estimate the expected future cash flow of the
 2953 earnout. Also, a risk-neutral framework is not
 2954 needed to incorporate the impact of the structure
 2955 on the discount rate. For illustration purposes,
 2956 and to compare with more complex structures,
 2957 we will perform the analysis in both an SBM
 2958 (using the expected case) and an OPM
 2959 framework.

2960 *Calculations Using SBM*

2961	[1] Expected future value of earnout payment:	600.00	{ = $2,000 \times 30\%$ }
2962	[2] Discount factor for risk of revenue (mid-period)	0.97531	{ = $\exp(-5.0\% \times 0.5)$ }
2963	[3] Discount factor for time from mid-period to payment:	0.99626	{ = $\exp(-0.5\% \times (1.25 - 0.5))$ }
2964	[4] Discount factor for credit risk*:	<u>0.96319</u>	{ = $\exp(-3.0\% \times 1.25)$ }
2965	Value of earnout:	561.54	{ = [1] \times [2] \times [3] \times [4] }

2966 *Calculations Using OPM*

2967	[5] Expected present value of revenue:	1,950.62	{ = $2,000 \times \exp(-5.0\% \times 0.5)$ }
2968	[6] Expected future value of revenue (risk-neutral):	1,955.50	{ = [5] $\times \exp(0.5\% \times 0.5)$ }
2969	[7] Equivalent RMRP-adjusted forecast:	1,955.50	{ = $2,000 \times \exp(-4.5\% \times 0.5)$ }
2970	[8] Expected future earnout cash flow (risk-neutral):	586.65	{ = [6] $\times 30\%$ }
2971	[9] Discount factor for credit risk and time value*:	<u>0.9572</u>	{ = $\exp(-3.0\%+0.5\%) \times 1.25$ }
2972	Value of earnout:	561.54	
2973	<i>Expected future value of earnout payment:</i>	600.00	



2974 *Implied discount rate, excluding credit risk:* 5.0% { = $\log_e([1]/[8])/(1 - 0.5) + 0.5\%$ }

2975 *Credit risk and time value of money from the valuation date to the payment date.

2976 9.3 Example: Technical Milestone (Diversifiable Binary) Structure

2977 *Earnout Payoff Structure*

2978 Company A will be required to pay 100 upon the achievement of a technical (nonfinancial)
 2979 milestone that represents a diversifiable risk. The success or failure of achievement of the
 2980 milestone will be determined in one year. The payment is due three months after the milestone is
 2981 achieved.

2982 *Assumptions*

2983 Probability of success/failure: 60% / 40%


2984 Risk-free rate over payment period: 0.5%

2985 Credit spread of Company A: 3%

2986 *Valuation Methodology*

2987 Since the earnout is a nonlinear function of the
 2988 outcome, a probabilistic framework is needed to
 2989 estimate the expected future cash flow of the
 2990 earnout. A risk-neutral framework, however, is
 2991 not needed since the risk of the underlying
 2992 outcome is diversifiable. Since the risk of the
 2993 underlying outcome can be fully diversified, the
 2994 discount rate need only account for time value
 2995 of money and counterparty credit risk (i.e., the
 2996 cost of debt of Company A specific to the term
 2997 and seniority of the earnout obligation).

Technical Milestone (digital / binary)



2998 *Calculations Using SBM*

2999 [1] Expected future value of earnout payment: 60.00 { = $100 \times 60\%$ }

3000 [2] Discount factor for systematic risk: 1.0 { because $\beta = 0$ }

3001 [3] Discount factor for time to payment: 0.99377 { = $\exp(-0.5\% \times 1.25)$ }

3002 [4] Discount factor for credit risk: 0.96319 { = $\exp(-3.0\% \times 1.25)$ }

3003 **Value of earnout:** 57.43 { = $[1] \times [2] \times [3] \times [4]$ }

3004 *Expected future value of earnout payment:* 60.00

3005 *Implied discount rate, excluding credit risk:* 0.5% { = $\log_e([2])/(1 - 0.5) + 0.5\%$ }

3006 9.4 Example: Financial Milestone (Systematic Binary) Structure

3007 *Earnout Payoff Structure*

3008 Company A will be required to pay 100 if the acquiree's annual EBITDA exceeds 2,000 over the
 3009 subsequent one-year period. The payment is due three months after the end of the year.

3010 *Assumptions*

3011 Forecast annual EBITDA: 2,000

3012 Expected volatility of future annual EBITDA: 50%

3013 Discount rate applicable to future EBITDA: 10%


3014 Risk-free rate to payment period: 0.5%

3015 Required Metric Risk Premium: 9.5% {= 10% – 0.5%}
 3016 Credit spread of Company A: 3%

3017 *Valuation Methodology*

3018 Since the earnout is a nonlinear function of
 3019 EBITDA, a probabilistic framework is needed
 3020 to estimate the expected future cash flow of the
 3021 earnout. The valuation is performed in a risk-
 3022 neutral framework to incorporate the impact of
 3023 the nonlinear payoff structure on the discount
 3024 rate. The earnout payoff structure can be
 3025 replicated as a long digital/binary call option
 3026 with strike = 2,000 in an OPM framework.

Milestone / Binary Structure



3027 *Black-Scholes-Merton Digital/Binary Call Option*
 3028 *Formula*

3029 Digital/Binary Call Option = $P \times N(d_2) \times e^{-rT}$

3030 Where $d_2 = (\log_e(S_0/K) + (r - 0.5\sigma^2) \times T) / \sigma\sqrt{T}$

3031 N(.): standard normal cumulative distribution function
 3032 P: payment upon the underlying reaching the strike price
 3033 T: term of the option
 3034 r: risk-free rate commensurate with term T

S_0 : present value of the underlying
 K: strike price
 σ : volatility of the underlying
 $\log_e(.)$: natural logarithm function

3035 *Calculations*

3036	[1] Expected present value of EBITDA:	1,902.46	{ = 2,000 × exp(-10% × 0.5) }
3037	[2] Expected future value of EBITDA (risk-neutral):	1,907.22	{ = [1] × exp(0.5% × 0.5) }
3038	[3] Equivalent RMRP-adjusted forecast:	1,907.22	{ = 2,000 × exp(-9.5% × 0.5) }
3039	[4] Expected future earnout cash flow (risk-neutral):	37.785	{ * }
3040	[5] Discount factor for credit risk and time value**:	<u>0.9572</u>	{ = exp(-(3.0%+0.5%) × 1.25) }
3041	Value of earnout:	36.17	
3042	[6] <i>Expected future value of earnout payment:</i>	42.984	{ *** }
3043	<i>Implied annual discount rate, excluding credit risk:</i>	26.28%	{ = log _e ([6]/[4]) / (1 - 0.5) + 0.5% }

3044 *Digital Call × exp(0.5% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Digital Call formula: $S_0 = [1]$; $K = 2,000$; $r = 0.5\%$; $\sigma = 50\%$;
 3045 $T = 0.5$; $P = 100$.
 3046 **Credit risk and time value of money from the valuation date to the payment date.
 3047 ***Digital Call × exp(10% × 0.5). Inputs to Digital Call formula: $S_0 = [1]$; $K = 2,000$; $r = 10\%$; $\sigma = 50\%$; $T = 0.5$; $P = 100$.

3049 **9.5 Example: Threshold (Call Option) Structure**

3050 *Earnout Payoff Structure*

3051 Company A will be required to pay 30% of the excess of the acquiree’s annual EBITDA above
 3052 2,000 over the subsequent one-year period. The payment is due three months after the end of the
 3053 year.

3054 *Assumptions*


3055 Forecast annual EBITDA: 2,000
 3056 Expected volatility of future annual EBITDA: 50%
 3057 Discount rate applicable to future EBITDA: 10%

3058 Risk-free rate to payment period: 0.5%
 3059 Required Metric Risk Premium: 9.5% {= 10% – 0.5%}
 3060 Credit spread of Company A: 3%

3061 *Valuation Methodology*

3062 Since the earnout is a nonlinear function of
 3063 EBITDA, a probabilistic framework is needed
 3064 to estimate the expected future cash flow of the
 3065 earnout. The valuation is performed in a risk-
 3066 neutral framework to incorporate the impact of
 3067 the nonlinear payoff structure on the discount
 3068 rate. The earnout payoff structure can be
 3069 replicated as a call option with strike = 2,000 in
 3070 an OPM framework.

Call Option Structure



3071 *Black-Scholes-Merton Call Option Formula*

3072 Call Option = $S_0 \times N(d_1) - K \times N(d_2) \times e^{-rT}$

3073 Where $d_1 = (\log_e(S_0/K) + (r + 0.5\sigma^2) \times T)/\sigma\sqrt{T}$ and $d_2 = (\ln(S_0/K) + (r - 0.5\sigma^2) \times T)/\sigma\sqrt{T}$

3074 N(.): standard normal cumulative distribution function

3075 K: strike price

3076 σ : volatility of the underlying

3077 $\log_e(.)$: natural logarithm function

S_0 : present value of the underlying

T: term of the option

r: T-year risk-free rate

3078 *Calculations*

3079 [1] Expected present value of EBITDA: 1,902.46 { = 2,000 × exp(-10% × 0.5) }
 3080 [2] Expected future value of EBITDA (risk-neutral): 1,907.22 { = [1] × exp(0.5% × 0.5) }
 3081 [3] Equivalent RMRP-adjusted forecast: 1,907.22 { = 2,000 × exp(-9.5% × 0.5) }
 3082 [4] Expected future earnout cash flow (risk-neutral): 69.053 { * }
 3083 [5] Discount factor for credit risk and time value**: 0.9572 { = exp(-(3.0%+0.5%) × 1.25) }
 3084 **Value of earnout:** **66.10**

3085 [6] *Expected future value of earnout payment:* 84.190 { *** }
 3086 *Implied discount rate, excluding credit risk:* 40.14% { = $\log_e([6]/[4]) / (1 - 0.5) + 0.5\%$ }

3087
 3088 *30% × Call Option × exp(0.5% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Call option formula: $S_0 = [1]$; Strike = 2,000; $r = 0.5\%$;
 3089 $\sigma = 50\%$; Term = 0.5.

3090 **Credit risk and time value of money from the valuation date to the payment date.

3091 ***30% × Call Option × exp(10% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Call option formula: $S_0 = [1]$; Strike = 2,000; $r = 10\%$;
 3092 $\sigma = 50\%$; Term = 0.5.

3093 **9.6 Example: Percentage of Total above a Threshold (Asset-or-Nothing) Structure**

3094 *Earnout Payoff Structure*

3095 Company A will be required to pay 30% of the acquiree’s annual EBITDA if the annual EBITDA
 3096 exceeds 2,000 over the subsequent one-year period. The payment is due three months after the end
 3097 of the year.

3098 *Assumptions*


3099 Forecast annual EBITDA: 2,000
 3100 Expected volatility of future annual EBITDA: 50%

3101	Discount rate applicable to future EBITDA:	10%
3102	Risk-free rate to payment period:	0.5%
3103	Required Metric Risk Premium:	9.5% {= 10% – 0.5%}
3104	Credit spread of Company A:	3%

3105 *Valuation Methodology*

3106 Since the earnout is a nonlinear function of
 3107 EBITDA, a probabilistic framework is needed
 3108 to estimate the expected future cash flow of the
 3109 earnout. The valuation is performed in a risk-
 3110 neutral framework to incorporate the impact of
 3111 the nonlinear payoff structure on the discount
 3112 rate. The earnout payoff structure can be
 3113 replicated as a digital call option with strike =
 3114 2,000 plus a call option with strike = 2,000 in an
 3115 OPM framework.

Asset-or-nothing Structure



3116 *Calculations*

3117	[1] Expected present value of EBITDA:	1,902.46	{ = 2,000 × exp(-10% × 0.5) }
3118	[2] Expected future value of EBITDA (risk-neutral):	1,907.22	{ = [1] × exp(0.5% × 0.5) }
3119	[3] Equivalent RMRP-adjusted forecast:	1,907.22	{ = 2,000 × exp(-9.5% × 0.5) }
3120	[4] Expected future earnout cash flow (risk-neutral):	295.76	{ * }
3121	[5] Discount factor for credit risk and time value**:	<u>0.9572</u>	{ = exp(-(3.0%+0.5%) × 1.25) }
3122	Value of earnout:	283.10	
3123	[6] Expected future value of earnout payment:	342.09	{ *** }
3124	Implied discount rate, excluding credit risk:	29.60%	{ = log _e ([6]/[4])/(1 – 0.5) + 0.5% }

3125
 3126 *(Digital Call Option + 30% × Call Option) × exp(0.5% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Option formulae: S0 = [1];
 3127 Strike = 2,000; r = 0.5%; σ = 50%; Term = 0.5; Digital payment = 2,000×30% = 600.
 3128 **Credit risk and time value of money from the valuation date to the payment date.
 3129 ****(Digital Call Option + 30% × Call Option) × exp(10% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Option formulae: S0 = [1];
 3130 Strike = 2,000; r = 10%; σ = 50%; Term = 0.5; Digital payment = 2,000×30% = 600.

3131 **9.7 Example: Threshold and Cap (Capped Call) Structure**

3132 *Earnout Payoff Structure*

3133 Company A will be required to pay 30% of the excess of the acquiree’s annual EBITDA above
 3134 2,000 over the subsequent one-year period with a payment cap of 300. The payment is due three
 3135 months after the end of the year.


3136 *Assumptions*

3137	Forecast annual EBITDA:	2,000
3138	Expected volatility of future annual EBITDA:	50%
3139	Discount rate applicable to future EBITDA:	10%
3140	Risk-free rate to payment period:	0.5%
3141	Required Metric Risk Premium:	9.5% {= 10% – 0.5%}
3142	Credit spread of Company A:	3%

3143 *Valuation Methodology*

3144 Since the earnout is a nonlinear function of
 3145 EBITDA, a probabilistic framework is needed
 3146 to estimate the expected future cash flow of the
 3147 earnout. The valuation is performed in a risk-
 3148 neutral framework to incorporate the impact of
 3149 the nonlinear payoff structure on the discount
 3150 rate. The earnout payoff structure can be
 3151 replicated as a long call option with strike =
 3152 2,000 minus a short call option with strike =
 3153 3,000 in an OPM framework.

Capped Call Structure



3154 *Calculations*

3155	[1] Expected present value of EBITDA:	1,902.46	{ = 2,000 × exp(-10% × 0.5) }
3156	[2] Expected future value of EBITDA (risk-neutral):	1,907.22	{ = [1] × exp(0.5% × 0.5) }
3157	[3] Equivalent RMRP-adjusted forecast:	1,907.22	{ = 2,000 × exp(-9.5% × 0.5) }
3158	[4] Expected future earnout cash flow (risk-neutral):	57.16	{*}
3159	[5] Discount factor for credit risk and time value**:	<u>0.9572</u>	{ = exp(-(3.0%+0.5%) × 1.25) }
3160	Value of earnout:	54.71	
3161	[6] Expected future value of earnout payment:	68.12	{***}
3162	Implied discount rate, excluding credit risk:	35.58%	{ = log _e ([6]/[4])/(1 - 0.5) + 0.5% }

3163
 3164 *(30% × Call Option₁ - 30% × Call Option₂) × exp(0.5% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Call Option formulae: S₀ = [1];
 3165 Strike₁ = 2,000; Strike₂ = 3,000; r = 0.5%; σ = 50%; T = 0.5.

3166 **Credit risk and time value of money from the valuation date to the payment date.

3167 ***((30% × Call Option₁ - 30% × Call Option₂) × exp(10% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Call Option formulae: S₀ = [1];
 3168 Strike₁ = 2,000; Strike₂ = 3,000; r = 10%; σ = 50%; T = 0.5.

3169 **9.8 Example: Tiered Payoff Structure**

3170 *Earnout Payoff Structure*

3171 Company A will be required to pay 30% of the excess of the acquiree’s annual EBITDA above
 3172 2,000, plus 10% of the excess annual EBITDA above 2,400 over the subsequent one-year period
 3173 with a payment cap of 200. The payment is due three months after the end of the year.


3174 *Assumptions*

3175	Forecast annual EBITDA:	2,000	
3176	Expected volatility of future annual EBITDA:	50%	
3177	Discount rate applicable to future EBITDA:	10%	
3178	Risk-free rate to payment period:	0.5%	
3179	Required Metric Risk Premium:	9.5%	{ = 10% - 0.5% }
3180	Credit spread of Company A:	3%	

3181 *Valuation Methodology*

3182 Since the earnout is a nonlinear function of
 3183 EBITDA, a probabilistic framework is needed
 3184 to estimate the expected future cash flow of the
 3185 earnout. The valuation is performed in a risk-
 3186 neutral framework to incorporate the impact of
 3187 the nonlinear payoff structure on the discount
 3188 rate. The earnout payoff structure can be
 3189 replicated as a long call option with strike =
 3190 2,000, minus a short call option with strike =
 3191 2,400 and minus a short call option with strike
 3192 = 3,200 in an OPM framework.

Layered Structure



3193 *Calculations*

3194	[1] Expected present value of EBITDA:	1,902.46	{ = 2,000 × exp(-10% × 0.5) }
3195	[2] Expected future value of EBITDA (risk-neutral):	1,907.22	{ = [1] × exp(0.5% × 0.5) }
3196	[3] Equivalent RMRP-adjusted forecast:	1,907.22	{ = 2,000 × exp(-9.5% × 0.5) }
3197	[4] Expected future earnout cash flow (risk-neutral):	43.003	{ * }
3198	[5] Discount factor for credit risk and time value**:	<u>0.9572</u>	{ = exp(-(3.0%+0.5%) × 1.25) }
3199	Value of earnout:	41.16	
3200	[6] Expected future value of earnout payment:	50.746	{ *** }
3201	Implied discount rate, excluding credit risk:	33.61%	{ = log _e ([6]/[4])/(1 - 0.5) + 0.5% }

3202
 3203 *(30% × Call Option₁ – 20% × Call Option₂ – 10% × Call Option₃) × exp(0.5% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Call Option
 3204 formulae: S₀ = [1]; Strike₁ = 2,000; Strike₂ = 2,400; Strike₃ = 3,200; r = 0.5%; σ = 50%; T = 0.5.
 3205 **Credit risk and time value of money from the valuation date to the payment date.
 3206 *** (30% × Call Option₁ – 20% × Call Option₂ – 10% × Call Option₃) × exp(10% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Call
 3207 Option formulae: S₀ = [1]; Strike₁ = 2,000; Strike₂ = 2,400; Strike₃ = 3,200; r = 10%; σ = 50%; T = 0.5.

3208 **9.9 Example: Multi-year, Not Path Dependent (Series of Capped Calls)**

3209 *Earnout Payoff Structure*

3210 Company A will be required to pay 30% of the excess of the acquiree’s annual EBITDA above
 3211 2,000 with a payment cap of 300 for the first year, and 30% of the excess of the Target’s annual
 3212 EBITDA above 2,400 with a payment cap of 300 for the second year. The payments are due three
 3213 months after the end of each earnout period.


3214 *Assumptions*

3215	1 st year annual EBITDA forecast:	2,000
3216	2 nd year annual EBITDA forecast:	2,400
3217	Expected volatility of future annual EBITDA:	50%
3218	Discount rate applicable to future EBITDA:	10%
3219	Risk-free rate to payment period:	0.5%
3220	Required Metric Risk Premium:	9.5% { = 10% – 0.5% }
3221	Credit spread of Company A:	3%


3222 *Valuation Methodology*

3223 Since the earnout is a nonlinear function of EBITDA, a probabilistic framework is needed to
 3224 estimate the expected future cash flow of the earnout. The valuation is performed in a risk-neutral
 3225 framework to incorporate the impact of the nonlinear payoff structure on the discount rate. The
 3226 earnout payoff structure can be replicated as a series of long and short call options in an OPM

Capped Call Structure - Year 1



Capped Call Structure - Year 2



3227 framework.

3228 *Calculations*

3229	Value of earnout for year 1:	54.71	{ See Section 9.7, Capped Call }
3230	[1] Expected present value of EBITDA:	2,065.70	{ = 2,400 × exp(-10% × 1.5) }
3231	[2] Expected future value of EBITDA (risk-neutral):	2,081.25	{ = [1] × exp(0.5% × 1.5) }
3232	[3] Equivalent RMRP-adjusted forecast:	2,081.25	{ = 2,400 × exp(-9.5% × 1.5) }
3233	[4] Expected future earnout cash flow (risk-neutral):	61.09	{ * }
3234	[5] Discount factor for credit risk and time value**:	<u>0.9243</u>	{ = exp(-(3.0%+0.5%) × 2.25) }
3235	Value of earnout for year 2:	56.47	
3236	[6] <i>Expected future value of earnout payment:</i>	82.37	{ *** }
3237	<i>Implied discount rate, excluding credit risk:</i>	20.42%	{ = log _e ([6]/[4])/(2 - 0.5) + 0.5% }

3238
 3239 *(30% × Call Option₁ - 30% × Call Option₂) × exp(0.5% × 1.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Call Option formulae: S₀ = [1];
 3240 Strike₁ = 2,400; Strike₂ = 3,400; r = 0.5%; σ = 50%; Term = 1.5.
 3241 **Credit risk and time value of money from the valuation date to the payment date.
 3242 *** (30% × Call Option₁ - 30% × Call Option₂) × exp(10% × 1.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Call Option formulae: S₀ = [1];
 3243 Strike₁ = 2,400; Strike₂ = 3,400; r = 10%; σ = 50%; Term = 1.5.

3244 **9.10 Example: Multi-year, Path Dependent (Capped Call Series with a Catch-Up Feature)**

3245 *Earnout Payoff Structure*

3246 Company A will be required to pay 30% of the excess of the acquiree’s annual EBITDA above
 3247 2,000 with a payment cap of 300 for the first year, and 30% of the excess of the acquiree’s annual
 3248 EBITDA above 2,400 with a payment cap of 300 for the second year. If the payment cap in the
 3249 first year is not reached, then any shortfall as compared to the first-year payment cap will be added
 3250 to the payment cap in the second year as a catch-up feature. The payments are due three months
 3251 after the end of each earnout period.

3252 *Assumptions*

3253	Previous years EBITDA:	1,800 (illustrative - not needed in the analysis)
3254	Forecast annual EBITDA 1 st year:	2,000
3255	Forecast annual EBITDA 2 nd year:	2,400

3256	Expected volatility of future annual EBITDA:	50%
3257	Discount rate applicable to future EBITDA:	10%
3258	Risk-free rate to payment period:	0.5%
3259	Required Metric Risk Premium:	9.5% {= 10% – 0.5%}
3260	Credit spread of Company A:	3%

3261 *Analysis Methodology*

3262 Since the earnout is a nonlinear function of EBITDA, a probabilistic framework is needed to
 3263 estimate the expected future cash flow of the earnout. The valuation is performed in a risk-neutral
 3264 framework to incorporate the impact of the nonlinear payoff structure on the discount rate. In
 3265 addition, due to the catch-up feature, the earnout payoff structure is path dependent and therefore
 3266 an implementation that can handle path dependency, such as Monte Carlo simulation, is needed to
 3267 estimate the value of the earnout.

3268 *Calculation of a Single Iteration of a Monte Carlo Simulation:*

Calculation Steps	Period _{T=1}	Period _{T=2}	Description of Calculation Step
Simulating Future EBITDA in Risk-Neutral Framework			
[1] Calculation period (yrs)	1.0	2.0	Periods at which payments are calculated
[2] Payment period	1.25	2.25	Periods at which earnout payments are made
[3] Mid-period	0.5	1.5	Mid-period of calculation period
[4] Time-step for simulation	0.5	1.0	Simulation period consistent with mid-period assumption
[5] Forecast/Expected EBITDA	2,000	2,400	Input assumption
[6] Expected annual growth rate	10.536%	18.232%	$\log_e(2,000/1,800)$; $\log_e(2,400/2,000)$; Previous years EBITDA of 1,800 cancels in [12].
[7] Discount factor for EBITDA:	0.9512	0.8607	$=\exp(-10\% \times [3])$
[8] Expected PV of EBITDA:	1,902.46	2,065.70	Present value of forecast EBITDA using mid-period i.e. [5] \times [7]
[9] Random Normal (0,1)	0.951	0.856	Standard Normal distribution random numbers
[10] Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM)	1.3182	1.7936	Risk neutral GBM starting at 1: $= [10]_{t-1} \times \exp((0.5\% - 1/2 \times 50\%^2) \times [4] + \text{sqrt}([4]) \times 50\% \times [9])$
[11] Risk-neutral random EBITDA	2,507.73	3,705.05	[10] \times [8]
[12] Equivalent Risk-neutral random EBITDA using RMRP	2,507.73	3,705.05	Risk neutral GBM starting at 1,800: $= [12]_{t-1} \times \exp(([6] - 9.5\% \times [4] - 1/2 \times 50\%^2 \times [4]) + \text{sqrt}([4]) \times 50\% \times [9])$
Calculating the Present Value of the Earnout Payment			
[13] Min. EBITDA Threshold	2,000	2,400	Minimum EBITDA threshold for payment
[14] Maximum EBITDA Cap (excl. catch-up)	3,000	3,400	EBITDA at which cap payment is reached, excluding the catch-up feature
[15] Earnout payment (excl. catch-up)	152.32	300.00	$30\% \times (\text{Max}([12] - [13], 0) - \text{Max}([12] - [14], 0))$
[16] Catch-up adjustment to cap		147.68	$\text{Max}(300 - [15]_{T=1}, 0)$
[17] Adjusted Maximum EBITDA Cap (incl. catch-up)		3,892.27	$[13] + ([16] + 300) / 30\%$
[18] Earnout payment (incl. catch-up)	152.32	391.52	$T=2: 30\% \times (\text{Max}([12] - [13], 0) - \text{Max}([12] - [17], 0))$
[19] Discount factor for credit risk and time value	0.9572	0.9243	At 3.0% + 0.5% = 3.5% over the Payment Period [2]
PV of earnout payments	145.80	361.87	[19] \times [18]
PV of earnout for one iteration	507.66		

3269 Running the above calculation 10,000 times and averaging over all iterations resulted in an estimated value for
 3270 the earnout of 123.67 (results will vary slightly depending on the random numbers generated).

3271 **9.11 Example: Clawback (Put Option Structure)**

3272 *Clawback Payoff Structure*

3273 Company A will be entitled to receive 30% of the shortfall of the acquiree’s annual EBITDA below
 3274 2,000 over the subsequent one-year period. The payment is due three months after the end of the
 3275 year and is payable by the sellers as a potential clawback of the purchase price.


3276 *Assumptions*

3277	Forecast annual EBITDA:	2,000
3278	Expected volatility of future annual EBITDA:	50%
3279	Discount rate applicable to future EBITDA:	10%
3280	Risk-free rate to payment period:	0.5%
3281	Required Metric Risk Premium:	9.5% {= 10% – 0.5%}
3282	Credit spread of the sellers:	3%

3283 *Valuation Methodology*

3284 Since the payoff structure is a nonlinear
 3285 function of EBITDA, a probabilistic framework
 3286 is needed to estimate the expected future cash
 3287 flow of the earnout. The valuation is performed
 3288 in a risk-neutral framework to incorporate the
 3289 impact of the nonlinear payoff structure on the
 3290 discount rate. The clawback payoff structure
 3291 can be replicated as a put option with strike =
 3292 2,000 in an OPM framework.

Put Option Structure



3293 *Black-Scholes-Merton Put Option Formula*

3294 Put Option = $K \times N(-d_2) \times e^{-rT} - S_0 \times N(-d_1)$

3295 Where $d_1 = (\log_e(S_0/K) + (r + 0.5\sigma^2) \times T) / \sigma\sqrt{T}$ and $d_2 = (\log_e(S_0/K) + (r - 0.5\sigma^2) \times T) / \sigma\sqrt{T}$

3296 N(.): standard normal cumulative distribution function

3297 P: payment upon the underlying reaching the strike price

3298 T: term of the option

3299 r: risk-free rate commensurate with term T

S_0 : present value of the underlying

K: strike price

σ : volatility of the underlying

$\log_e(.)$: natural logarithm function

3300 *Calculations*

3301	[1] Expected present value of EBITDA:	1,902.46	{ = 2,000 × exp(-10% × 0.5) }
3302	[2] Expected future value of EBITDA (risk-neutral):	1,907.22	{ = [1] × exp(0.5% × 0.5) }
3303	[3] Equivalent RMRP-adjusted forecast:	1,907.22	{ = 2,000 × exp(-9.5% × 0.5) }
3304	[4] Expected future clawback cash flow (risk-neutral):	96.887	{*}
3305	[5] Discount factor for credit risk and time value**:	<u>0.9572</u>	{ = exp(-(3.0%+0.5%) × 1.25) }
3306	Value of earnout:	92.74	
3307	[6] Expected future value of clawback payment:	84.190	{***}
3308	Implied discount rate, excluding credit risk:	-27.59%	{ = log _e ([6]/[4]) / (1 – 0.5) + 0.5% }

3309
 3310 *30% × Put Option × exp(0.5% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Put option formula: S_0 = [1]; Strike = 2,000; r = 0.5%; σ
 3311 = 50%; Term = 0.5.

3312 **Credit risk and time value of money from the valuation date to the payment date.

3313 *** 30% × Put Option × exp(10% × 0.5). Inputs to Black-Scholes-Merton Put Option formulae: S_0 = [1]; Strike = 2,000; r = 10%;
 3314 σ = 50%; Term = 0.5.

Section 10: Appendix

3315 10.1 Frequently Asked Questions

3316 1. *None of my bankers or corporate development staff consider option pricing models when*
3317 *negotiating a deal. Usually the terms of the earnout are the outcome of the negotiation with the*
3318 *seller, who is probably also not considering option pricing models. How does using an OPM result*
3319 *in an appropriate fair value when the methodology is not used in practice?*

3320 Parties to a business acquisition do not transact the earnout on a standalone basis. From the perspective
3321 of a market participant for the standalone earnout, the observable active market trades that most
3322 resemble (have nonlinear payoff structures like) contingent consideration are traded options and other
3323 derivatives. These are typically priced using an OPM. Furthermore, the scenario-based models
3324 discounted at a WACC or IRR sometimes used by deal participants do not accurately account for the
3325 impact on risk of either (a) differences in time horizon and in leverage between the earnout metric and
3326 long-term free cash flows or (b) nonlinear payoff structures with non-diversifiable underlying metrics.

3327 2. *I have carefully constructed scenarios and their associated probabilities that I used in the*
3328 *negotiation with the seller. Why are they not used in estimating the fair value of the earnout?*

3329 For diversifiable metrics (e.g., technical milestones), the scenarios and their probabilities are key
3330 inputs into the valuation of the related earnout. For non-diversifiable metrics (e.g., financial metrics),
3331 the scenarios and their probabilities are primarily used to estimate the expected outcome of the earnout
3332 metric and to help inform the estimate of volatility around this expected outcome. In either case, care
3333 should be taken to minimize common assessment issues such as anchoring on recent results or
3334 overconfidence bias and to cross-check the implied variability in the metric to be sure that the range
3335 of outcomes has not been underestimated. However, for an earnout based on a non-diversifiable metric
3336 with a nonlinear payoff structure (e.g., a financial metric with a threshold, a cap, tiers, or other
3337 nonlinear payoff structure), the use of a scenario-based valuation model can present significant
3338 difficulties with regard to the estimation of an appropriate discount rate.

3339 3. *If the contingent consideration is based on future earnings and my expected earnings are exactly*
3340 *at the earnings threshold, why would the discount rate differ from the WACC or IRR?*

3341 The objective is to estimate the fair value of the contingent consideration payments and not of the
3342 underlying earnings. If the payoff structure is not a simple fraction or multiple of earnings, then the
3343 risk of the contingent consideration payments may be fundamentally different than the risk of the
3344 earnings. For example, for an earnout with a threshold (and no cap), the payoff of such an earnout
3345 resembles a leveraged investment with a higher discount rate than for earnings.

3346 4. *When estimating the earnout metric discount rate or the required metric risk premium, what*
3347 *factors should I consider with respect to the additional premiums in the WACC build-up for the*
3348 *acquiree (i.e., size, country, and/or company-specific premiums)?*

3349 The valuation specialist should first consider the rationale for including each of the additional
3350 premiums in the WACC build-up, and then assess whether and to what degree the same rationale
3351 applies to the earnout metric. The factors to consider might include, for example, the extent to which
3352 the acquiree's business is anticipated to be integrated with the acquirer's over the term of the earnout
3353 (for size premium) or the extent to which a higher risk due to aggressive projections is relevant to the
3354 earnout metric over the earnout period (for company-specific premium). When there is no clear

3355 support for fully including or excluding an additional premium, the valuation specialist may deem it
3356 reasonable to proportionately adjust that additional premium in accordance with an estimate of the
3357 risk-differential between the free cash-flows of the acquiree and the earnout metric. For example, if
3358 there is support that the earnout metric is 20% less risky than the acquiree's long-term free cash-flows,
3359 then proportionately reducing the additional premiums by 20% might be reasonable and practical.

3360 5. *The option pricing theory you reference is based on a significant body of academic research. What*
3361 *academic studies have been published to support using OPM for earnouts?*

3362 Since the application of option pricing theory specifically to the valuation of earnouts is relatively new
3363 (first textbook treatment that the Working Group is aware of is a 2005 textbook by Arzac), the body
3364 of academic research is developing. However, there is a robust, more general literature on the
3365 application of option pricing theory to assets and liabilities that are not traded in the market (the
3366 literature on real options).

3367 6. *A major assumption underlying OPM is that the earnout metric (e.g., EBITDA, revenue) is*
3368 *lognormally distributed. What evidence do you have that EBITDA or revenue is lognormally*
3369 *distributed?*

3370 The Working Group does not have substantive evidence that EBITDA or revenue are lognormally
3371 distributed. The application of the lognormal distribution to a company's stock price, however, is
3372 widely used in practice and EBITDA and revenue are at least somewhat correlated with a company's
3373 equity value. Where the risk associated with the metric is non-diversifiable and the metric's
3374 distribution is known to be far from lognormally distributed in a manner that could significantly affect
3375 the valuation, an adjustment may be appropriate. For example, certain deviations from the lognormal
3376 distribution, such as a "lumpy" distribution due to the impact of an event with diversifiable risk (e.g.,
3377 the degree of technical success for an R&D effort) or the need to model negative EBITDA, can be
3378 handled relatively simply.

3379 7. *When using an OPM for which the earnout metric is based on profits, isn't it a problem that a*
3380 *lognormal distribution assumes the metric cannot go below zero?*

3381 While a lognormal distribution does not capture outcomes below zero, the overall impact of excluding
3382 these outcomes may not be significant. A typical profit-based earnout is generally only paid when
3383 profits are substantially positive—making it most important to correctly capture the likelihood of
3384 upside outcomes. In the rare case where contingent consideration is paid for negative profit outcomes
3385 or the impact of excluding negative outcomes is significant (such as, for example, for a clawback), the
3386 analysis could be modified to model an alternative (but related) metric that is unlikely to go negative
3387 (e.g., modeling future revenues and then estimating profits from revenue) or to transform the
3388 distribution into a non-negative distribution consistent with a risk-neutral framework.

3389 8. *The use of an OPM generally results in lower values than the values estimated using a scenario-*
3390 *based method. As a result, later I may have to recognize a loss because the amount ultimately paid*
3391 *to the seller is much greater than originally estimated. Does this cause a problem from a financial*
3392 *reporting perspective?*

3393 Implemented appropriately with consistent assumptions, the OPM and SBM will give the same result.
3394 For nonlinear payoff structures involving a metric with non-diversifiable risk, the SBM discount rate
3395 needs to be adjusted to account for the impact of the nonlinear payoff structure. This adjustment cannot
3396 be easily intuited and the difficulty of estimating the impact of the payoff structure on risk in an SBM

3397 framework can be the source of significant differences between the results obtained using OPM and
3398 SBM. Assuming however that the OPM and SBM are implemented appropriately with consistent
3399 assumptions, the initial lower value versus what is expected to be paid out reflects the impact of time
3400 value of money, counterparty credit risk and non-diversifiable risk (including the impact of the payoff
3401 structure on risk) on the value that a market participant would pay for the expected earnout payment
3402 in a fair value transaction. As the uncertainty is resolved positively or in-line with expectations, the
3403 increase in value is entirely consistent with the requirement to update the fair value at specified
3404 reporting periods. Similarly, if the uncertainty is resolved negatively, a decrease in the value of the
3405 earnout liability may cause a gain to be recognized.

3406 *9. We do not typically do complex security valuations at my firm and do not have models or software*
3407 *to perform Monte Carlo simulations. Is it okay to never use such a model?*

3408 When the earnout payoff is path dependent or is a function of multiple correlated financial outcomes,
3409 a technique such as Monte Carlo simulation will generally be needed to model the earnout cash flow.

3410 *10. When performing a Monte Carlo simulation, what are examples of situations where one would*
3411 *consider a distribution different than lognormal?*

3412 For an earnout payoff based on the outcome of a nonfinancial milestone event with predominantly
3413 diversifiable risk (such as the result of a product development phase), the valuation specialist would
3414 typically consider a discrete distribution for a set of scenarios that represent the possible outcomes for
3415 that event. For an earnout based on a financial metric with a nonlinear payoff structure, the valuation
3416 specialist would generally assume a lognormal distribution. To address situations where the
3417 distribution of a financial metric is “lumpy” or asymmetric due to the impact of a diversifiable risk or
3418 where it is important to consider profit outcomes that are negative, simple adjustments to the standard
3419 implementation of a lognormal distribution may be appropriate. If other issues cause a financial metric
3420 to be far from lognormally distributed in a manner that could significantly affect the valuation, more
3421 complex adjustments or techniques may be appropriate. In general, consideration should be given to
3422 the trade-off between computational complexity versus a more accurate representation of the real-
3423 world metric distribution.

3424 *11. I am valuing an earnout for an acquisition that, in addition to market participant synergies, is*
3425 *expected to realize significant synergies that are unique to the buyer. Should I consider these*
3426 *buyer-specific synergies in the valuation of the earnout?*

3427 Yes, assuming the synergies are included in the earnout agreement’s definition of the metric. Because
3428 an earnout depends on the performance of the acquired business following the acquisition, a market
3429 participant buying or selling the standalone earnout would consider the expected earnout payments
3430 post-transaction, under the new ownership of the actual buyer. Therefore, to the extent that the earnout
3431 payoff is affected by buyer-specific synergies (or dis-synergies), these should be included in the
3432 valuation of the earnout.

3433 *12. I strongly believe that we will be making the earnout payment, yet the valuation analysis indicates*
3434 *a significant discount from the payment amount. Why does that make sense?*

3435 The valuation of the earnout is based on the expected payment rather than the most likely payment.
3436 Even when the payment is anticipated to be made, there may still be considerable downside risk.
3437 Further, even if there is no uncertainty about the payment (e.g., for a deferred payment) since the fair
3438 value analysis estimates the price that would be paid for the earnout cash flow by a market participant,

3439 the fair value of the earnout will always be less than the expected payment due to discounting for the
3440 time value of money and counterparty credit risk.

3441 *13. I am valuing an earnout for an acquisition of an early stage life sciences company with one drug*
3442 *under development by a large pharmaceutical company. A payment of 10 million will be made if*
3443 *regulatory approval is received. I have estimated the probability of receiving that regulatory*
3444 *approval. Would it be preferable in this case to use a scenario-based method? What discount rate*
3445 *should I use?*

3446 Yes, it would be preferable to use a scenario-based method. The earnout represents a fixed payment
3447 upon realization of an outcome (i.e., regulatory approval) that is largely a diversifiable risk. The
3448 probability-weighted expected earnout cash flow can be discounted at the obligor's cost of debt (i.e.,
3449 the risk-free rate plus the counterparty's credit spread, with adjustments for duration, seniority, etc.).

3450 *14. Related to #13 above, what discount rate would you consider if the payments involved a simple*
3451 *royalty based on a fixed percentage of revenues (assuming the product is successfully launched)?*

3452 In this case, the earnout metric (revenue) is exposed to systematic risk and therefore a discount rate
3453 should be used that captures the Required Metric Risk Premium associated with the forecast revenue,
3454 the time value of money over the relevant time horizon (the risk-free rate), and the credit risk of the
3455 obligor. The estimate of the Required Metric Risk Premium will generally differ from the risk premium
3456 used to value the associated business, due to differences in risk between revenue and the long-term
3457 free cash flows of the business. Unless there are buyer-specific synergies incorporated in the revenue
3458 projections for the earnout, long-term free cash flows would generally be riskier than revenues, due to
3459 operational leverage. Thus, even in a linear payoff structure such as a fixed percentage of revenues,
3460 the discount rate for the earnout cash flow (excluding the impact of the obligor's credit risk) will
3461 typically be lower than the WACC for the relevant business.

3462 *15. Can I use a simpler methodology to value an earnout that is almost certain to be paid? For*
3463 *example, consider an earnout that pays five million at the end of three years if cumulative EBITDA*
3464 *over the three years exceeds one million. After two years, cumulative EBITDA is 990,000. Nothing*
3465 *has recently occurred to indicate a change in the outlook for the business over the next year.*

3466 In this fact pattern, one can reasonably argue that the probability of payment is so high that the risk of
3467 the earnout cash flow resembles the risk of a plain vanilla debt instrument. In this case it may be
3468 appropriate to assume that the earnout payment will be earned with certainty and to discount the
3469 payment of five million at a rate that reflects the time value of money (risk-free rate) and the obligor's
3470 credit risk over the remaining one-year time horizon.

3471 *16. When updating an earnout valuation, should I assume the same discount rate and counterparty*
3472 *credit risk as in the original valuation?*

3473 All inputs should be reevaluated when updating the valuation. Consideration should be given to
3474 changes in market conditions and to the credit risk of the obligor as well as to changes in the discount
3475 rate, the expected case (mean) forecast of the earnout metric, and (if using OPM) the estimated
3476 volatility around that forecast.

3477 *17. Is adding an additional discount for the buyer's credit risk double counting since I am already*
3478 *considering the WACC as part of estimating the risk of the earnout metric? Does this imply that*
3479 *the buyer will book a gain if its credit quality worsens?*

3480 There are two distinct risks being considered in the valuation of the earnout: the risk of the underlying
3481 metric (as modified by the functional form of the payoff) and the risk associated with the obligor's
3482 ability to make an earnout payment if and when it becomes due. Therefore, there is no double counting.
3483 The dynamics of booking a gain associated with a decline in the buyer's credit quality is no different
3484 than the dynamics observed when estimating the fair value of debt for financial reporting purposes.

3485 *18. How should I estimate counterparty credit risk? Should I consider the credit risk of the buyer or*
3486 *the seller?*

3487 Counterparty credit risk represents the risk associated with the obligor's ability to make a contingent
3488 consideration payment when it is due. For an earnout, the obligor is typically the buyer. For a
3489 clawback, the obligor is typically the seller. Factors to consider in estimating counterparty credit risk
3490 include the expected timing of the payment(s), the seniority of the obligation, any credit risk mitigation
3491 mechanisms (such as whether or not sufficient funds to cover the potential payment have been placed
3492 in escrow), and any correlation between the outcomes (e.g., the upside scenarios in which an earnout
3493 payment is due) and the obligor's ability to pay.

3494 *19. Should the counterparty credit risk adjustment assume that the earnout payment is subordinated*
3495 *to the buyer's outstanding debt?*

3496 The seniority of the earnout payment in the obligor's capital structure should be evaluated based on
3497 discussions with management and/or a review of the relevant documentation. When estimating the
3498 counterparty credit risk, consideration should be given to the level of subordination (e.g., priority of
3499 claims) of the earnout within the obligor's capital structure.

3500 *20. If the expected outcome for the earnout metric is partially locked in, should I take that into*
3501 *consideration in the valuation of the earnout? For example, a portion of the revenue needed to*
3502 *achieve the threshold may already be under contract.*

3503 Yes. The assessment of the risk of the earnout metric should consider all relevant facts and
3504 circumstances.

3505 *21. Since the earnout is a liability, should I apply a premium to the value over the asset value to reflect*
3506 *what a market participant would require to assume the risk of the liability?*

3507 No. The fair value of the earnout as an asset and as a liability should be the same. Also, the accounting
3508 guidance is clear that one needs to value an earnout from the perspective of the asset. For example,
3509 ASC 820-10-35-16B states, "When a quoted price for the transfer of an identical or a similar liability
3510 or instrument classified in a reporting entity's shareholders' equity is not available and the identical
3511 item is held by another party as an asset, a reporting entity shall measure the fair value of the liability
3512 or equity instrument from the perspective of a market participant that holds the identical item as an
3513 asset at the measurement date." Similar guidance is provided in IFRS 13:37.

3514 *22. I am valuing an earnout that will pay 10% of EBIT in the first year post-close. I plan to start with*
3515 *the WACC for the subject business, then adjust for the short-term nature of the earnout to get to a*
3516 *discount rate appropriate for 1-year EBIT. However, the WACC for the business is a measure of*

3517 *the cost of capital for post-tax cash flows. Do I need to make any further adjustment to the discount*
 3518 *rate, since EBIT is a pre-tax metric?*

3519 Typically, no, assuming EBIT is unlikely to be negative. Income taxes are usually assumed to be a
 3520 linear function of earnings, and therefore typically do not impact risk. In such a situation, the
 3521 systematic risk does not differ between the pre-and post-tax cash flows of a business, and therefore a
 3522 tax-related adjustment to the post-tax WACC is not appropriate. However, there are cases in which
 3523 tax payments can introduce nonlinearities and/or leverage that would significantly affect the risk of
 3524 the cash flows of a business; such a situation could require an adjustment to the discount rate to capture
 3525 this difference in risk between pre- and post-tax cash flows.

3526 **10.2 Glossary**

Terms	Definitions
Adjusted CAPM	A framework in which adjustments are made to the results of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model to incorporate additional risk(s) beyond volatility and correlation with the market. Common examples of such additional risks include risks related to the size of the relevant business, country-related risk, and company-specific risk.
ASC 805	FASB Accounting Standards Codification 805 “Business Combinations”
ASC 820	FASB Accounting Standards Codification 820 “Fair Value Measurement”
Asset Beta	Also known as unlevered beta, it is derived from the equity beta by removing the effect of financial leverage in the capital structure of a specific company.
Backlog	Unfulfilled purchase or sales order contracts.
Beta	A measure of systematic risk (e.g., the tendency of a stock price to correlate with changes in the market).
Binary/Digital Option	A type of option in which the payoff is either a fixed amount if the option expires in the money or nothing at all if the option expires out of the money.
Black-Scholes-Merton Formula	A formula which gives a theoretical estimate of the price of options that can only be exercised at maturity, derived from the Black-Scholes-Merton model.

Buyer-Specific Synergies	Synergies that only a particular buyer would be able to realize from the transaction.
Call Option	An agreement that gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy an agreed quantity of an asset from the seller at a certain time for a certain price.
CAPM	Capital Asset Pricing Model is a model in which the cost of capital for any stock or portfolio of stocks equals a risk-free rate plus a risk premium that is proportionate to the systematic risk of the stock or portfolio.
Catch-Up Feature	A feature of an earnout agreement which allows specified shortfalls in payment (as compared to a payment cap) in prior periods to be earned in subsequent periods.
Clawback	The right of an acquirer to the return of previously transferred consideration if specified conditions are met.
Contingent Consideration	Contingent consideration usually is an obligation of the acquirer to transfer additional assets or equity interests to the former owners of an acquiree as part of the exchange for control of the acquiree if specified future events occur or conditions are met. However, contingent consideration also may give the acquirer the right to the return of previously transferred consideration if specified conditions are met.
Cost Approach	A general way of determining a value indication of an individual asset by quantifying the amount of money required to replace the future service capability of that asset.
Counterparty Credit Risk	Risk of the obligor being able to make a future payment when it is due.
Credit Spread	Rate of return above the risk-free rate required by investors to compensate for counterparty credit risk. Typically measured as the difference between the yields of corporate debt instruments and the benchmark (risk-free) government debt security (e.g., U.S. Treasury bond) of the same maturity.

DCF	Discounted Cash Flow is a method of valuing a project, company, or asset by discounting future cash flow projections at an appropriate rate to address risk and the time value of money, in order to arrive at a present value estimate.
Discount	Determine the present value of a cash flow or stream of cash flows that are projected to be received in the future.
Diversifiable	Diversifiable risks are idiosyncratic risks that can be substantially mitigated or eliminated from a portfolio by using adequate diversification. For example, a diversifiable (but still uncertain) event is one where the resolution of the uncertainty is typically not influenced by movements in the markets.
Earnout	An obligation of the acquirer to transfer additional assets or equity interests to the former owners of an acquiree as part of the exchange for control of the acquiree if specified future events occur or conditions are met.
EBIT	Earnings Before Interest and Tax is a measure of a firm's profitability that includes all expenses except interest and income tax expenses.
EBITDA	Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization is a measure calculated using a company's net earnings, before interest expenses, taxes, depreciation and amortization are subtracted, as a proxy for a company's current operating profitability.
EBT	Earnings Before Tax is a measure of a firm's profitability that includes all expenses except for income tax expenses.
Enterprise Value	An economic measure that reflects the market value of an ongoing operating business.
Fair Value	The price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.

FASB	Financial Accounting Standards Board is the independent, private-sector, not-for-profit organization that establishes financial accounting and reporting standards for public and private companies and non-for-profit organizations that follow U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
Financial Leverage	Measurement of the degree to which a company uses fixed-income securities such as debt and debt-like instruments.
Financial Metric	Refers to a unit of measurement of a company's financial or business performance, such as revenue, revenue margin, EBITDA, EBITDA margin, EBIT, net income, units sold, rental occupancy rates, market share, etc.
GBM	Geometric Brownian Motion is a continuous-time stochastic process in which the logarithm of the randomly varying quantity follows a Brownian motion.
IASB	International Accounting Standards Board is the independent, accounting standard-setting body of the IFRS Foundation.
Income Approach	The valuation approach that uses techniques to convert future amounts (e.g., cash flows or earnings) to a single current amount (discounted).
IFRS	International Financial Reporting Standards
IFRS 3R	International Financial Reporting Standard 3 (Revised) "Business Combinations"
IFRS 13	International Financial Reporting Standard 13 "Fair Value Measurement"
IPR&D	In-Process Research and Development refers to the incomplete R&D projects of an acquired business.
IRR	The Internal Rate of Return is a discount rate at which the present value of the future cash flows of the investment equals the value of the investment.
Leverage	Typically, the use of financial instruments or borrowed capital to increase the potential return on an investment, representing an equity

	holder's exposure to the underlying business as a result of the presence of debt in the capital structure. Can also refer to the degree of fixed costs in a firm's cost structure.
Leverage Ratio	A financial ratio that quantifies the extent or reliance on debt financing and/or the degree of fixed costs in a firm's cost structure.
LTFCFE	Long-Term Free Cash Flow to Equity is a measure of how much cash can be paid to the equity shareholders of a company after all expenses, reinvestment and debt are paid.
LTFCFF	Long-Term Free Cash Flow to the Firm is a measure of how much cash can be paid to the investors in a company (including debtholders, equity holders, and other non-equity investors) after all expenses and reinvestment are paid.
Market Approach	A valuation approach that uses prices and other relevant information generated by market transactions involving identical or comparable assets or liabilities.
Market Participant Synergies	Synergies that can be realized by a pool of hypothetical buyers and sellers (market participants with certain characteristics) in the principal (or most advantageous) market.
Market Risk Premium (MRP)	The Market Risk Premium, also known as the Equity Risk Premium, is the rate of return above the risk-free rate that is required by investors for holding the market portfolio (i.e., a large portfolio of diversified stocks, typically represented by a broad stock market index).
Midyear Convention	A convention that reflects economic benefits being generated at midyear, approximating the effect of economic benefits being generated evenly throughout the year.
Moneyness	The relative position of the current price (or future price) of an underlying asset with respect to the strike price of an option.
Monte Carlo Simulation	A technique used to sample randomly from a probability distribution, to produce different possible outcomes.

Noncontrolling Interest	The portion of equity (net assets) in a subsidiary not attributable, directly or indirectly, to a parent. A noncontrolling interest is sometimes called a minority interest.
Non-diversifiable	Risks that cannot be fully mitigated or eliminated through diversification. Typically these are risks that are correlated with the market. For example, revenue is exposed to both company-specific risk as well as to market risk.
Nonfinancial Milestone Event	Refers to an event that is not defined based on the outcome of a Financial Metric, such as regulatory approvals, resolution of legal disputes, execution of certain commercial contracts or retention of customers, closing of a future transaction, or achievement of technical milestones.
Operational Leverage	Measurement of the degree to which a firm or project incurs a combination of fixed and variable costs. A company with high fixed costs relative to its earnings has a high degree of operational leverage.
OPM	Option Pricing Method is a method whereby the valuation specialist applies an appropriate discount rate to the contingent consideration metric forecast in order to establish a risk-neutral forecast distribution for the metric, estimates the expected payoff cash flow in this risk-neutral framework, and discounts the risk-neutral expected payoff cash flow at the risk-free rate, plus any adjustment for counterparty credit risk.
Orderly Transaction	A transaction that assumes exposure to the market for a period before the measurement date to allow for marketing activities that are usual and customary for transactions involving such assets or liabilities; it is not a forced transaction (e.g., a forced liquidation or distress sale).
Path Dependency	An arrangement that includes multiple earnout periods and in which at least some of the contingent payments depend on the interrelated performance over multiple of these periods.

PV	Present Value is the value of future economic benefits and/or proceeds as of a specified date, calculated using an appropriate discount rate.
PFI	Prospective Financial Information is a forecast of expected future cash flows.
Required Rate of Return	The rate of return required by an investor to compensate for the time value of money and the non-diversifiable risk of investing in a particular investment.
Revenue Beta	A measure of the systematic risk of company revenue relative to the market.
RFR	The Risk-Free Rate is the rate of return required by investors to compensate for the time value of money on a risk-free investment.
Risk-Adjusting Discount Rate	The Required Metric Risk Premium plus the Risk-Free Rate
Risk-Neutral Framework	A framework in which non-diversifiable risk is first removed from a contingent consideration metric, the contingent consideration payoffs are then calculated based on the risk-adjusted metric, and finally the payoffs are discounted at the risk-free rate (plus any adjustments for counterparty credit risk).
RMRP	Required Metric Risk Premium is a measure of the excess return, or risk premium, that investors demand to bear the non-diversifiable risk associated with a specific metric.
SBM	Scenario-Based Method is a method whereby the valuation specialist identifies multiple outcomes, probability weights these outcomes to arrive at an expected payment cash flow, and discounts the result at an appropriate rate.
Size Premium	The additional return required to compensate an investor for the additional risk associated with smaller companies.
Standard Deviation	A measure that quantifies the amount of variation or dispersion of a set of data values from their mean.
Standard Normal Distribution	A special case of the normal distribution that occurs when a normal random variable (a very common, continuous probability distribution

	with a symmetrical, bell shape) has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
Strike Price	The price at which the holder of an option can buy or sell the underlying security.
Systematic Risk	Risks that cannot be fully mitigated or eliminated through diversification because they are correlated with the market. For example, revenue is exposed to both company-specific risk factors as well as to market risk.
Term	The remaining time to expiry of an instrument or security.
Unit of Account	The level at which an asset or liability is aggregated or disaggregated for accounting recognition purposes.
U.S. GAAP	United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
Volatility	The standard deviation of asset returns or metric growth rates.
WACC	Weighted Average Cost of Capital is the return required by both debt and equity investors, weighted by their respective contributions to the overall capital structure.
WARA	Weighted Average Return on Assets is the cost of capital determined by the weighted average, at market value, of the collective rates of return on the various types of tangible and intangible assets of a company.

3527 **10.3 Technical Notes**

3528 The Technical Notes section contains detailed technical discussions related to various methodologies
3529 including:

- 3530 • Estimating the RMRP for an earnings-based metric using the Hamada, Modigliani-Miller
3531 Generalized Beta, Practitioners' and Volatility-Based Methods
- 3532 • Estimating the RMRP for a revenue-based metric using the Fixed Costs vs. Assets Method
3533 and Volatility-based Methods
- 3534 • Estimating the RMRP for any metric via a bottom-up estimation technique
- 3535 • Risk-adjusting the metric forecast (to create a risk-neutral metric forecast for use in an OPM),
3536 using either of two equivalent techniques
- 3537 • The applicability of the normal distribution to financial metrics: pros and cons
- 3538 • The properties of a Geometric Brownian Motion, including how to handle situations where
3539 these properties do not hold (alternative methods)

3540 • A discussion of the academic literature and its support for the application of option pricing
3541 methods to the valuation of non-traded assets and liabilities.

3542 *10.3.1 Estimating Earnings-Based RMRPs by De-Levering for Financial Leverage*

3543 The methods for estimating earnings-based RMRPs by de-levering the equity RMRP for financial
3544 leverage described below include the Hamada, Modigliani-Miller Generalized Beta, Practitioners' and
3545 Volatility-Based Methods. There are numerous other methods for de-levering for financial leverage
3546 that can be employed, such as the Miles-Ezzel, Harris-Pringle, and Fernandez methods.^{125,126} Each of
3547 these methods relies on differing underlying assumptions, requires differing levels of complexity to
3548 estimate, and can produce different estimates for the RMRP.

3549 In choosing among these methods, it is important to ensure that the assumptions associated with the
3550 selected method are reasonable given the earnout timeframe and the capital structure of the subject
3551 business. Any potential issues with a method's assumptions should be thought through prior to
3552 applying the methodology. The following is a summary of the main considerations associated with
3553 these four de-levering methods (which are discussed in more detail in the remainder of this section):

- 3554 • The Hamada Method assumes that the company will always be able to realize an interest tax
3555 deduction in the period intended, debt has no systematic risk, and the debt amount is constant
3556 over time.
- 3557 • The Modigliani-Miller Generalized Beta Method assumes constant financial leverage and
3558 requires an estimate of the required risk premium for debt.
- 3559 • The Practitioners' Method assumes that debt has no systematic risk and that tax shields have
3560 the same risk as operating assets.
- 3561 • The Volatility-Based Method assumes that the correlation between the market and the earnout
3562 metric is the same as the correlation between the market and the company's return on equity
3563 and requires an estimate of volatility in growth rate for the metric.¹²⁷

3564 Depending on the underlying characteristics of the financial leverage associated with the earnout
3565 metric, an alternative method may be appropriate. For example, the Hamada, Modigliani-Miller
3566 Generalized Beta and Practitioners' Methods all estimate the same RMRP for all earnings-based
3567 metrics—which might be an issue, e.g., where the metric is EBITDA and depreciation or amortization
3568 are substantial. In such a situation, the Fixed Costs vs. Assets Method (see Section 10.3.2) can be used
3569 to further adjust the RMRP for EBIT estimated with one of these three methods to obtain a RMRP for
3570 EBITDA.

3571 The Hamada, Modigliani-Miller Generalized Beta, Practitioners' and Volatility-Based Methods are
3572 described below in terms of estimating the RMRP. Because the theories are predicated on the CAPM
3573 framework, the reader may be more familiar with the application of these methods to estimating betas.
3574 Indeed, that is how they are typically portrayed and understood in the financial literature.

3575 In general, similar principles should be applicable even under alternatives to the CAPM framework
3576 for the analysis of systematic risk.

¹²⁵ See Pratt and Grabowski, *Cost of Capital*, 5th ed. (2014), pp. 248-254.

¹²⁶ The WACC less the long-term risk-free rate is another alternative estimate that could be used to approximate the RMRP of an earnings-based metric. This method is described in Section 5.2.3.1. When using this method, the valuation specialist should consider whether adjustments are needed for differences in the risk of the earnout metric as compared to the risk associated with the long-term free cash flows to the firm.

¹²⁷ If the valuation specialist is using OPM (e.g., because the payoff structure is nonlinear), an estimate of metric volatility will often be required for the analysis anyway. However, if using SBM to value an earnout with a linear payoff structure, an estimate of metric volatility would generally not be required unless it is needed for the method used to estimate the RMRP.

3577 Hamada Method

3578 The Hamada Method uses the following equation to de-lever the equity RMRP for financial
3579 leverage:¹²⁸

3580
$$RMRP_{EBIT} = RMRP_{Equity} / [1 + (1-t) \times D/E]$$

3581 Where:

3582 $RMRP_{EBIT}$ = the risk premium (above the risk-free rate) appropriate to EBIT

3583 $RMRP_{Equity}$ = the risk premium (above the risk-free rate) appropriate to long-term free cash
3584 flows to equity

3585 t = the relevant tax rate

3586 D/E = the debt-to-equity ratio of the subject company.

3587 The advantage of this methodology is that it is relatively straightforward to calculate and it is a well-
3588 known methodology with which many practitioners are familiar. However, this formulation assumes
3589 that the company will always be able to realize an interest tax deduction in the period intended, that
3590 the debt of the company has no systematic risk (or in a CAPM framework, that the beta on debt is
3591 always zero), and that the debt amount is constant over time, which is equivalent to assuming a
3592 decreasing debt-to-equity ratio as the company grows in size. The Hamada Method also estimates the
3593 same RMRP for different earnings-based metrics (e.g., EBIT vs. EBITDA), which might be an issue
3594 where there is a significant difference in leverage between these metrics (e.g., if depreciation or
3595 amortization are substantial). These assumptions may or may not be reasonable.

3596 Modigliani-Miller Generalized Beta Method

3597 An alternative method for de-levering for financial leverage that relies on estimates for both equity
3598 and debt RMRPs (or, in a CAPM framework, on both equity and debt betas) is proposed below:¹²⁹

3599
$$RMRP_{EBIT} = RMRP_{Debt} \times D/V + RMRP_{Equity} \times E/V$$

3600 Where:

3601 V = the firm's total value

3602 D/V = the percentage of the firm's value comprised of debt

3603 E/V = the percentage of the firm's value comprised of equity.

3604 The fundamental underpinning of this methodology is that the returns on debt are correlated with
3605 market returns, and the methodology therefore allows for factoring in the systematic risk of debt. This
3606 methodology also assumes a constant financial leverage ratio. As for the Hamada method, the
3607 Modigliani-Miller Generalized Beta Method calculation is straightforward;¹³⁰ however, this method
3608 requires estimation of a RMRP for debt (or, in a CAPM framework, a debt beta).¹³¹ The Modigliani-
3609 Miller Generalized Beta Method also estimates the same RMRP for different earnings-based metrics

¹²⁸ See Hamada (1972). The formula is typically expressed in terms of equity and asset betas, as follows:
Asset beta = Equity beta / [1 + (1-t) × D/E].

¹²⁹ See Brealey, Myers, and Allen, *Principles of Corporate Finance*, pp. 225-226. The formula is typically expressed in terms of equity and asset betas, as follows: $\beta_{Asset} = \beta_{Debt} \times D/V + \beta_{Equity} \times E/V$.

¹³⁰ In fact, the Hamada Method is a special case of the Modigliani-Miller Generalized Beta Method, where (a) debt is considered to be risk-free; and (b) tax shields have the same risk as debt. See McKinsey & Company, *Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies*, 5th ed. (2010), Appendix D.

¹³¹ For estimates of debt betas based on credit ratings, see, for instance, Pratt and Grabowski, *Cost of Capital*, 5th ed. (2014), p. 221.

3610 (e.g., EBIT vs. EBITDA), which might be an issue where there is a significant difference in leverage
3611 between these metrics (e.g., if depreciation or amortization are substantial).

3612 Practitioners' Method

3613 The Practitioners' Method, so named because it is often used in practice, uses the following method
3614 for de-levering for financial leverage:¹³²

$$3615 \quad RMRP_{EBIT} = RMRP_{Equity} / [1 + D/E]$$

3616 Where:

3617 $RMRP_{EBIT}$ = the risk premium (above the risk-free rate) appropriate to EBIT

3618 $RMRP_{Equity}$ = the risk premium (above the risk-free rate) appropriate to long-term free cash
3619 flows to equity

3620 D/E = the debt-to-equity ratio of the business.

3621 The Practitioner's Method is a special case of the Modigliani-Miller Generalized Beta Method, where
3622 the valuation specialist assumes that (a) debt has no systematic risk (this assumption is also made by
3623 the Hamada Method) and (b) tax shields have the same risk as operating assets.¹³³

3624 On the plus side, this is also a relatively straightforward calculation, and is well known to practitioners.
3625 However, the assumption of no systematic risk for debt and the fact that it does not factor in the impacts
3626 of any tax deduction of interest payments may or may not be reasonable. The Practitioner's Method
3627 also estimates the same RMRP for different earnings-based metrics (e.g., EBIT vs. EBITDA), which
3628 might be an issue where there is a significant difference in leverage between these metrics (e.g., if
3629 depreciation or amortization are substantial).

3630 Volatility-Based Method

3631 The Volatility-Based Method is predicated on the assumption that differences in risk due to leverage
3632 are fully captured by differences in volatility of the underlying metrics. In a CAPM framework, this
3633 assumption implies that the correlation between the subject metric (e.g., EBIT) and the market is the
3634 same as the correlation between the return on equity (if starting with an equity RMRP) and the market.

$$3635 \quad RMRP_{EBIT} = RMRP_{Equity} \times \sigma_{EBIT} / \sigma_{Equity}$$

3636 Where:

3637 σ_{EBIT} = the volatility of the EBIT of the company¹³⁴

3638 σ_{Equity} = the volatility of the equity of the company.

3639 If this method is selected, care should also be taken to ensure that sufficiently reliable data is available
3640 to estimate volatility in the growth rate for the metric. Note that if the valuation specialist is using
3641 OPM (e.g., because the payoff structure is nonlinear), an estimate of volatility in the growth rate for
3642 the metric will often be required for the analysis anyway. However, if using SBM to value an earnings-
3643 based earnout with a linear payoff structure, an estimate of volatility in the growth rate for the metric
3644 would generally not be required, unless it is needed for the method used to estimate the RMRP.

¹³² See Pratt and Grabowski, *Cost of Capital*, 5th ed. (2014), pp. 248-254. The formula is typically expressed in terms of equity and asset betas, as follows: Asset beta = Equity beta / [1 + D/E].

¹³³ See McKinsey (2010), *Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies*, Appendix D.

¹³⁴ Note: the volatility of the earnings-based metric can be estimated either by de-levering equity volatilities or by estimating volatilities specific to the metric itself (i.e., EBITDA or EBIT, etc.)

3645 On the plus side, the Volatility-Based Method allows for capturing the intricate differences in risk
3646 associated with different types of earnings (e.g., EBIT vs. EBITDA). However, the method relies on
3647 the simplifying assumption that the correlation between the market and the earnout metric is the same
3648 as the correlation between the market and the company's return on equity, which may or may not be
3649 reasonable.

3650 See Section 5.2.4 for estimating volatility.

3651 *10.3.2 Estimating Revenue-Based RMRPs by De-Levering EBIT RMRPs for Operational Leverage*

3652 Methods for estimating revenue RMRPs by de-levering EBIT RMRPs¹³⁵ for operational leverage
3653 include the Fixed Costs vs. Assets Method and the Volatility-Based Method. These two methods are
3654 described below. An alternative method, the Harris-Pringle formula (which was designed to estimate
3655 operating betas), is not recommended by the Working Group for estimating a RMRP for a revenue
3656 metric.¹³⁶ See also Section 5.2.3.5 for a more general discussion of the pros and cons of using a de-
3657 leveraging methodology for estimating the RMRP for a revenue-based metric.

3658 In choosing between these methods, it is important to ensure that the assumptions associated with the
3659 selected method are reasonable given the earnout timeframe and the capital structure of the subject
3660 business. Any potential issues with a method's assumptions should be thought through prior to
3661 applying the methodology. The following is a summary of the main considerations associated with
3662 these two methods (which are discussed in more detail in the remainder of this section):

- 3663 • The Fixed Costs vs. Assets Method assumes that the systematic risk associated with fixed
3664 costs is approximately zero and generally requires an estimate of the percentage of costs that
3665 are fixed versus variable over the time horizon(s) relevant to estimating the earnout payoff
3666 (which can be challenging to estimate, given the typical difficulties in distinguishing between
3667 fixed and variable costs).
- 3668 • The Volatility-Based Method assumes that the correlation between the market and the earnout
3669 metric is the same as the correlation between the market and the company's return on equity
3670 and the method also requires an estimate of volatility in the growth rate for the metric.¹³⁷

3671 Note that both the Fixed Costs vs. Assets Method and the Volatility-Based Method can also be used
3672 to estimate the RMRP for other metrics besides revenue, such as gross profit, net income, etc., as long
3673 as adjustments are made for the relative risk and leverage of the relevant earnout metric.

3674 These two methods are described in this section in terms of estimating the RMRP. Because the theories
3675 are predicated on the CAPM framework, the reader may be more familiar with the application of these

¹³⁵ In lieu of starting with an EBIT RMRP, it may often be reasonable to start with the WACC less the long-term risk-free rate, make any adjustments for differences in duration or financial leverage, and then de-lever for differences in operational leverage.

¹³⁶ The Harris-Pringle formula is as follows:

$$\beta_{\text{Operating}} = \beta_{\text{Unlevered}} / [1 + \text{Fixed Costs/Variable Costs}]$$

Where:

$\beta_{\text{Operating}}$ = the operating beta of the company

$\beta_{\text{Unlevered}}$ = the unlevered beta

Fixed Costs/Variable Costs = the ratio of fixed operating costs (without regard to costs of financing) to variable operating costs

Unfortunately, the Harris-Pringle method can be problematic in the context of estimating revenue betas as it doesn't directly relate fixed costs or variable costs to either revenue or EBIT, but rather only to each other. As such, this method would give the same result whether total costs are 1% of revenue or 100% of revenue. It may not result, therefore, in a reasonable estimate of a revenue RMRP.

¹³⁷ If the valuation specialist is using OPM (e.g., because the payoff structure is nonlinear), an estimate of metric volatility will often be required for the analysis anyway. However, if using SBM to value an earnout with a linear payoff structure, an estimate of metric volatility would generally not be required unless it is needed for the method used to estimate the RMRP.

3676 methods to estimating betas. Indeed, that is how they are typically portrayed and understood in the
3677 financial literature.

3678 Similar principles should generally be applicable even under alternatives to the CAPM framework for
3679 the analysis of systematic risk. That is, if an alternative framework for modeling systematic risk is
3680 used for a revenue-based metric, consideration should be given as to how to adjust the risk premiums
3681 for long-term free cash flows for operational leverage. For example, in an Adjusted CAPM framework,
3682 if a size premium is appropriate for valuing the business, consideration should be given to adjusting
3683 the size premium commensurate with the differences in risk between long-term free cash flows and
3684 the revenue metric. While the Fixed Costs vs. Assets Method and/or the Volatility-Based Method can
3685 be appropriate for such adjustments, depending on the framework and the specific situation, it is
3686 possible that an alternative method might be more appropriate for adjusting the additional risk
3687 premiums.

3688 Fixed Costs vs. Assets Method

3689 This method is designed to estimate a RMRP for revenue via further adjustment to the RMRP for an
3690 EBIT metric, for operational leverage over the term of the earnout. The key assumption underlying
3691 this method is that the systematic risk associated with fixed costs is approximately zero (which may
3692 or may not be reasonable). Under this assumption, the RMRP for revenue can be estimated as:¹³⁸

$$3693 \quad RMRP_{Revenue} = RMRP_{EBIT} / [1 + PV(\text{fixed costs}) / PV(EBIT)]$$

3694 Where:

3695 $PV(\text{fixed costs})$ = the present value of fixed costs during the earnout period

3696 $PV(EBIT)$ ¹³⁹ = the present value of EBIT during the earnout period, where $PV(EBIT) =$
3697 $PV(\text{revenue}) - PV(\text{fixed costs}) - PV(\text{variable costs})$.

3698 The RMRP for EBIT can be estimated as discussed in Section 10.3.1. To estimate the operational
3699 leverage ratio of $PV(\text{fixed costs})/PV(EBIT)$, often one starts by estimating the percentage of costs that
3700 are fixed versus variable over the relevant time periods. Then one can derive the present value of the
3701 fixed costs by discounting the fixed costs over the period of the earnout; given the assumption that the
3702 systematic risk associated with fixed costs is approximately zero, the discount rate for fixed costs can
3703 be reasonably approximated by the estimated cost of debt of the entity whose obligation it is to pay
3704 these fixed costs. The present value of the EBIT can be estimated by discounting the EBIT over the
3705 period of the earnout at the estimated discount rate appropriate to EBIT.

3706 Difficulties may arise in using this methodology, as distinguishing fixed from variable costs may be
3707 challenging. In theory, over a long time horizon, all costs become variable. Over a medium or short
3708 time horizon, though, usually some costs are fixed and some are variable. As such, it is important to
3709 consider which costs are fixed vs. variable *over the term of the earnout period*.

3710 Furthermore, many earnouts are associated with the performance of early-stage businesses for which
3711 EBIT can often be either negative or very small. For such businesses, the denominator of this ratio
3712 may produce unreasonable results.

3713 Finally, even though this methodology is couched in terms of revenue, it could be adapted for any
3714 financial metric based on the relative operational leverage over the term of the earnout. For instance,

¹³⁸ Or, in a CAPM framework, as $\beta_{Revenue} = \beta_{Asset} / [1 + PV(\text{fixed costs}) / PV(\text{asset})]$. See Brealey, Myers, and Allen, *Principles of Corporate Finance*, pp. 226-229 for further detail on asset beta and revenue beta estimation.

¹³⁹ $PV(EBIT)$ is generally seen as a reasonable measurement of the present value of the underlying assets of the related business, on which the formula is predicated.

3715 if the underlying metric were gross profit, instead of using all fixed costs, you would instead use only
3716 the fixed component of operating expenses. Similarly, this method could be utilized to handle the
3717 situation where the metric is EBITDA and depreciation or amortization expenses are substantial, by
3718 adjusting a RMRP relevant to EBIT to arrive at a RMRP relevant to EBITDA.

3719 Volatility-Based Method

3720 The Volatility-Based Method assumes that differences in leverage can be captured solely via relative
3721 differences in volatility, which in the CAPM framework means that the correlation between the metric
3722 of interest (e.g., revenue) and the market is the same as the correlation between the return on equity
3723 (if starting with an equity beta) or the return on assets (if starting with an asset beta) and the market.
3724 This assumption may or may not be reasonable.

3725 When using this methodology, care should also be taken to ensure that sufficiently reliable data is
3726 available to estimate the volatility in the growth rate for the metric. Note that if the valuation specialist
3727 is using OPM (e.g., because the payoff structure is nonlinear), an estimate of volatility in the growth
3728 rate for the metric will often be required for the analysis anyway. However, if using SBM to value a
3729 revenue-based earnout with a linear payoff structure, an estimate of volatility in the growth rate for
3730 the metric would generally not be required, unless it is needed for the method used to estimate the
3731 RMRP.

3732 One possible implementation of the Volatility-Based Method starts with an EBIT RMRP as estimated,
3733 for example, by one of the methodologies in Section 10.3.1. The RMRP for the metric is then estimated
3734 as follows:

$$3735 \quad RMRP_{metric} = RMRP_{EBIT} \times \sigma_{metric} / \sigma_{EBIT}$$

3736 Where:

3737 σ_{metric} = the volatility in the growth of the metric of the company

3738 σ_{EBIT} = the volatility of returns on the assets of the company.

3739 Alternatively, in a CAPM framework one can instead begin with an equity beta:

$$3740 \quad \beta_{metric} = \beta_{Equity} \times \sigma_{metric} / \sigma_{Equity}$$

3741 Where:

3742 σ_{metric} = the volatility in the growth of the metric of the company

3743 σ_{Equity} = the volatility of returns on the equity of the company.

3744 A useful cross-check when using the Volatility-Based Method is to compute the operational leverage
3745 ratio implied by the Volatility-Based Method, test it for reasonability, and potentially also compare it
3746 to the operational leverage ratio implied by the Fixed Costs vs. Assets Method. These respective
3747 operational leverage ratios may be calculated as follows:

$$3748 \quad \text{Volatility-Based Method implied operational leverage ratio} = \sigma_{EBIT} / \sigma_{metric} - 1$$

$$3749 \quad \text{Fixed Costs vs. Assets Method implied operational leverage ratio} = PV(\text{fixed costs}) / PV(EBIT)$$

3750 This check can help ensure that the estimated de-levering adjustment makes sense for the business
3751 over the earnout period.

3752 *10.3.3 The Bottom-Up Method for Estimating a RMRP for Any Metric*

3753 The bottom-up method is described in this section in terms of estimating metric betas, from which the
3754 Required Metric Risk Premium can be calculated in a CAPM (or Adjusted CAPM) framework. The
3755 discussion is predicated on assumptions underlying the CAPM framework because that is how it is
3756 typically portrayed and understood in the literature.

3757 Similar principles should generally be applicable under alternatives to the CAPM framework for the
3758 analysis of systematic risk; whatever method was used for estimating the risk of the long-term free
3759 cash flows of the business, the bottom-up technique should be adaptable enough to develop direct
3760 estimates of the risk associated with the underlying metric. For example, in an Adjusted CAPM
3761 framework, if a company-specific premium is appropriate for valuing the business, consideration
3762 should be given to incorporating in the RMRP the portion of that premium that is relevant to the
3763 earnings metric. Methods for incorporating such additional risk premiums are discussed in Section
3764 5.2.3.

3765 In any case, care should be taken to ensure that the underlying assumptions of the bottom-up method
3766 are reasonable in the given circumstance, and that any differences in underlying assumptions are
3767 thought through prior to applying the methodology.

3768 In contrast to the top-down methods of Sections 10.3.1 and 10.3.2 that are specific to estimating
3769 RMRPs for earnings-based and revenue-based metrics respectively (or equivalently in a CAPM
3770 framework, estimating asset/earnings betas and revenue betas), a bottom-up method can be used
3771 regardless of the metric on which the earnout is based. The bottom-up method directly measures the
3772 beta of the underlying metric, and therefore does not rely on the equity beta (or the WACC or the IRR)
3773 as a starting point.

3774 The bottom-up method estimates a beta associated with any type of metric (such as revenue, EBIT, or
3775 EBITDA) by using CAPM to estimate the systematic risk associated with the underlying metric. This
3776 method is consistent with the “real options” pricing method.¹⁴⁰ The metric beta can be estimated as
3777 follows:

3778
$$\beta_{Metric} = \rho_{(Metric, Market)} \times S_{Metric} \div S_{Market}$$

3779 Where:

3780 $\rho_{(Metric, Market)}$ = the instantaneous correlation between the percent changes in the metric and the
3781 returns on a broad index of stock market prices

3782 S_{Metric} = the volatility of the growth in the metric

3783 S_{Market} = the volatility of the return on a broad index of stock market prices.

3784 In circumstances where there is significant debt in the capital structure, the valuation specialist should
3785 consider whether it would be appropriate to make an adjustment to the estimated RMRP due to the
3786 impact of the availability of debt financing. For example, the valuation specialist could rely on an
3787 appropriately weighted average of the RMRP for the earnout metric and the cost of debt.

3788 While it can be challenging to correctly estimate the correlation between the growth in the relevant
3789 metric and the return of the market or to estimate the volatility in growth in the metric, historical data

¹⁴⁰ See Hull, *Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives*, 8th ed. (2011), pp 766-768 for further detail on the Real Options methodology for valuing assets based on financial metrics not priced in the market. Note: the terminology in this Valuation Advisory differs slightly from the terminology used by Hull. In particular, what Hull refers to as the market price of risk (HMPR) is only a component of what is referred herein as the Required Metric Risk Premium (RMRP). The specific relationship is: $RMRP = HMPR \times S_{Metric}$.

3790 for the company in question, comparable companies, or the industry can often be used to inform the
3791 estimates if adequate historical data is available. Adjustments are typically made to remove historical
3792 outliers and/or data points with a large impact due to nonrecurring, idiosyncratic issues such as major
3793 acquisitions, divestitures, or product announcements. Furthermore, when estimating historical
3794 correlation, if using quarterly data, the analysis should use year-on-year quarterly growth (e.g., Q1 of
3795 the current year vs. Q1 of the prior year) rather than quarter-to-quarter growth (e.g., Q1 of the current
3796 year vs. Q4 of the prior year) to avoid artificial impacts on correlation due to seasonality.

3797 When estimating the historical correlation in metric growth for the company and comparable
3798 companies with a broad market index, the first question to consider is what index might be most
3799 appropriate. The S&P 500 index may be appropriate for a U.S.-based company that conducts most of
3800 its business in the U.S., but perhaps not for a company that conducts most of its business in Europe or
3801 Asia. Furthermore, one may need to investigate lagged effects to obtain a proper estimate of
3802 correlation.¹⁴¹

3803 As discussed above, if an alternative framework for modeling systematic risk is used, consideration
3804 should be given as to what portion of that framework's risk premiums to incorporate in the RMRP.
3805 For example, in an Adjusted CAPM framework, if a size premium is appropriate for valuing the
3806 business, consideration should be given to incorporating a portion of the size premium into the RMRP
3807 for revenue—the portion commensurate with the amount of the risk represented by the size premium
3808 that is applicable to the revenue metric. Methods for incorporating such additional risk premiums are
3809 discussed in Section 5.2.3.

3810 See Section 5.2.4 for a discussion of estimating volatility in the growth rate for the metric.

3811 See Section 5.2.3.6 for the pros and cons of using a bottom-up method for estimating a RMRP.

3812 *10.3.4 Two Methods for Risk-Adjusting the Metric Forecast*

3813 As discussed in Section 5.4.1, the OPM is appropriate for valuing contingent consideration based on
3814 a nonlinear payoff structure with metrics that involve non-diversifiable risk.

3815 There are two ways of adjusting management's forecast for the metric to account for non-diversifiable
3816 risk:

- 3817 • **Forecast Risk Adjustment (1)** – Management's *forecast* for the metric is discounted at an
3818 appropriate risk-adjusting discount rate, which results in a risk-neutral forecast of the metric
3819 that is forward looking.
- 3820 • **Forecast Risk Adjustment (2)** – Management's *forecast growth rate* of the metric is adjusted
3821 by the Required Metric Risk Premium.

3822 While appearing different, these two risk-adjustment methodologies are in fact equivalent; they
3823 provide the same risk-neutral future value for the metric. The equivalence will first be illustrated with
3824 an example, after which the mathematical equivalence will be demonstrated.

3825 *Example Earnout Payoff Structure*

3826 Company A will be required to pay 30% of the excess of the acquiree's annual EBITDA above
3827 2,000 over the next year. The payment is due three months after the end of that year.

¹⁴¹ There is some evidence that stock market returns are a leading indicator of revenue growth, with a lead time of approximately one quarter (equivalently, revenue growth lags related stock market movements by approximately one quarter).

3828 *Assumptions*

3829 Management provided historical EBITDA of 1,800 as of the end of the previous period and
3830 forecasted EBITDA of 2,000 as of the end of the following period. The RMRP associated with the
3831 acquiree's EBITDA is 9.5%, the risk-free rate consistent with the timeframe to payment of the
3832 earnout is 0.5% (i.e., the risk-adjusting discount rate applicable to future EBITDA is 10%), and
3833 the credit spread of Company A for a subordinated obligation such as this earnout is 3.0% (all
3834 these rates are per annum, continuously compounded).

3835 *Forecast Risk Adjustment (1)*

3836 The present value of the forecasted EBITDA, assuming EBITDA is earned at the mid-period (i.e.
3837 using the mid-period convention) is calculated as:

3838 $1,902.5 = 2,000 \times \exp(-10.0\% \times 0.5)$

3839 The OPM is applied, assuming a lognormal distribution of the metric.¹⁴² The risk-neutral present
3840 value of forecasted EBITDA is used to simulate the value for the risk-neutral future EBITDA as:¹⁴³

3841 $2,507.73 = 1,902.5 \times \exp((0.5\% - (50.0\%)^2/2) \times 0.5 + 50.0\% \times (0.5)^{1/2} \times 0.951)$

3842 *Forecast Risk Adjustment (2)*

3843 The continuous (annualized) growth rate of management's forecast for the metric is:

3844 $10.536\% = \log_e(2,000 / 1,800)$

3845 The growth rate of management's forecast for the metric is adjusted by the RMRP (equal to 9.5%
3846 in this example) and is used to simulate the value for the risk-neutral future EBITDA as:¹⁴⁴

3847 $2,507.73 = 1,800 \times \exp((10.536\% - 9.5\% \times 0.5 + (50.0\%)^2/2) \times 0.5 + 50.0\% \times (0.5)^{1/2} \times 0.951)$

3848 The one path simulated risk-neutral future EBITDA is the same for the two forecast risk adjustment
3849 methods above. For this simulated path:

- 3850 • the contingent consideration payoff for the random draw of 0.951 is

3851 $152.32 = 30.0\% \times \max\{2,507.73 - 2,000, 0\}$

- 3852 • the present value of the contingent consideration payment for this random draw is

3853 $145.8 = 152.32 \times \exp(-(3.0\% + 0.5\%) \times 1.25)$

3854 *Equivalence of the Two Forecast Risk-Adjustment Methods for an OPM*

3855 In the example above, both forecast risk adjustment methods provide the same risk-neutral future
3856 EBITDA. The equivalence of the two methods, in terms of providing the same risk-neutral future
3857 values for the metric, hinges upon the following relation between the Required Metric Risk
3858 Premium and the risk-adjusting discount rate applicable to the metric:

¹⁴² A discussion on the use of the lognormal distribution for non-traded metrics (e.g., revenue, EBIT, EBITDA) is provided in Section 5.4.

¹⁴³ For illustration purposes we assume an EBITDA volatility of 50.0% and 0.951 as a random draw from a standard normal distribution. The calculated value represents only one simulated path assuming EBITDA is earned at the mid-period; the valuation specialist will choose an appropriate number of iterations (paths) that ensures the required convergence of results.

¹⁴⁴ The adjusted growth rate is applied to the actual EBITDA as of the end of previous period. For consistency with Forecast Risk Adjustment (1), we continue to assume an EBITDA volatility of 50.0% and 0.951 as a random draw from a standard normal distribution. The calculated value represents only one simulated path assuming EBITDA is earned at the mid-period; the valuation specialist will choose an appropriate number of iterations (paths) that ensures the required convergence of results.

3859 Required Metric Risk Premium = Risk-adjusting discount rate – Risk-free rate

3860 The implication is that neither of the two methods should be considered superior since the two
3861 methods are theoretically equivalent. In practice, it can be the case that practitioners using the two
3862 methods come to different conclusions, but this is due to differences in the methodology used to
3863 estimate the RMRP (see Section 5.2.2), not to differences caused by otherwise logically equivalent
3864 methods.

3865 *10.3.5 The Applicability of the Normal Distribution to Financial Metrics*

3866 The assumption that returns (or growth rates) of a financial investment are normally distributed has
3867 been debated since the advent of modern portfolio theory. The normal distribution assumption is
3868 generally applied as a simplification to ensure tractable results; any alternative assumption
3869 significantly increases the complexity of the model.¹⁴⁵

3870 In finance, the most common criticism of the normal distribution assumption is that it is not a heavy-
3871 tailed distribution and therefore does not adequately capture the significant deviations from the mean
3872 that have been empirically observed in financial markets. Despite this well-founded criticism as well
3873 as the existence of heavy-tailed alternative models, the general applications of the Capital Asset
3874 Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Black-Scholes-Merton Options pricing framework make use of the
3875 normal distribution assumption, and are among the most widely used models in finance today. The
3876 main reasons for maintaining the normal distribution assumption, despite contradictory empirical
3877 evidence and better fitting models, is ease of use and intuitive results. Extensive research, closed-form
3878 solutions, and convenient mathematical properties have also contributed to the wide application of the
3879 normal distribution in finance.

3880 To date there have been two main criticisms of the normal distribution assumption as *applied to*
3881 *financial metrics* such as revenue or EBITDA, namely, (a) that the tails of the normal distribution are
3882 too heavy¹⁴⁶ and can result in metric growth rates that are too extreme; and (b) assuming that growth
3883 rates of the underlying metric are normally distributed results in a lognormal distribution for the
3884 underlying metric, which precludes the possibility of the underlying metric going negative.

3885 For the first (“tails too heavy”) criticism, there are few models commonly used in practice that have
3886 tails thinner than a normal distribution. However, a financial metric that has thin tails can in most cases
3887 be adequately modeled using a normal distribution with a commensurately low volatility assumption.
3888 There may be cases, however, where the underlying metric has a definite limit (e.g., a production
3889 constraint could limit the near-term upside for revenues) and the probability of reaching this limit is
3890 significant. In such cases, the use of the normal distribution might not be appropriate. An alternative
3891 is to transform the (constrained or thin-tailed) distribution in a manner that is consistent with modeling
3892 in a risk-neutral framework, as discussed in Wang (2002).

3893 For the second criticism, it is true that a lognormal distribution cannot fully represent the distribution
3894 of a metric that can go negative, such as an earnings-based metric. Fortunately, earnouts are typically
3895 structured to incentivize substantially positive earnings, in which case the impact of modeling negative
3896 outcomes as if they were small, positive outcomes is often negligible. However, there are cases where
3897 the probability of future earnings going negative is not *de minimis* and has a significant impact on the

¹⁴⁵ As described in Section 5.4.3, there is an exception related to diversifiable events. If the metric distribution is substantially lumpy or asymmetric due to future diversifiable events (such as success of product development efforts), it is relatively straightforward to incorporate the impact of the resolution of such events on the metric distribution into the modeling.

¹⁴⁶ In contrast to equities, where the criticism is that the tails of the normal distribution are *not wide enough*, revenue and EBITDA might tend to have *narrower* tails than a normal distribution due to real world constraints such as, for example, capacity (on the high end) and already booked or repeat business (on the low end).

3898 value of the contingent consideration. In such cases, one can still maintain the normal distribution
3899 assumption either by basing the model on pre-earnings financial metrics (such as revenues) or via the
3900 use of more sophisticated techniques. These alternatives are described in more detail in Section 10.3.6.

3901 While the application of the normal distribution to equity/asset returns has become widely accepted,
3902 and the application of options theory to financial assets that are not traded in the market has been
3903 around for more than 20 years (see Section 10.3.7), the use of a normal distribution to model growth
3904 rates of underlying financial metrics is relatively new in the context of contingent consideration
3905 valuation. At least some justification for the use of the normal distribution to model financial metrics
3906 can be inferred from the correlation between movements in a company's equity/asset value and its
3907 financial metrics. However, similar to most applications in finance, the primary reasons for applying
3908 the normal distribution assumption to financial metrics are ease of use and mathematical tractability.
3909 In particular, the normal distribution assumption facilitates the use of a risk-neutral framework that
3910 can easily incorporate the impact of the nonlinear payoff structure of an earnout into the valuation.
3911 The normal distribution assumption is also the limiting case of a random walk and is generally justified
3912 by the central limit theorem. As such, the normal distribution tends to be a natural and objectively
3913 defensible model for financial metrics where there is no well-established alternative.

3914 *10.3.6 Characteristics of a Geometric Brownian Motion, Extensions and Alternatives*

3915 As discussed in Sections 5.4.3 and 10.3.5, when the characteristics of a GBM are substantially
3916 deficient (or contradict) the distribution of the underlying metric being modelled *and* this deficiency is
3917 anticipated to have a significant impact on the value of the earnout, then a valuation specialist should
3918 consider alternative models that resolve these deficiencies.

3919 Below are some key characteristics of a GBM to consider when determining whether it is an
3920 appropriate model. A GBM process S_t has the following properties:

- 3921 • Growth rate of S_t is assumed to be normally distributed (i.e. $\text{Log}(S_t/S_{t-1}) \sim \text{Normal}$)
 - 3922 ○ Alternative models with non-normal increments could be considered (for example, one
3923 may be able to apply a more generalized Lévy process).
- 3924 • S_t is always positive
 - 3925 ○ If there is a significant probability of the earnout metric going negative and this would
3926 significantly impact the earnout payment, then the valuation specialist may want to
3927 consider a model that allows the metric to go negative.
 - 3928 ○ For example, suppose EBITDA has a substantial probability of being negative in one year
3929 and clawback payments are based on one-year EBITDA thresholds that are negative. Then
3930 the valuation specialist could consider performing the entire analysis based on revenues
3931 (converting thresholds, caps, tiers, etc. from EBITDA to a corresponding revenue amount).
3932 Since revenues are typically not negative, the issue is circumvented.
 - 3933 ○ Alternatively, if conversion to revenues is problematic, the valuation specialist could
3934 assume Arithmetic Brownian Motion (ABM) for the underlying metric. ABM allows the
3935 underlying metric to go negative while still preserving the tractable properties of the normal
3936 distribution assumption.
 - 3937 ○ Yet another option is to transform the distribution to a non-negative distribution in a
3938 manner that is consistent with modeling in a risk-neutral framework, as discussed in Wang
3939 (2002).

- 3940 • S_t is continuous with respect to time t (i.e. there are no “jumps”)
- 3941 ○ If the distribution has jumps (is “lumpy”) due only to the uncertainty around a small
- 3942 number of discrete events with *diversifiable* risk, such as outcomes of R&D programs, the
- 3943 valuation specialist can often take such diversifiable events into account via defining
- 3944 scenarios based on the outcomes of these diversifiable events, computing the payoffs in
- 3945 those scenarios (which no longer have a “lumpy” distribution and so are appropriate for
- 3946 the application of a GBM), and probability-weighting the payoffs in those scenarios.¹⁴⁷
- 3947 ○ If there are significant discrete drops or jumps in the metric distribution due to a *non-*
- 3948 *diversifiable* risk, one may want to consider a model that allows for these “jumps” like a
- 3949 jump diffusion model.

3950 • $\text{Correlation}(S_t, S_{t+k}) = (e^{\sigma^2 t} - 1) / \sqrt{(e^{\sigma^2 t} - 1)(e^{\sigma^2(t+k)} - 1)}$

- 3951 ○ Subsequent realizations of a GBM usually have a strong positive correlation (> 50%). This
- 3952 characteristic is also generally true for subsequent financial metrics. However, if this
- 3953 assumption is significantly deficient (e.g. if subsequent year’s financial metric is
- 3954 anticipated to be negatively correlated with each prior year) and this has a significant
- 3955 impact on the value of the earnout, then the valuation specialist may want to model each
- 3956 period-specific underlying metric as a separate GBM, and apply a specific correlation
- 3957 between the GBMs.

- 3958 • Volatility of S_t is a known constant (or a known deterministic function)
- 3959 ○ Alternative models to GBM can assume that volatility has its own stochastic process, for
- 3960 example, the Heston Model.¹⁴⁸

3961 Models such as Arithmetic Brownian Motion, a more generalized Lévy process, and the Heston Model

3962 generally increase complexity and can introduce additional issues as compared to a GBM. These

3963 models are less well understood and have been less frequently studied as compared to the widely

3964 applied GBM. Since consideration should be given to the trade-off between computational complexity

3965 versus a more accurate representation of the real-world metric distribution, the usage of these

3966 alternative models should be rare.

3967 *10.3.7 Academic Support for Use of OPM for Non-Traded Financial Metrics*

3968 The academic support for the concepts presented in this Valuation Advisory starts with the literature

3969 on option pricing theory. Examples of this vast literature that are referenced in this Valuation Advisory

3970 include the 1973 papers “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities” by Black and Scholes and

3971 the “Theory of Rational Option Pricing” by Merton, the 1979 *Journal of Financial Economics* article

3972 “Option pricing: A Simplified Approach,” by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein and the textbook *Principles*

3973 *of Corporate Finance* by Brealey, Myers, and Allen.

3974 More specific to the application of options theory to assets and liabilities that are not traded in the

3975 market is the literature on real options. Textbooks on this topic were published starting in the 1990s.

3976 Examples of textbooks on real options include *Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives* by Hull (first

3977 published in 1995, see e.g., Chapter 34, “Real Options” in the 2011 edition), *An Applied Course in*

¹⁴⁷ Similar modeling of such events should also be included in the valuation of the business, if the resolution of the uncertainty significantly impacts the value of the business.

¹⁴⁸ Heston (1993), “A Closed-Form Solution for Options with Stochastic Volatility with Applications to Bond and Currency Options.”

3978 *Real Options* by Shockley (2006), and *Real Options: A Practitioner's Guide* by Copeland and
3979 Antikarov (2001).

3980 There is also a robust literature associated with the insurance industry on pricing risks, including the
3981 pricing of contingent payoffs where the underlying asset or liability is not traded. See, for example,
3982 “Modern Valuation Techniques” (Jarvis et al., 2001) and “A Universal Framework for Pricing
3983 Financial and Insurance Risks” (Wang 2002).

3984 The literature specific to valuing earnouts (as opposed to the more general literature on the application
3985 of options theory to valuation of untraded assets/liabilities in general) was thin until recently. This was
3986 part of the motivation for this Valuation Advisory. The literature includes a 2005 textbook by Arzac
3987 entitled *Valuations for Mergers, Buyouts, and Restructuring* (see chapter 10.6 in this textbook,
3988 “Earnouts as Options on Future Cash Flows”), a 2009 *Business Valuation Review* article by Tallau
3989 entitled “The Value of Earn Out Clauses: an options based approach”¹⁴⁹ and a 2012 *European Journal*
3990 *of Operation Research* article by Lukas, Reuer and Welling entitled “Earnouts in merger and
3991 acquisitions: a game theoretic option pricing approach.” Members of the Working Group and other
3992 valuation professionals have also made numerous presentations on this topic at various conferences,
3993 including conferences of the American Society of Appraisers and the American Institute of Certified
3994 Public Accountants dating back at least to 2009.

3995 The literature on estimating betas is extensive, and includes literature on asset betas, revenue betas,
3996 issues relating to short vs. long-term betas, etc. Examples of the literature related to revenue betas
3997 (which tends to be less well known than the literature on betas more generally) include the textbooks
3998 by Hull (2011) and Brealey, Myers and Allen (2013), along with *Cost of Capital* by Pratt and
3999 Grabowski (2014).

4000 Lastly, we note that in general for business valuation, the models don't change depending on whether
4001 what's being valued is a public (traded) or private (untraded) business. The same is true for options.
4002 We therefore end this section by quoting Stewart Myers:¹⁵⁰

4003 “A misunderstanding you run into is the idea that it is somehow inappropriate to use option
4004 pricing techniques in a corporate setting when you are dealing with non-traded assets. You
4005 hear this again and again from very sophisticated people. And it reflects a misunderstanding
4006 of what corporate finance is all about...”

4007 **10.4 References**

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